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I n t r o du c t i o n 	“As	we	move	from	one	rhetorical	climate	deadline	to	another,	there	is	a	real	danger	that	a	hyperventilating	condition	of	despair	and	panic	will	lead	society	into	making	either	hubristic	or	authoritarian	responses	to	climate	change.	Before	we	realise	it,	we	may	see	Paul	Crutzen’s	howitzers	pumping	shell	after	shell	of	aerosols	into	the	stratosphere	to	wage	an	almost	literal	war	on	climate	change.”	(Hulme,	2014a)	What	Mike	Hulme	warns	us	against	in	his	book	on	different	climate	understandings	is	a	rhetorically	induced	one-sided	condition	of	fear,	which	may	motivate	us	into	drastic	counteractions	while	at	the	same	time	blinding	us	to	important	opportunities.	In	order	to	translate	Mike	Hulme’s	proposal	for	a	rethinking	of	climate	change	into	more	psychological	terms,	vigilantly	scanning	our	environment	for	indications	of	danger	in	a	motivational	emphasis	to	prevent	climate	change	catastrophes	might	constitute	an	inappropriate	self-regulatory	focus.		Such	a	motivational	emphasis	becomes	apparent	in	current	debates	on	climate	change,	which	predominantly	revolve	around	the	prevention	of	risks,	for	example,	when	scholars	encourage	their	readers	to	view	climate	change	as	a	global	risk	management	problem	(Wagner	&	Weitzman,	2015),	or	when	they	portray	the	challenges	of	climate	communication	as	being	mainly	an	issue	of	how	dangers	and	risks	are	presented	or	perceived	(e.g.,	Leiserowitz,	2005).		The	present	work	therefore	makes	the	proposition	that	current	debates	on	climate	change	may	overemphasize	the	motivational	focus	of	prevention	in	the	sense	of	regulatory	focus	theory	(Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011),	possibly	hindering	necessary	societal	
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changes,	or	giving	rise	to	debates	around	technological	fixes	such	as	climate	engineering	that	might	well	prove	to	be	a	deadlock	in	the	future	(Robock,	Jerch	&	Bunzl,	2008).	To	introduce	my	proposition,	I	will	first	present	current	framings	of	climate	change	around	issues	of	catastrophic	risk,	from	where	I	will	move	on	to	explain	the	concept	of	climate	engineering	technology.	Note	that	throughout	this	work	the	term	“framing”	is	used	in	a	broader	sense	than	the	term	known	from	Kahneman’s	work	on	cognitive	heuristics	and	biases	(Kahneman	&	Tversky,	2000)	and	denotes	“the	ways	in	which	social	actors	choose	to	organise	and	communicate,	or	‘frame’,	ideas	such	as	geoengineering“	(Bellamy,	2013,	p.1).	I	will	then	introduce	regulatory	focus	theory	and	explain	its	potential	to	understand	current	dominant	framings	around	prevention	in	the	climate	change	debate.	By	reference	to	the	idea	of	climate	engineering	as	an	exemplary	outcome	of	a	prevention	orientation,	I	will	then	provide	a	more	detailed	explanation	of	why	a	sole	focus	on	prevention	may	be	problematic.	To	substantiate	my	claim,	I	will	present	empirical	findings	to	show	that	a	shift	towards	a	promotion	focus	could	be	beneficial	in	our	dealings	with	climate	change	and	will	discuss	potential	practical	implications	of	how	to	undertake	a	shift	from	prevention	to	promotion	in	the	organizational	context	and	the	general	area	of	communication.	I	will	conclude	by	discussing	avenues	for	further	research	into	the	application	of	regulatory	focus	theory	to	the	domain	of	climate	change	and	its	more	general	application	to	behavior	towards	risk.		
P r e v en t i n g 	 c l ima t e 	 c h an g e 	 c a t a s t r o ph e 	 a nd 	 t h e 	 i d e a 	 o f 	
c l ima t e 	 e n g i n e e r i n g 	Decisions	about	the	pressing	environmental	issues	of	our	time	such	as	climate	change	means	dealing	with	uncertainty	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2013;	Lempert,	Nakicenovic,	Sarewitz,	Schlesinger,	2004;	Murphy	et	al.,	2004).	Confronted	with	a	multitude	of	factors	
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with	global	linkages	and	under	conditions	of	dynamic	change,	we	now	need	to	plan	for	time	scales	large	enough	to	make	reliable	prediction	extremely	difficult.	We	also	need	to	consider	a	long	and	presumably	incomplete	list	of	variables,	which	interact	in	ways	we	do	not	fully	understand.	Therefore,	the	amount	of	anticipatory	knowledge	is	limited,	and	despite	of	the	accumulation	of	knowledge	that	can	be	observed	in	between	the	release	dates	of	two	successive	reports	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC),	scientific	uncertainty	is	likely	to	remain	high.		Given	that	uncertainty	and	risk	are	defining	characteristics	of	the	situation	we	face	with	climate	change,	a	focus	on	risk,	and	especially	potential	catastrophic	risks	in	discourses	around	climate	change	may	be	understandable,	as	are	communication	efforts	to	persuade	a	wider	public	of	the	necessity	to	take	action.	However,	discussing	climate	change	in	a	context	which	present	this	phenomenon	as	a	problem	that	needs	to	be	solved,	a	risk	which	has	to	be	managed,	may	only	be	one	way	of	contextualizing	the	situation,	and	not	a	particularly	successful	one:	Despite	growing	international	awareness,	public	as	well	as	political	efforts	to	take	action	are	insufficient	while	at	the	same	time	a	general	consensus	on	how	to	act	is	missing.	The	idea	of	catastrophic	risk	in	the	climate	change	context	becomes	explicit	with	the	emergency	framing	of	climate	change	(Frantz	&	Mayer,	2009;	Schneider,	2011).	Despite	of	the	fact	that	it	is	not	clear	from	a	scientific	standpoint	how	a	“climate	emergency”	could	be	defined,	the	possibility	of	a	dramatic	shift	into	completely	new	and	unforeseen	states	with	potentially	catastrophic	consequences	is	increasingly	deemed	plausible	by	climate	experts	(Hamilton,	2013;	Lenton,	2011).		This	notion	challenges	the	idea	that	climate	change	is	happening	gradually	and	that	politics	can	adapt	gradually	as	well,	which	is	why	we	may	need	an	emergency	plan	other	than	emission	cuts	to	offset	
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the	worst	consequences.	Such	an	emergency	framing	of	climate	change	gave	rise	to	the	idea	of	climate	engineering	(CE).	CE	comprises	a	set	of	heterogeneous	technological	ideas,	which	(a)	aim	at	offsetting	the	temperature	effects	of	climate	change	by	reducing	the	amount	of	incoming	solar	radiation	(Solar	Radiation	Management)	or	(b)	aim	at	cancelling	out	rising	CO2	emissions	by	extracting	them	from	the	atmosphere	(Carbon	Dioxide	Removal).	The	notion	of	massively	intervening	into	the	climate	system	is	controversial	because	interventions	of	this	scope	can	be	expected	to	pose	severe	challenges	in	terms	of	environmental	and	societal	risk.	Even	basic	feasibility	studies	are	at	times	viewed	critically	because	they	may	lead	us	on	a	“slippery	slope”	to	eventual	deployment	(the	“slippery	slope”	argument;	Jamieson,	1996).		The	idea	of	a	possible	climate	emergency	as	a	justification	for	more	research	into,	development	of,	and	sometimes	eventual	deployment	of	climate	engineering	is	one	of	the	most	widely	used	contextual	framings	in	scientific	and	grey	literature	accounts	of	these	newly	emerging	technologies	(Bellamy,	Chilvers,	Vaughan	&	Lenton,	2012).	However,	this	“emergency	framing”	of	CE	has	also	been	criticized	for	narrowing	down	the	problem	space	in	a	way	that	prematurely	constrains	deliberation	of	alternatives.	(Horton,	2015;	Hulme,	2014;	Markusson,	Ginn,	Ghaleigh	&	Scott,	2014).	Moreover,	the	emergency	framing	constitutes	an	example	of	the	wide	prevalence	of	the	aspect	of	catastrophic	risk	in	political	and	scientific	discourses	around	climate	change,	which	are	largely	confined	within	a	risk	management	framework	(e.g.,	IPCC,	2014a,b;	Kunreuther,	Heal,	Allen,	Edenhofer,	Field	&	Yohe,	2013;	Wagner	&	Weitzman,	2015).	In	this	way,	one	of	the	most	important	arguments	–	and	a	seemingly	compelling	one	-	in	favor	of	research	and	eventual	deployment	of	CE	technology	has	been	challenged.	
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Additional	reservations	against	CE	as	a	means	to	tackle	catastrophic	climate	change	are	put	forward	in	our	own	work	in	which	we	argue	that	–from	a	psychological	point	of	view	-	a	false	sense	of	controllability	and	security	may	be	established	via	the	introduction	of	CE	into	the	problem	field,	especially	if	it	is	used	in	the	context	of	a	possible	climate	emergency	(Manuscript	1).	This	sense	of	controllability	may	prove	to	be	an	illusion	because	the	necessary	preconditions	for	adequate	control	of	a	complex	system	–	learning	with	the	help	of	several	feedback	cycles	-	are	not	met.	We	therefore	advocate	for	a	learner’s	approach	in	our	dealings	with	climate	change	with	adequate	communication	between	all	stakeholders		(e.g.,	political	decision-makers,	scientists,	civil	society)	as	one	necessary	precondition	to	facilitate	this	approach.	Similar	to	the	way	an	emergency	framing	of	CE	has	been	challenged	for	its	narrow	focus,	a	narrow	framing	of	climate	change	as	a	problem	of	multiple	risks	which	need	to	be	reduced,	has	also	been	challenged	for	its	potential	of	missing	important	opportunities	(Hulme,	2009).	However,	such	a	framing	not	only	affects	current	political	decision-making	processes	(IPCC,	2014a,b),	it	also	largely	influences	communication	with	lay	recipients	(Smith,	2005).	As	part	of	this	work,	I	have	empirically	demonstrated	that	the	ways	people	understand	and	make	sense	of	-	or	“frame”	-	a	complex	issue	such	as	CE	affect	their	attitude	and	decision	behavior	towards	it	(Manuscript	2).	Therefore,	a	critical	examination	of	dominant	frames	in	scientific	and	public	debates	as	well	as	their	responsible	use	appears	warranted.		
Regu l a t o r y 	 f o c u s 	 t h e o r y : 	 P r e v en t i n g 	 r i s k s 	 o r 	 a c h i e v i n g 	
s ome t h i n g 	 n ew ? 	The	“preventing	risk”	framework	in	which	the	climate	change	problem	is	discussed	might	overemphasize	a	focus	on	prevention	instead	of	promotion	in	the	sense	of	psychological	regulatory	focus	theory	(Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011).	According	to	this	
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theory,	a	prevention	focus	is	a	motivational	tendency	characterized	by	a	need	for	security	and	a	preservation	of	the	status	quo	rather	than	the	attainment	of	new	gains.	Regulatory	focus	theory	posits	that	a	prevention	focus	is	not	the	only	motivational	focus	we	can	adopt	to	regulate	our	behavior:	People	self-regulate	their	behavior	driven	by	varying	combinations	of	two	uncorrelated	motivational	tendencies:	a	focus	on	prevention	or	on	promotion.	People	with	a	prevention	focus	are	more	easily	motivated	by	security	and	safety	needs	and	the	avoidance	of	undesired	goal	states.	In	other	words,	these	people	are	more	in	alignment	with	goals	that	advocate	going	from	-1	(some	loss)	to	0	(the	status	quo	or	a	neutral	end-state)	rather	than	trying	to	achieve	+1	(a	gain).	On	the	other	hand,	people	with	an	active	promotion	focus	feel	a	better	‘regulatory	fit’	with	goals,	which	are	in	alignment	with	their	growth	and	advancement	needs	and	the	attainment	of	gains.	These	people	would	not	consider	the	status	quo	(a	‘0’)	a	desired	end-state,	but	would	seek	to	achieve	a	gain	(+1)	(Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011).	Because	the	two	motivational	foci	are	uncorrelated,	people	can	be	motivated	by	both	tendencies	in	varying	degrees,	also	depending	on	the	task	they	are	confronted	with.	However,	most	people	appear	to	have	a	general	preference	for	one	of	the	two	tendencies.		
C l ima t e 	 e n g i n e e r i n g : 	 A 	 f o c u s 	 o n 	 p r e v en t i o n 	In	Manuscript	1	of	this	work,	we	have	argued	that	CE	may	be	seen	as	a	tool	to	reduce	the	psychological	experience	of	uncertainty	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2013).	If	CE	is	a	tool	to	reduce	experienced	uncertainty,	a	prevention	focus	can	be	the	motivational	tendency	behind	the	adoption	of	such	a	tool.	In	other	words,	the	idea	of	climate	engineering	may	be	an	exemplary	outcome	of	a	preferential	focus	on	prevention.	In	a	similar	way,	authors	from	other	disciplines	have	advocated	for	the	necessity	of	a	new	societal	perspective	on	risk	in	the	context	of	climate	change	and	CE.	One	
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philosophy	author	argues,	for	example:	„Now	geoengineering	promises	possibilities	for	providing	the	conditions	that	allow	the	perpetuation	of	fossil	fuel	powered	neoliberalism	further	into	the	future.	Or	rather	it	might,	if	security	continues	to	be	formulated	in	terms	of	the	perpetuation	of	the	existing	political	order,	precisely	the	order	that	has	generated	such	dramatic	ecological	disruption	in	the	first	place.“	(Dalby,	2015,	p.	3).		In	this	example,	the	author	argues	that	CE	is	used	as	a	means	to	establish	or	return	to	a	status	quo	that	needs	to	be	preserved	rather	than	put	into	question.	In	other	words,	CE	is	the	means	to	satisfy	the	need	for	security	and	non-losses.	CE	is	an	option	intended	to	regulate	the	risks	of	climate	change	in	reference	to	a	goal	state	that	is	characterized	by	the	presence	or	absence	of	negative	outcomes.	It	is	not	a	means	designed	towards	a	goal	state	characterized	by	the	presence	or	absence	of	positive	achievements.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	intended	to	provide	us	with	an	idea	of	how	a	“better”	or	more	sustainable	world	could	look	like,	but	it	aims	at	largely	preserving	the	status	quo	while	trying	to	prevent	the	worst	from	happening.	Regulatory	focus	theory	does	not	imply	that	prevention-	and	promotion-focused	individuals	necessarily	differ	in	the	overall	aim	they	want	to	achieve	(e.g.,	sustainability).	However,	they	should	differ	in	the	strategies	they	prefer	to	reach	their	goal:	“…when	individuals	have	fallen	below	the	status	quo,	as	in	a	stock	investment	paradigm,	prevention-focus	strength,	but	not	promotion-focus	strength,	predicts	a	willingness	to	take	risks	that	may	possibly	return	participants	to	the	status	quo”	(Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011,	p.	150).	In	the	context	of	climate	change,	an	anticipated	fall	below	the	status	quo	(anticipated	losses	due	to	climate	change)	might	trigger	a	motivation	to	do	whatever	necessary,	even	if	very	risky	in	itself	(such	as	CE),	to	return	to	the	status	quo.	From	a	
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promotion	focus,	the	idea	of	CE	must	sound	a	little	less	intriguing	because	nothing	more	positive	is	attained	by	it	than	what	we	have	today.	Thus,	a	strengthened	focus	on	prevention	more	than	a	promotion	focus	would	heighten	the	willingness	to	consider	a	risky	strategy	such	as	CE	to	ensure	the	status	quo.	In	a	similar	vein,	many	participants	in	our	study	(Manuscript	2)	used	CE	as	a	potential	means	to	insure	against	the	risks	of	mitigation	failure,	possibly	as	a	result	of	an	implicit	focus	on	the	prevention	of	losses	as	opposed	to	the	achievement	of	gains:	climate	change	as	well	as	the	decision	alternatives	provided	to	the	participants	were	clearly	conceptualized	in	terms	of	potential	losses	and	non-losses	rather	than	in	terms	of	gains	and	non-gains,	as	revealed	by	the	information	they	inquired	about	(e.g.,	questions	concerning	negative	consequences	were	four	times	more	common	than	questions	on	positive	consequences),	and	the	thought	processes	they	expressed.	This	focus	on	risks	and	losses	by	our	participants	is	especially	noteworthy	because	in	the	introduction	to	the	scenario	task,	the	potentiality	of	a	loss	resulting	either	from	climate	change	or	any	of	the	options	was	not	explicitly	mentioned.	Additional	support	for	the	claim	that	an	endorsement	of	CE	may	be	the	result	of	a	prevention	focus	more	than	a	promotion	focus	can	be	drawn	from	the	empirical	finding	that	a	promotion	focus	is	associated	with	a	higher	sense	of	control	and	with	a	lower	tendency	to	predict	trend	reversals	or	sudden	shifts	(such	as	a	climate	emergency	due	to	a	tipping-induced	qualitative	climate	regime	shift)	in	a	generally	stable	trend	(such	as	gradual	warming)	(Guo	&	Spina,	2015).	A	prevention	focused	individual’s	sense	of	control	would	therefore	be	lower,	while	such	an	individual	would	also	deem	a	possible	climate	emergency	to	be	more	plausible.	Both	would	lead	to	a	greater	endorsement	of	CE	technology	to	re-establish	one’s	sense	of	control.		
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From	a	broader	sociological	viewpoint,	the	consequences	of	a	collective	emphasis	on	prevention	were	already	described	within	Ulrich	Beck’s	seminal	work	about	the	“world	risk	society”.	In	this	sense,	the	entire	debate	among	researchers	whether	CE	technology	might	be	a	good	idea	to	deal	with	climate	change,	might	stem	from	a	general	perspective	on	risk	and	uncertainty	in	terms	of	what	Ulrich	Beck	calls	the	“risk	contract”:	“That	a	risk	contract	is	a	possible	or	necessary	response	to	the	adventure	involved	in	opening	up	and	conquering	new	markets	and	in	developing	and	implementing	new	technologies	is	a	social	invention	…	that	was	extended	to	almost	all	social	problem	areas	and	gradually	perfected	with	the	emergence	of	national	capitalism.	Consequences	that	at	first	affect	individuals	become	‘risks’,	that	is,	systemic,	statistically	describable,	and	hence,	‘calculable’	event	types	that	can	be	subsumed	under	supra-individual	compensation	and	avoidance	rules.”	(Beck,	2009,	p.	7).	Beck	challenges	these	traditional	dealings	with	risk	because	the	premise	on	which	the	“state-sanctioned	risk	contract”	was	enacted,	is	no	longer	prevailing.	Therefore,	he	challenges	the	assumption	“…that	it	is	possible	to	control	and	compensate	for	industrially	generated	insecurities	and	dangers,	an	assumption	which	is	central	to	the	risk	contract.”	(p.	7)	A	generalized	and	unbalanced	motivational	focus	on	prevention	may	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	the	“risk	society”	in	Ulrich	Beck’s	sense.	Furthermore,	this	unbalanced	focus	poses	several	problems	such	as	an	overemphasis	on	the	status	quo	or	the	prevention	of	necessary	changes.	A	framework	of	self-regulation	with	its	regulatory	focus	theory	might	offer	a	new	perspective	to	these	problems	in	that	it	provides	us	with	an	idea	how	an	alternative	approach	could	look	like:	How	could	a	stronger	focus	on	promotion	be	beneficial	in	our	dealings	with	climate	change?	
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A 	 f o c u s 	 o n 	 p r omo t i o n : 	 F i n d i n g 	 c r e a t i v e 	 s o l u t i o n s 	 f o r 	 c l ima t e 	
c h an g e 	 	A	focus	on	promotion	has	been	found	to	be	advantageous	in	organizational	and	team	contexts,	in	which	it	fosters	creativity,	and	innovation	(Shin	et	al.,	2016;	Shin,	2014;	Wallace	et	al.,	2016;	Zhou	et	al.,	2012).	Because	innovation	and	the	finding	of	creative	solutions	will	be	a	crucial	factor	if	we	want	to	effectively	respond	to	climate	change	(e.g.,	Holdren,	2006),	what	implications	may	these	findings	have	for	the	climate	change	domain?	As	part	of	this	work,	we	have	identified	various	characteristics	of	the	climate	change	problem,	which	affect	a	decision-maker’s	ability	to	adequately	control	its	dynamics,	such	as	a	network	of	interacting	variables,	or	scientific	uncertainty	with	regard	to	influencing	factors,	their	interactions,	and	resulting	future	trends	(Manuscript	1).	These	characteristics	necessitate	that	problem	solvers	perform	specific	cognitive	tasks	to	effectively	deal	with	them	including	building	an	adequate	mental	representation	of	the	problem,	or	predicting	future	trends.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	outline	the	results	of	several	studies,	which	demonstrate	positive	effects	of	a	promotion	focus	on	the	performance	of	several	of	these	tasks	relevant	to	problem-solvers	in	the	context	of	climate	change	including	(a)	the	achievement	of	an	adequate	problem	representation,	(b)	an	endorsement	of	dynamic	change,	(c)	a	flexible	up-dating	of	mental	models	as	well	as	(d)	the	development	of	sufficient	motivational	persistence	to	facilitate	learning.	Given	that,	with	climate	change,	political	decisions	taken	at	this	point	in	time	will	affect	all	of	humanity	for	the	coming	decades	and	even	centuries,	other	stakeholders	including	the	public	should	be	included	as	much	as	possible	in	respective	decision-making	processes.	Therefore,	the	results	I	am	going	to	present	do	not	only	pertain	to	political	decision-makers,	but	civil	society	as	a	
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whole	because	political	decisions	need	to	be	supported	by	the	people,	or	because	solutions	may	even	be	more	effective	when	found	and	implemented	in	bottom-up	processes	than	in	a	political	top-down	process	(Ostrom,	1990).	This	means	that	each	member	of	society	may	be	regarded	as	a	problem	solver	and	not	merely	as	a	passive	recipient	of	climate	policy	decisions.	(a)	Achievement	of	an	accurate	problem	representation.	An	accurate	representation	of	the	problem	is	a	crucial	prerequisite	for	the	finding	of	better	and	more	accurate	solutions	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2013;	Reiter-Palmon,	Mumford,	O'Connor,	Boes	&	Runco,	1997).	In	the	complex	domain	of	climate	change,	this	necessitates	a	certain	degree	of	engagement	in	the	problem	identification	process	not	only	on	the	side	of	political	decision	makers	but	also	by	members	of	the	public.	If	there	is	high	engagement	in	the	process	of	understanding	the	problem,	it	will	be	more	likely	that	different	views	and	additional	alternatives	are	being	considered,	and	that	hereby	a	more	accurate	representation	of	the	problem	is	achieved.		Our	own	work	demonstrates	that	people	differ	considerably	in	the	time	and	effort	they	put	into	this	first	step	of	a	problem	solving	process:	the	establishment	of	an	accurate	problem	representation	(Manuscript	2).	Interestingly,	a	higher	engagement	in	the	problem	identification	process	and	a	higher	likelihood	of	the	consideration	of	additional	alternatives	is	associated	with	a	promotion	focus	because	it	makes	it	more	likely	that	the	“correct”	alternative	(a	“hit”)	is	included,	and	because	promotion	focused	individuals	are	less	sensitive	to	“false	alarms”	(Henker,	Sonnentag	&	Unger,	2015;	Liberman	et	al.,	2001).	Prevention	oriented	individuals,	on	the	other	hand,	are	less	inclined	to	simultaneously	endorse	alternative	hypotheses	but	prefer	to	make	a	quick	decision	for	one	explanation	to	ensure	against	“false	alarms”,	an	error	of	commission	rather	than	an	error	of	omission.		
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To	achieve	a	more	accurate	problem	representation	of	the	complexities	of	climate	change,	we	also	need	to	be	able	to	identify	connections	and	overarching	themes	between	individual	pieces	of	data,	which	may	also	include	the	identification	of	distal	and	non-obvious	relationships	between	factors	(cf.	Amelung	&	Funke,	2013).	Such	processes	are	facilitated	by	a	relational	elaboration	style	rather	than	an	item-specific	elaboration	style,	which	examines	the	details	of	individual	factors	independent	of	others.	A	relational	elaboration	style	has	been	found	to	be	adopted	primarily	by	promotion	focused	individuals	(Zhu	&	Meyers-Levy,	2007).	Similar	to	a	relational	elaboration	style,	the	ability	to	identify	connections	between	seemingly	unrelated	events	or	trends,	to	“connect	the	dots”	and	hereby	recognize	underlying	patterns	in	a	complex	environment	has	also	been	found	to	be	crucial	for	the	recognition	of	opportunity	in	the	business	sector	(Baron	&	Ensley,	2006).	Opportunity	recognition	may	therefore	be	one	of	the	beneficial	outcomes	of	a	relational	elaboration	style.	This	could	be	the	mechanism	behind	findings,	which	indicate	that	promotion	focused	individuals	also	show	an	increased	tendency	to	recognize	opportunities	and	that	they	identify	opportunities	characterized	by	higher	degrees	of	innovation	(Tumasjan	&	Braun,	2012).	Scholars	have	argued	that	to	effectively	deal	with	climate	change,	important	opportunities	should	not	be	missed	because	connections	between	seemingly	disparate	items	are	not	perceived.	The	argument	is	that	by	broadening	our	focus	and	making	these	connections,	we	could	increase	the	odds	to	achieve	our	climate	policy	goals.	For	example,	looking	at	alternative	sustainable	development	paths,	or	global	investment	opportunities	could	be	more	efficient	in	our	dealings	with	climate	change	than	climate	policies	which	narrowly	focus	on	the	difficult	balance	between	minimizing	or	adapting	to	climate	change	impacts	and	restricting	domestic	cost	(Robinson	et	al.,	2006).	Thus,	
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opportunity	recognition	based	on	a	relational	elaboration	style,	both	of	which	are	associated	with	a	promotion	focus,	can	be	regarded	as	important	prerequisites	for	our	ability	to	cope	with	and	avert	future	negative	impacts	of	climate	change.		(b)	Endorsement	of	dynamic	change.	We	have	also	established	in	Manuscript	1	that	an	important	characteristic	of	the	complex	problem	of	climate	change	is	the	lack	of	stability	of	the	environment	we	seek	to	control.	In	other	words,	we	have	to	deal	with	the	dynamics	of	the	different	overlapping	(social	and	natural)	systems,	which	compound	other	uncertainties	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2013).	In	these	kinds	of	highly	dynamic	and	unstable	environments,	which	are	characterized	by	high	amounts	of	uncertainty,	managers’	and	CEOs’	promotion	focus	has	been	found	to	be	more	beneficial	for	venture	performance	than	a	focus	on	prevention	only.	The	authors	of	one	of	these	studies	have	found	this	relationship	to	be	mediated	by	managers’	endorsement	of	changes	in	the	business	concept	rather	than	a	clinging	to	original	concepts	(Hmieleski	&	Baron,	2008;	Wallace	et	al.,	2010).	Therefore,	a	focus	on	promotion	may	be	more	suited	to	adequately	respond	to	the	uncertainties	of	climate	change	than	a	focus	on	prevention	because	the	former	induces	a	higher	willingness	to	endorse	necessary	changes.		(c)	Flexible	up-dating	and	learning.	In	Manuscript	1,	we	have	advocated	for	a	learner’s	approach	to	cope	with	the	changing	demands	of	a	complex	and	highly	uncertain	environment.	Such	an	approach	requires	the	ability	to	flexibly	adapt	one’s	mental	model	and	to	reframe	the	problem	based	on	the	integration	of	new	information	or	based	on	changing	demands	of	the	environment	such	as	shifting	goals	etc.	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2013).	The	climate	change	problem	can	be	framed	within	multiple	potential	categories,	which	in	turn	will	activate	specific	pertinent	approaches	and	goals.	For	example,	framed	as	an	economic	problem,	climate	change	will	in	most	cases	be	assessed	within	a	cost-
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benefit	framework	with	cost	reduction	and	welfare	maximization	as	associated	goals.	Climate	change	may	also	be	categorized	as	an	issue	of	equity	between	nations	or	generations,	warranting	the	establishment	of	compensation	rules,	as	a	security	issue,	determining	negotiations	over	legal	frameworks	and	international	treaties,	or	as	a	global	catastrophe	calling	for	a	risk	management	approach.	The	ability	to	simultaneously	hold	these	categories	within	conscious	access	as	well	as	to	adaptively	shift	between	them	based	on	changes	in	the	environment	is	crucial	to	facilitate	a	learner’s	approach.	Such	an	ability	can	be	termed	cognitive	flexibility.	Cognitive	flexibility	or	the	ability	to	access	and	retrieve	ideas	from	different	semantic	categories	as	well	as	the	capacity	to	switch	between	categories	and	goals	is	associated	with	a	promotion	focus	(Baas,	De	Dreu	&	Nijstad,	2008).		(d)	Development	of	sufficient	motivational	persistence	to	enable	learning.	Promotion	focused	individuals	have	been	found	to	perform	better	at	difficult	tasks,	and	to	be	less	likely	to	quit	a	difficult	task	after	failure	(i.e.,	to	be	more	persistent),	because	they	are	less	vigilant	towards	losses	(Crowe	&	Higgins,	1997).	Thus,	a	promotion	focus	may	provide	us	with	the	necessary	persistence	in	our	motivation	to	tackle	climate	change.	This	could	be	especially	important	given	the	amount	of	findings,	which	demonstrate	psychological	“numbing”	to	the	issue	of	climate	change	due	to	negative	representations	of	“failure”	and	“doom”	in	the	media	(Moser,	2007).		In	sum,	a	promotion	focus	appears	to	enhance	a	person’s	problem	solving	skills	in	ways,	which	are	especially	adaptive	in	highly	complex,	uncertain	and	unstable	environments.	Therefore,	a	more	balanced	focus	towards	promotion	may	indeed	be	more	beneficial	to	effectively	deal	with	the	complexities	and	ambiguities	of	climate	change	than	a	sole	focus	on	prevention,	especially	in	the	face	of	difficulty	and	drawbacks.	
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If	this	is	the	case,	how	can	a	shift	towards	a	more	pronounced	focus	on	promotion	be	achieved	in	the	climate	change	context?	Even	if	regulatory	focus	is	conceptualized	as	a	chronic	personal	tendency,	it	has	been	shown	in	numerous	studies	that	a	specific	regulatory	focus	can	also	be	induced	by	simple	environmental	cues,	including	task	instructions	with	an	emphasis	on	the	attainment	of	gains	(promotion)	or	the	avoidance	of	losses	(prevention),	for	example	(e.g.,	Keller	&	Bless,	2006).		In	addition,	shifts	in	regulatory	focus	have	also	been	observed	as	a	result	of	specific	leadership	styles	in	the	organizational	context	or	as	a	consequence	of	certain	framings	in	communication.	In	its	applications	to	the	organizational,	leadership,	and	communication	contexts,	these	results	may	be	useful	to	improve	the	design	of	efficient	climate	policies	or	climate	communication	processes	between	stakeholders.	I	will	therefore	discuss	the	potential	of	these	two	applications	of	regulatory	focus	theory	to	(a)	the	organizational	context	and	(b)	to	the	communication	context	as	potential	starting	points	to	achieve	a	shift	in	our	collective	focus	from	prevention	to	promotion,	and	will	discuss	avenues	of	future	research.		
P r a c t i c a l 	 imp l i c a t i o n s : 	 p r omo t i n g 	 c h an g e 	 i n 	 t h e 	
o r g an i z a t i o n a l 	 c o n t e x t 	Insights	on	how	to	capitalize	on	the	advantages	of	a	promotion	focus	in	the	domain	of	climate	policy-making	may	be	drawn	from	studies	in	leadership	and	organizational	contexts,	which	treated	specific	regulatory	states	such	as	the	promotion	focus	as	the	outcome	variable.	For	example,	a	focus	on	promotion	has	been	found	to	be	induced	by	transformational	leadership	behaviors.	Originally	observed	by	political	scientist	James	Burns	(1978,	2003)	in	political	leaders	such	as	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	the	concept	was	later	applied	to	the	
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organizational	context	(Bass,	1990).	Transformational	leadership	behaviors	include	challenging	dominant	perspectives	(the	status	quo),	articulating	a	vision	(making	the	positive	outcomes	more	salient),	hereby	shifting	the	focus	away	from	security	concerns	to	the	necessary	task,	and	fostering	cooperation	in	pursuit	of	a	common	goal	(Bass,	1990).	Via	the	induction	of	a	focus	on	promotion,	a	transformational	leadership	style	has	been	shown	to	foster	creative	problem-solving	(Henker,	Sonnentag	&	Unger,	2015).	Because	conflicting	goals	or	security	concerns	are	among	the	major	barriers	to	climate	action	as	identified	by	The	‘American	Psychological	Association’s	Task	Force	on	the	Interface	Between	Psychology	and	Global	Climate	Change’	(Swim	et	al.,	2009),		a	transformational	leadership	style	may	be	especially	well	suited	to	address	these	issues	within	an	organizational	context	(such	as	the	business	sector).		Furthermore,	policies	as	well	as	leadership	behaviors,	which	address	these	issues	may	be	effective	in	promoting	necessary	transformational	processes	on	different	levels	in	the	climate	policy	domain.	Existing	literature	on	leadership	in	the	climate	policy	domain	addresses	the	who,	the	why,	and	the	how	of	leadership	(Karlsson	et	al.,	2011).	Regulatory	focus	theory	could	provide	a	framework	to	understand	‘why’	specific	ways	of	leadership	may	be	important	to	achieve	specific	climate	policy	goals,	and	may	also	provide	tentative	answers	to	the	’how’,	given	that	inappropriate	leadership	behaviors	have	been	discussed	as	one	of	the	critical	barriers	to	necessary	changes	in	climate	policies,	such	as	adaptation	(Moser	&	Ekstrom,	2010).	However,	an	awareness	of	the	different	levels	on	which	leadership	may	play	a	role	(local,	national,	international)	is	warranted	in	the	climate	policy	domain	because	it	is	more	complex	than	the	domain	of	single	organizations.	This	means	that	entire	nations	or	economic-political	unions	of	member	states	can	act	as	leaders,	and	on	each	level,	there	may	be	more	than	one	leader	(e.g.,	the	EU	or	China)	(Karlsson	et	al.,	2011).	Still,	
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research	on	leadership	styles	such	as	the	transformative	style	may	serve	as	an	inspiration	to	derive	guidelines	for	an	effective	implementation	of	necessary	transformative	processes	via	climate	policies	on	regional	and	local	levels,	for	example.		
P r a c t i c a l 	 imp l i c a t i o n s : 	 p r omo t i n g 	 c h an g e 	 i n 	 c ommun i c a t i o n 	Present	conceptualizations	of	climate	change	in	scientific	and	public	debates	largely	revolve	around	the	prevention	of	losses.	For	example,	communication	with	the	public	is	currently	focused	for	the	most	part	on	persuading	wider	masses	of	the	severity	of	anticipated	climate	change	impacts,	at	the	same	time	stressing	the	urgency	to	take	action	(Moser,	2009;	Pearce,	Brown,	Nerlich	&	Koteyko,	2015).	It	can	be	assumed	that	a	sole	focus	on	the	avoidance	of	harm,	in	terms	of	losses	and	non-losses,	may	self-perpetuate	a	societal	debate	of	climate	change	under	the	one-sided	focus	of	prevention.	This	may	be	true	for	the	public,	which	is	exposed	to	respective	media	framings,	as	well	as	political	decision	makers	who	are	exposed	to	expert	debate	around	the	prevention	of	risks	(e.g.,	Wagner	&	Weitzman,	2015).	Because,	as	I	have	established,	the	prevention	focus	may	not	be	a	suitable	approach	under	conditions	of	uncertain	change,	this	has	wide	implications	for	the	area	of	risk	communication	and	how	climate	change	and	climate	engineering	are	put	into	context	in	scientific	and	political	debates.		For	example,	framing	the	climate	change	problem	in	terms	of	the	avoidance	of	risk	may	produce	less	“regulatory	fit”	with	certain	audiences	and	may	therefore	elicit	psychological	reactance.	Empirical	evidence	for	this	idea	comes	from	a	recent	study	which	showed	that	framing	climate	change	in	terms	of	the	achievement	of	gains,	such	as	a	more	caring	society	or	technological	progress,	was	able	to	motivate	more	pro-environmental	action	intentions	in	climate	deniers	than	framing	it	in	terms	of	the	avoidance	of	risk	(Bain	et	al.,	2012).	In	a	similar	study,	support	of	CO2	mitigation	policies	
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was	enhanced	by	framing	them	in	terms	of	slightly	reduced	gains	than	in	terms	of	losses	(Hurlstone	et	al.,	2014).	In	another	study	with	a	large	community	sample,	framing	climate	change	solutions	around	personal	sacrifices	was	less	effective	in	promoting	mitigative	behavior	intentions	than	a	framing	around	positive	values	and	visions	(Gifford	&	Comeau,	2011).			The	idea	that	a	focus	on	risks	may	not	mobilize	wider	parts	of	society	into	action	against	climate	change	is	not	new:	Experts	in	Communication	have	already	argued	that	the	promotion	of	fear	induces	feelings	of	disempowerment	rather	than	behavior	change	(Moser,	2007).	The	abovementioned	examples	demonstrate	that	a	shift	from	a	prevention	focus	to	a	promotion	focus	may	yield	more	encouraging	results,	at	least	with	certain	subgroups	of	society	(e.g.,	climate	skeptics).		One	important	assumption	of	regulatory	focus	theory	is	that	a	message	will	be	most	effective	and	acceptable	if	it	produces	regulatory	fit	with	a	person’s	dominant	focus	(Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011).	This	implies	that	not	one	single	focus	will	be	necessarily	acceptable	and	effective	for	all	parts	of	society	and	in	all	situations.	Therefore,	a	balanced	communication	of	potential	gains	in	addition	to	potential	losses	may	be	the	most	effective	way	to	address	all	parts	of	society	regardless	of	their	pre-existing	beliefs	or	value	orientations.		Also,	because	climate	science	clearly	reveals	that	climate	change	poses	severe	threats	to	humanity,	and	the	public	needs	to	be	informed	about	these	findings,	simply	replacing	a	focus	on	losses	with	a	sole	focus	on	gains	and	opportunities	may	yield	equally	imbalanced	and	ineffective	discourses.	Rather,	a	more	balanced	inclusion	of	both	foci	in	climate	messages	may	lead	to	more	inclusive	debates	based	on	a	more	comprehensive	picture	of	the	situation,	and	may	re-establish	trust,	which	may	have	been	
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lost	due	to	climate	campaigns	with	evidently	coercive	political	agendas	(cf.	Bowman	et	al.,	2010;	Brulle,	Carmichael	&	Jenkins,	2012;	Fischhoff,	2007).		Our	work	(Manuscript	3)	demonstrates	the	potential	usefulness	of	non-coercive	ways	of	communicating	climate	science,	and	provides	some	evidence	for	the	importance	of	regulatory	focus	mechanisms	for	climate	communication:	participants	from	Germany,	India	and	the	US	showed	a	lower	willingness	to	donate	money	to	mitigation	projects	not	only	if	their	objectively	measured	text	understanding	of	excerpts	from	the	IPCC	reports’	Summary	for	Policy-makers	was	lower,	but	additionally,	if	they	felt	that	they	had	better	understood	the	excerpts	independent	of	actual	understanding	(i.e.,	they	were	overconfident;	Fischer,	Amelung	&	Said,	submitted	work).	Interestingly,	objective	climate	understanding,	which	was	positively	associated	with	donation	behavior,	was	negatively	associated	with	a	chronic	focus	on	prevention,	r(262)=-.36,	p	<	.001,	while	a	chronic	focus	on	promotion	was	associated	with	higher	levels	of	subjective	understanding,	r(261)=.41,	p	<	.001	(as	measured	with	the	regulatory	focus	scale	by	Lockwood,	Jordan	&	Kunda,	2002;	results	not	reported	in		Manuscript	3).	Furthermore,	group	comparisons	between	participants	with	a	distinct	promotion	focus	(high	prevention	orientation	combined	with	low	promotion	orientation	identified	by	median	split)	and	a	distinct	prevention	focus	reveal	a	significant	lower	objective	understanding	for	participants	with	a	distinct	prevention	focus,	t(110)=-3.35,	p=.001.		In	addition	to	this,	overconfidence	independent	of	actual	understanding	is	associated	with	a	stronger	promotion	focus,	r(261)=.43,	p	<	.001,	and	distinctly	promotion-oriented	participants	were	significantly	more	overconfident	than	distinctly	prevention-oriented	participants,	t(126)=-5.29,	p	<	.001.	While	an	association	between	a	chronic	promotion	focus	and	the	overconfidence	bias	has	so	far	not	been	empirically	demonstrated,	this	latter	finding	is	in	line	with	existing	results	demonstrating	an	
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association	between	a	stronger	promotion	focus	and	higher	confidence	in	one’s	own	success	and	an	enhanced	sense	of	control	(Guo	&	Spina,	2015;	van	Vianen,	Klehe,	Koen	&	Dries,	2012).			While	regulatory	focus,	as	outlined	earlier,	is	known	to	affect	a	range	of	cognitive	skills	and	strategies	with	the	potential	to	influence	an	adequate	understanding	of	difficult	climate	science,	including	cognitive	flexibility	(Baas,	De	Dreu	&	Nijstad,	2008),	(relational	vs.	item-specific)	elaboration	style	(Zhu	&	Meyers-Levy,	2007),	and	problem	representation	strategies	(Henker,	Sonnentag	&	Unger,	2015;	Liberman	et	al.,	1999),	the	exact	mechanism	responsible	for	the	lower	understanding	levels	of	prevention-oriented	participants	needs	to	be	clarified	in	future	work.		One	possible	explanation	may	include	that	the	high	levels	of	difficulty	of	the	IPCC	texts	reduced	prevention-oriented	individuals’	motivation	to	understand	them,	because	they	also	perceived	the	texts	as	more	difficult	on	average	than	promotion-focused	individuals,	t(127)=3.18,	p=.002.	This	explanation	is	in	line	with	the	finding	that	prevention-oriented	individuals	show	lower	levels	of	perseverance	in	difficult	tasks	than	promotion-oriented	individuals,	especially	after	failure	(Crowe	&	Higgins,	1997).			In	sum,	our	findings	demonstrate	the	relevance	of	regulatory	focus	mechanisms	for	the	understanding	of	climate	science	information	and	for	resulting	decision	behavior.	Also,	this	finding	further	underlines	that	an	imbalance	towards	either	a	focus	on	prevention	(lower	objective	understanding)	or	on	promotion	(higher	levels	of	unjustified	confidence)	may	not	be	adaptive.	
D i s c u s s i o n 	 	 	Drawing	on	theoretical	and	empirical	findings	within	the	three	articles	of	this	work,	I	have	established	that	only	a	balanced	focus	on	prevention	as	well	as	promotion	may	enable	us	to	successfully	address	climate	change.		
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Manuscript	1	establishes	the	preconditions	for	an	effective	management	of	climate	change	from	a	problem-solving	point	of	view,	preconditions	for	which	a	sole	prevention	focus	may	not	be	conducive,	but	may	rather	give	rise	to	an	unjustified	endorsement	of	technological	control	strategies	such	as	CE.	Manuscript	2	demonstrates	empirically	that	a	perception	of	CE	as	a	back-up	strategy	to	control	the	risks	of	mitigation	failure	indeed	makes	CE	appear	a	favorable	strategy	(possibly	due	to	an	implicit	dominant	focus	on	the	prevention	of	risk).	Manuscript	3	provides	some	empirical	evidence	for	the	importance	of	a	balance	between	prevention	and	promotion	also	for	climate	science	understanding,	one	of	the	prerequisites	for	the	development	of	an	adequate	problem	representation	and	therefore	adequate	control,	as	outlined	in	Manuscript	1.	The	following	sections	will	discuss	avenues	for	future	research	on	the	application	of	regulatory	focus	theory	to	climate	action	barriers,	climate	risk	perception	and	communication,	and	risk	management	behavior	more	generally.			
Outlook:	Future	research	on	regulatory	focus	and	climate	change		Regulatory	focus	theory	has	proven	to	be	a	useful	framework	to	explain	behavior	on	different	levels	of	analysis,	such	as	the	individual,	and	the	group	or	organizational	levels.	Therefore,	and	albeit	it	has	not	been	systematically	applied	to	the	field,	it	could	provide	a	useful	framework	to	direct	future	climate-related	psychological	and	interdisciplinary	research.		For	instance,	experimental	work	could	further	our	understanding	of	the	usefulness	of	a	focus	on	promotion	to	address	specific	psychological	barriers	to	climate	change	action	that	have	been	systemized	by	the	‘American	Psychological	Association’s	Task	Force	on	the	Interface	Between	Psychology	and	Global	Climate	Change’	in	its	report	from	2009	and	related	articles	(Gifford,	2011;	Swim	et	al.,	2009).		
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Regarding	these	barriers,	including,	among	others,	ignorance,	reactance,	and	denial,	the	authors	identify	several	avenues	for	further	research.	For	example,	the	exact	mechanism	and	emotional	or	motivational	underpinnings	of	phenomena	such	as	reactance	or	denial	need	to	be	better	understood.	Regulatory	focus	theory	could	be	a	useful	framework	to	help	explain	the	missing	link	between	some	of	the	identified	psychological	barriers	and	climate	action.		For	instance,	if	one	understands	denial	as	a	defense	mechanism	resulting	from	worry	over	a	perceived	threat	coupled	with	a	feeling	of	powerlessness	(cf.	Aitken,	Chapman	&	McClure,	2011),	it	would	constitute	a	maladaptive	coping	mechanism	in	response	to	climate	change	because	it	leads	to	inaction.	Since	prevention	focused	individuals	are	more	vigilant	towards	cues,	which	signal	threats	and	losses	(Sassenberg,	Sassenrath	&	Fetterman,	2015),	thus	worry	more	over	potential	losses,	and	generally	feel	less	in	control	than	their	promotion	focused	counterparts	(Guo	&	Spina,	2015),	they	may	exhibit	higher	degrees	of	denial.		Because	on	the	other	hand,	worry	over	potential	losses	could	also	be	associated	with	a	higher	motivation	to	engage	in	climate	action,	if	it	is	coupled	with	the	feeling	of	being	more	in	control,	a	prevention	focus	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	less	climate	action	than	a	promotion	focus.	Regulatory	focus	could	therefore	help	identify	the	conditions	under	which	worry	leads	to	more	climate-related	action	and	in	what	cases	it	leads	to	inaction.	Results	could	then	inform	the	design	of	messages	that	inform	about	climate	change	in	a	way	that	reduces	maladaptive	and	unnecessary	response	mechanisms	of	denial.	For	instance,	based	on	the	rationale	as	outlined	above,	balanced	messages	that	do	convey	the	scientific	facts	of	climate	change	impacts	but	at	the	same	time	either	indirectly	enhance	a	focus	on	promotion	or	directly	enhance	prevention-oriented	
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individuals’	feelings	of	control	(e.g.,	by	stressing	either	easy	ways	to	personally	contribute	to	climate	action,	or	other	people’s	climate	efforts	to	help	achieve	an	empowering	community	sense,	hereby	highlighting	the	possibility	of	a	non-loss)	might	help	enhance	climate	action.	Supporting	evidence	for	this	notion	comes	from	one	study,	which	found	that	highlighting	possible	non-losses	as	opposed	to	possible	losses	had	a	positive	effect	on	pro-environmental	behavior	intentions	mediated	by	higher	feelings	of	efficacy	(Morton,	Rabinovich,	Marshall	&	Bretschneider,	2011).			A	crucial	barrier	to	climate	action	is	the	way	people	deal	with	uncertainty	and	risk	(Lorenzoni,	Nicholson-Cole	&	Whitmarsh,	2007;	Swim	et	al.,	2009).	This	includes	phenomena	such	as	temporal	discounting,	or	the	discounting	of	uncomfortable	information	that	is	presented	as	scientifically	uncertain,	such	as	in	the	IPCC	assessment	reports	(Budescu,	Por	&	Broomell,	2012).	Therefore,	it	also	includes	all	aspects	of	public	understanding	of	risk	(e.g.,	the	perception	of	not	being	at	risk)	and	its	implications	for	risk	communication	(Pidgeon	&	Fischhoff,	2011).	Behavior	changes	to	address	climate	change	often	pose	a	dilemma	between	short-term	losses	and	long-term	gains	leading	to	the	temporal	discounting	of	future	rewards.	Regulatory	focus	theory	provides	an	interesting	perspective	on	conflicting	decisions	of	this	type:	One	study	has	shown	that	a	promotion	focus	can	explain	the	connection	between	a	higher	tendency	to	consider	future	consequences	and	healthy	eating	and	exercise	behavior	(Joireman	et	al.,	2012).	The	authors	explain	this	finding	by	a	broader	tendency	of	promotion-oriented	individuals	to	focus	on	their	ideals	and	hopes	
for	the	future,	while	prevention-oriented	individuals	are	more	vigilant	towards	
immediate	negative	consequences	of	their	behavior	and	are	thus	less	focused	on	the	future	(cf.	also	Pennington	&	Roese,	2003).	This	could	mean	that	a	person	with	an	active	
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promotion	focus	would	be	more	inclined	than	a	person	with	a	prevention	focus	to	act	in	the	pursuit	of	a	future	gain	even	if	this	means	accepting	smaller	immediate	losses.	However,	climate	actions	are	different	from	health-related	actions	in	that	future	gains	are	not	only	personal,	but	also	collective,	whereas	immediate	losses	are	clearly	personal.	Conflicting	decisions	in	the	climate	change	domain	therefore	typically	involve	not	only	the	temporal	dimension	(immediate	vs.	future	consequences),	but	also	the	scope	(affecting	only	the	decision-maker	vs.	the	collective)	of	any	gains	and	losses	involved.	Therefore,	it	remains	unclear	whether	a	promotion-focused	individual	will	under	all	circumstances	exhibit	a	higher	inclination	towards	climate-friendly	behavior.	For	example,	one	study	involving	conflicting	decisions	between	personal	vs.	collective	gains	has	shown	that	promotion-focused	individuals	were	more	likely	than	prevention-focused	participants	to	act	in	their	self-interest	when	personal	goals	and	the	goal	of	a	group	were	in	conflict,	in	fact,	they	pursued	personal	success	at	the	expense	of	group	success	(Zaal	et	al.,	2015).	Therefore,	future	research	could	disentangle	the	effects	of	regulatory	focus	on	(a)	the	temporal	dimension	and	(b)	the	scope	of	gains	and	losses	involved	in	climate-related	decisions	by	directly	manipulating	the	two	aspects.			Regulatory	focus	theory	has	also	been	applied	to	the	field	of	risk	perception	and	decision-making,	where	it	provides	an	explanation	for	different	behavioral	tendencies	towards	risks	framed	as	losses	and	risks	framed	as	gains	(Bryant	&	Dunford,	2008).	The	authors’	model	of	risky	behavior	predicts	that	risks	framed	as	gains	or	as	losses	(the	framing	effect	postulated	by	Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1981)	can	be	perceived	as	either	positive	or	negative,	respectively,	depending	on	the	regulatory	focus	of	the	person,	and	depending	on	whether	it	is	framed	as	an	act	of	omission	or	an	act	of	commission.		More	specifically,	an	act	of	omission	(e.g.,	not	changing	the	status	quo	of	one’s	household	energy	supply	system,	not	supporting	the	adoption	of	some	technological	
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innovation)	would	be	perceived	as	a	positive	risk	from	a	prevention	focus	because	it	provides	the	chance	of	a	non-loss,	while	from	a	promotion	focus	it	would	mean	a	chance	of	a	non-gain	and	would	therefore	be	rejected	as	negative.	The	opposite	would	be	true	for	an	act	of	commission.	This	could	potentially	explain	null	findings	of	a	comparison	between	loss	and	gain	framings	of	climate	change	messages	(Bernauer	&	McGrath,	2016).	It	would	therefore	be	worthwhile	to	investigate	the	effects	of	different	climate	messages	with	a	manipulation	of	message	framing	(gains	vs.	losses)	and	action	type	(omission	vs.	commission)	on	risk	perception	dependent	on	regulatory	focus.	Regulatory	focus	theory	could	provide	an	interesting	framework	not	only	for	the	identification	of	causal	mechanisms	behind	climate	action	barriers,	but	also	for	a	direct	investigation	of	climate	behaviors	in	organizational	settings.	On	such	an	organizational	level	of	analysis,	studies	could	reveal	if	and	under	what	conditions	transformational	leadership	behaviors	could	be	successful	in	inducing	climate-friendly	behaviors	in	organizations	mediated	by	a	promotion	focus.	Studies	have	so	far	concentrated	on	group	creativity	as	an	outcome	of	leadership	behavior	and	regulatory	focus	in	the	business	sector	(e.g.,	Henker,	Sonnentag	&	Unger,	2015).	Because	business	organizations,	for	example	in	the	industry	sector,	are	especially	required	to	change	for	more	climate-friendly	strategies	if	the	climate	policy	goals	of	the	Paris	Agreement	of	2015	are	to	be	met	(IPCC,	2014b),	similar	studies	could	reveal	the	conditions	for	change	towards	more	sustainable	business	practices	with	regulatory	focus	as	possible	mediator.	
Outlook:	Regulatory	focus	as	an	explanation	for	risk	management	behavior	More	generally,	regulatory	focus	theory	could	provide	an	explanation	for	the	difference	between	active	or	passive	risk	defusing	within	Oswald	Huber’s	Risk	Management	Decision	Theory	(2012).	In	Manuscript	2	of	this	work,	we	have	used	this	framework	as	a	theoretical	basis	to	track	participants’	decision	behavior	in	a	quasi-
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realistic	scenario,	which	asked	them	to	consider	different	CE	technologies	within	the	context	of	other	climate	strategies	such	as	mitigation	(Amelung	&	Funke,	2015).	For	example,	if	a	promotion	focus	is	associated	with	a	more	relational	elaboration	style	(Zhu	&	Meyers-Levy,	2007)	and	a	higher	tendency	to	find	innovative	opportunities	(Tumasjan	&	Braun,	2012),	promotion-focused	individuals	may	be	more	likely	to	search	for	an	additional	action	(such	as	CE)	to	defuse	the	risk	of	an	attractive,	but	risky	option	(such	as	mitigation)		based	on	an	increased	tendency	to	examine	the	relations	between	the	different	options	(CE	could	constitute	an	insurance	for	failed	mitigation	efforts),	rather	than	an	assessment	of	each	option	individually.	Following	this	rationale,	one	would	assume	a	generally	higher	tendency	to	search	for	and	identify	a	risk-defusing	option	from	a	promotion	focus	than	from	a	prevention	focus.	In	addition	to	this,	the	following	can	be	considered:	Oswald	Huber	(2012)	has	argued	that	the	two	goals	a	decision-maker	pursues	in	a	risky	decision	making	process	are	the	achievement	of	attractive	positive	outcomes	(which	is	a	promotion	goal)	and	the	minimization	of	risks	(a	prevention	goal).	He	assumes	a	sequential	process	in	that	a	decision-maker	is	more	concerned	with	the	positive	outcome	first,	after	which	the	minimization	of	risk	becomes	more	important	in	a	second	step.	However,	such	a	sequential	process	may	not	pertain	to	everyone:	a	promotion-focused	individual	is	generally	more	concerned	with	the	achievement	goal	of	step	1,	while	a	prevention-focused	individual	will	put	more	emphasis	on	step	2	of	the	process.	Following	this	rationale,	a	prevention-focused	individual	will	not	identify	the	most	attractive	alternative	first	and	then	defuse	the	associated	risk	in	a	two-step	process,	but	will	quickly	find	the	alternative	with	the	least	amount	of	risk	(the	MAXIMIN	decision	rule).	In	line	with	this,	empirical	studies	show	that	some	participants	act	according	to	the	MAXIMIN	heuristic	rather	than	actively	defusing	the	risks	of	a	preferred	option	
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(Amelung	&	Funke,	2015;	Bär	&	Huber,	2008),	a	more	passive	way	to	reduce	risks	according	to	Huber.	Additional	support	for	the	assumption	that	active	risk	defusing	may	be	more	in	line	with	the	promotion	focus	can	be	drawn	from	the	study	by	Liberman	et	al.	(2001),	which	found	that	promotion-focused	individuals	are	more	likely	to	simultaneously	hold	in	mind	alternative	ideas	in	the	process	of	acquiring	knowledge	and	thus	engage	less	in	causal	discounting.	It	can	therefore	be	assumed	that	they	are	less	likely	to	unequivocally	decide	for	one	option	early	in	the	process	and	discount	alternative	options.	Instead,	promotion-oriented	individuals	will	be	more	likely	to	simultaneously	consider	alternative	options	long	enough	to	explore	and	identify	possible	connections	between	them.		On	the	other	hand,	one	could	also	argue	that	from	a	prevention	focus,	a	decision-maker	should	exhibit	higher	levels	of	active	risk	defusing	since	the	minimization	of	the	potential	for	a	loss	is	their	prime	interest.	Interestingly,	Huber	found	in	one	of	his	studies	that	active	risk	defusing	is	more	frequent	if	a	negative	frame	is	used	(an	uncertain	loss	or	worsening	of	a	situation)	than	if	a	positive	frame	is	used	(an	uncertain	gain	or	improvement	of	a	situation)	(Huber,	Huber	&	Bär,	2014).	Since	a	negative	frame	increases	the	saliency	of	a	potential	loss,	such	an	appeal	may	increase	the	motivation	to	secure	a	non-loss	especially	by	prevention-oriented	individuals.	Whether	the	risk	of	an	option	signifies	a	loss	or	a	non-gain	for	the	decision-maker	may	therefore	determine	his	decision	on	whether	he	spends	his	resources	on	active	risk	defusing	or	not.	For	example,	mitigation	failure	signifies	potential	losses	such	as	human	lives,	biodiversity,	resources,	economic	power,	stability	etc.,	which	renders	it	imperative	for	a	prevention-oriented	decision	maker	to	re-establish	the	status	quo	and	avert	these	losses	by	means	of	active	risk	defusing.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	risk	of	an	otherwise	attractive	
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alternative	signifies	a	potential	non-gain	such	as	the	risk	of	getting	a	rare	disease	from	travelling	to	a	foreign	country	for	vacation,	a	promotion-oriented	decision	maker	may	be	the	most	likely	to	show	active	risk-defusing	(such	as	a	vaccine).	Also,	especially	in	a	more	complex	real	life	scenario	such	as	the	one	we	used	in	Manuscript	2,	the	same	alternative	may	signify	either	a	means	to	prevent	a	potential	loss,	or	a	means	to	achieve	an	uncertain	gain.	For	example,	from	a	prevention	focus,	mitigation	(the	attractive	alternative)	may	have	been	understood	in	terms	of	the	prevention	of	climate	change	risks	of	potential	losses	(as	indicated	by	most	of	our	participants).	This	may	have	made	risk	defusing	by	means	of	CE	more	probable	to	secure	a	non-loss.	From	a	promotion	focus,	however,	mitigation	could	have	been	understood	as	a	means	to	achieve	fundamental	economic	and	societal	change	through	innovation.	From	such	a	focus,	active	risk	defusing	by	means	of	CE	may	either	not	seem	necessary	(e.g.,	because	of	a	heightened	sense	of	control	(Guo	&	Spina,	2015),	or	even	as	a	threat	to	change	(the	desired	goal).	In	sum,	regulatory	focus	theory	may	serve	as	a	framework	to	help	explain	the	difference	between	active	or	passive	risk	defusing	depending	on	whether	the	options	signify	potential	gains	or	potential	non-losses.	
Psychological	research	in	the	climate	change	domain	The	complex	challenges	posed	by	climate	change	can	only	be	adequately	understood	and	dealt	with	if	different	perspectives	and	fields	of	knowledge	are	brought	together,	which	can	only	happen	in	combined	multidisciplinary	efforts	(cf.	Manuscript	1).	These	efforts	also	call	for	a	flexible	application	of	methodologies	to	help	apply	psychological	insights	to	the	relevant	issues	and	questions	in	a	problem-based	approach	rather	than	examining	isolated	psychological	phenomena	in	a	mere	theory-driven	approach.		
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In	a	similar	vein,	other	authors	have	argued	that	for	psychologists	to	make	valuable	contributions	to	the	domain	of	environmental	change,	their	research	should	be	more	problem-based	than	theory-based,	less	focused	on	decontextualized	intrapsychic	phenomena	which	are	examined	in	isolation	from	a	person’s	environment	or	situation,	and	more	actively	involved	in	transdisciplinary	collaboration	(Clayton	et	al.,	2016).	To	make	their	contribution	visible,	this	may	also	include	efforts	to	integrate	psychological	theories	and	results	with	other	social	disciplines	such	as	sociology,	economics,	or	the	political	sciences.		Within	the	three	manuscripts	as	part	of	the	present	work,	I	have	adhered	to	these	principles	by	employing	a	more	problem-based	approach,	which	was	still	grounded	in	theory	but	did	not	specifically	aim	at	an	advancement	of	a	theoretical	construct	or	the	understanding	of	a	specific	intrapsychic	phenomenon.	Rather,	I	viewed	the	problem	of	climate	change,	and	more	specifically,	of	climate	engineering,	in	a	contextualized	manner	with	the	help	of	different	methodological	approaches	(mixed	quantitative-qualitative,	experimental,	and	non-empirical)	and	by	demonstrating	relevant	connections	to	other	disciplines	(such	as	sociology).	
Con c l u s i o n 	The	idea	of	climate	engineering	may	constitute	the	pinnacle	expression	of	a	deep-seated	need	to	reduce	the	uncomfortable	feeling	of	uncertainty	associated	with	prospects	of	potential	harm	from	an	uncontrollable	future.	Such	a	need	is	reflected	in	our	societal	ways	of	dealing	with	uncertainty	(cf.	Beck,	2009).	Especially	against	the	background	of	accountability	and	justification	pressures	weighing	on	governments,	institutions,	and	corporations,	often	involving	large	financial	risks,	risk	management	approaches	for	almost	anything	have	been	suggested,	sparking	the	up-rise	of	a	complete	sphere	of	activity	(Power,	2004).	
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I	have	proposed	that	such	a	societal	emphasis	on	risk	management	and	control	may	result	from	a	prevention	motivation	and	at	the	same	time	may	be	reinforcing	a	focus	on	a	prevention	motivation	in	the	sense	of	Scholer	and	Higgins’	self-regulatory	model	(2011).	This	is,	in	the	example	of	climate	change	risk	management,	reflected	in	the	fact	that	the	undesirable	end	state	(rise	of	global	average	temperature	above	2	or	even	1.5	degrees	C),	which	we	want	to	avoid	reaching,	and	which	we	currently	regulate	our	actions	towards	is	overemphasized,	while	ideas	about	a	desired	end	state	(such	as	what	an	energy	system	could	look	like	which	might	replace	current	emission	emitting	industries)	are	lacking	on	a	global	scale.	In	a	similar	way,	Mike	Hulme	proposed:	“Rather	than	asking	'How	do	we	solve	climate	change?'	we	need	to	turn	the	question	around	and	ask	'How	does	the	idea	of	climate	change	alter	the	way	we	arrive	at	and	achieve	our	personal	aspirations	and	our	collective	social	goals?’”	(2014,	p.	241).	A	direct	expression	of	the	prevention	focus	in	debates	on	international	legal	implications	of	CE	may	be	the	Precautionary	Principle,	an	important	subject	of	political,	economic	and	legal	debates	around	climate	policies	and	policies	of	the	European	Union	in	general	(Sunstein,	2005a).	The	Principle	states	that	if	there	exists	a	threat	of	harm,	precautionary	measures	should	be	taken	also	in	the	absence	of	scientifically	agreed	proof	of	harm.	Interestingly,	the	Precautionary	principle	has	been	criticised	by	legal	scholars	for	possibly	preventing	or	hindering	any	(technological)	innovation	because	risks	can	never	be	entirely	ruled	out	(Sunstein,	2005a,b).		I	therefore	conclude	that	it	might	be	crucial	for	our	ability	to	develop	important	new	solutions,	to	increasingly	shift	our	focus	away	from	a	prevention	focus	to	a	promotion	focus.	This	does	not	mean	to	discredit	and	drop	any	risk	management	activities	in	its	entirety	as	both	foci	(prevention	as	well	as	promotion)	need	to	co-exist.	In	fact,	insights	from	regulatory	focus	theory	have	shown	that	not	one	of	the	decision	
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making	styles	should	be	generally	preferred	over	the	other,	because	either	one	might	produce	better	results	depending	on	the	task	to	be	mastered	(cf.	Brockner,	Higgins	&	Low,	2004;	Scholer	&	Higgins,	2011).	Also,	both	foci	are	assumed	to	be	uncorrelated,	that	is	the	adoption	of	one	focus	does	not	preclude	the	other.	The	need	for	security	is	an	understandable	need	in	the	face	of	climatic	changes,	and	needs	to	be	addressed.	However,	our	focus	as	a	society	might	have	undergone	a	shift	too	far	into	one	direction,	which	has	caused	an	imbalance	in	our	aspirations.	Therefore,	we	should	realign	our	focus	to	allow	creative	bottom-up	solutions	to	emerge,	and	to	be	flexible	and	open	enough	for	change	to	occur	instead	of	rigidly	holding	on	to	the	old	ways	of	dealing	with	old	problems.	Our	current	predominant	focus	also	has	moral	implications.	A	prevention	focus	is	stressed	by	the	perspective	that	we	as	humans	need	to	preserve	our	resources	for	survival	and	to	prevent	the	risk	of	self-destruction.	A	promotion	focus	could	imply	a	stronger	focus	on	our	human	role	to	care	for	the	planetary	biodiversity	for	its	own	sake	and	to	create	a	world	much	more	worth	living	for	future	generations	than	it	is	now,	rather	than	merely	preventing	its	collapse.	Interestingly,	in	the	literature	on	how	a	complex	(economic,	ecological	and	social)	system	is	sustainably	managed,	we	can	find	notions	of	a	balanced	partnership	between	the	creation	of	opportunity	(which	would	be	the	domain	of	a	promotion	focus)	and	protection	mechanisms	against	destabilization	(corresponding	to	a	prevention	focus)	(Holling,	2001).	Therefore,	to	deal	with	the	complex	problem	of	climate	change,	it	seems	to	be	best	to	focus	both	on	promotion	and	on	prevention,	or	to	conclude	with	the	words	of	Holling	on	the	sustainable	management	of	complex	systems:	we	need	to	be	“both	creative	and	conserving”	(2001,	p.	390).			
36 
 
Re f e r en c e s 	Aitken,	C.,	Chapman,	R.,	&	McClure,	J.	(2011).	Climate	change,	powerlessness	and	the	commons	dilemma:	Assessing	New	Zealanders’	preparedness	to	act.	Global	
Environmental	Change,	21(2),	752-760.	Amelung,	D.,	&	Funke,	J.	(2015).	Laypeople's	risky	decisions	in	the	climate	change	context:	Climate	engineering	as	a	risk-defusing	strategy?	Human	and	Ecological	
Risk	Assessment,	21(2),	533-559.	Amelung,	D.,	&	Funke,	J.	(2013).	Dealing	with	the	uncertainties	of	climate	engineering:	Warnings	from	a	psychological	complex	problem	solving	perspective.	Technology	
in	Society,	35(1),	32-40.	Baas,	M.,	De	Dreu,	C.	K.,	&	Nijstad,	B.	A.	(2008).	A	meta-analysis	of	25	years	of	mood-creativity	research:	Hedonic	tone,	activation,	or	regulatory	focus?	Psychological	
Bulletin,	134(6),	779-806.	Bain,	P.	G.,	Hornsey,	M.	J.,	Bongiorno,	R.,	&	Jeffries,	C.	(2012).	Promoting	pro-environmental	action	in	climate	change	deniers.	Nature	Climate	Change,	2(8),	600-603.	Barkemeyer,	R.,	Dessai,	S.,	Monge-Sanz,	B.,	Renzi,	B.	G.,	&	Napolitano,	G.	(2016).	Linguistic	analysis	of	IPCC	summaries	for	policymakers	and	associated	coverage.	
Nature	Climate	Change,	6(3),	311-316.	Baron,	R.	A.,	&	Ensley,	M.	D.	(2006).	Opportunity	recognition	as	the	detection	of	meaningful	patterns:	Evidence	from	comparisons	of	novice	and	experienced	entrepreneurs.	Management	Science,	52(9),	1331-1344.	Bär,	A.	S.,	&	Huber,	O.	(2008).	Successful	or	unsuccessful	search	for	risk	defusing	operators:	Effects	on	decision	behaviour.	European	Journal	of	Cognitive	
Psychology,	20(4),	807-827.	Bass,	B.	M.	(1999).	Two	decades	of	research	and	development	in	transformational	leadership.	European	journal	of	work	and	organizational	psychology,	8(1),	9-32.	Beck,	U.	(2009).	World	at	risk.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	Bellamy,	R.	(2013).	Framing	Geoengineering	Assessment.	Geoengineering	Our	Climate	
Working	Paper	and	Opinion	Article	Series.	Available	at:	http://wp.me/p2zsRk-	9H		Bellamy,	R.,	Chilvers,	J.,	Vaughan,	N.	E.,	Lenton,	T.	M.	(2012).	A	review	of	climate	geoengineering	appraisals.	Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	3(6),	597–615.		Bernauer,	T.,	&	McGrath,	L.	F.	(2016).	Simple	reframing	unlikely	to	boost	public	support	for	climate	policy.	Nature	Climate	Change.		Bowman,	T.	E.,	Maibach,	E.,	Mann,	M.	E.,	Somerville,	R.	C.,	Seltser,	B.	J.,	Fischhoff,	B.,	Gardiner,	S.	M.,	Gould,	R.	J.,	Leiserowitz,	A.,	Yohe,	G.	(2010).	Time	to	take	action	on	climate	communication.	Science,	330(6007),	1044.		
37 
 
Brockner,	J.,	Higgins,	E.	T.,	&	Low,	M.	B.	(2004).	Regulatory	focus	theory	and	the	entrepreneurial	process.	Journal	of	Business	Venturing,	19(2),	203-220.		Brulle,	R.	J.,	Carmichael,	J.,	&	Jenkins,	J.	C.	(2012).	Shifting	public	opinion	on	climate	change:	an	empirical	assessment	of	factors	influencing	concern	over	climate	change	in	the	US,	2002–2010.	Climatic	change,	114(2),	169-188.		Bryant,	P.,	&	Dunford,	R.	(2008).	The	Influence	of	Regulatory	Focus	on	Risky	Decision-Making.	Applied	Psychology,	57(2),	335-359.		Budescu,	D.	V.,	Por,	H.	H.,	&	Broomell,	S.	B.	(2012).	Effective	communication	of	uncertainty	in	the	IPCC	reports.	Climatic	change,	113(2),	181-200.		Burns,	J.	M.	(2003).	Transforming	leadership:	A	new	pursuit	of	happiness	(Vol.	213).	NY:	Atlantic	Monthly	Press.		Burns,	J.	M.	(1978).	Leadership.	NY:	Harper	&	Row.		Clayton,	S.,	Devine-Wright,	P.,	Swim,	J.,	Bonnes,	M.,	Steg,	L.,	Whitmarsh,	L.,	&	Carrico,	A.	(2015).	Expanding	the	role	for	psychology	in	addressing	environmental	challenges.	American	Psychologist,	71(3),	199-215.			Corner,	A.,	Pidgeon,	N.,	Parkhill,	K.	(2012).	Perceptions	of	geoengineering:	public	attitudes,	stakeholder	perspectives,	and	the	challenge	of	‘upstream’	engagement.	
Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	3(5),	451–466.		Crowe,	E.,	&	Higgins,	E.	T.	(1997).	Regulatory	focus	and	strategic	inclinations:	Promotion	and	prevention	in	decision-making.	Organizational	behavior	and	human	decision	
processes,	69(2),	117-132.		Dalby,	S.	(2015).	Anthropocene	formations:	environmental	security,	geopolitics	and	disaster.	Theory,	Culture	&	Society,	1-20.	 		Fischhoff,	B.	(2007).	Nonpersuasive	communication	about	matters	of	greatest	urgency:	climate	change.	Environ.	Sci.	Technol.,	41	(21),	7204–7208.		Frantz,	C.	M.,	Mayer,	F.	S.	(2009).	The	emergency	of	climate	change:	why	are	we	failing	to	take	action?	Analyses	of	Social	Issues	and	Public	Policy,	9(1),	205–222.		Gifford,	R.	(2011).	The	dragons	of	inaction:	Psychological	barriers	that	limit	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation.	American	Psychologist,	66(4),	290.		Gifford,	R.,	&	Comeau,	L.	A.	(2011).	Message	framing	influences	perceived	climate	change	competence,	engagement,	and	behavioral	intentions.	Global	Environmental	
Change,	21(4),	1301-1307.		Guo,	T.,	&	Spina,	R.	(2015).	Regulatory	Focus	Affects	Predictions	of	the	Future.	
Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Bulletin,	41(2),	214-223.		
38 
 
Hamilton,	C.	(2013).	Earthmasters:	The	dawn	of	the	age	of	climate	engineering.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.		Henker,	N.,	Sonnentag,	S.,	&	Unger,	D.	(2015).	Transformational	leadership	and	employee	creativity:	the	mediating	role	of	promotion	focus	and	creative	process	engagement.	Journal	of	Business	and	Psychology,	30(2),	235-247.	Hmieleski,	K.	M.,	&	Baron,	R.	A.	(2008).	Regulatory	focus	and	new	venture	performance:	A	study	of	entrepreneurial	opportunity	exploitation	under	conditions	of	risk	versus	uncertainty.	Strategic	Entrepreneurship	Journal,	2(4),	285-299.	Holdren,	J.	P.	(2006).	The	energy	innovation	imperative:	addressing	oil	dependence,	climate	change,	and	other	21st	century	energy	challenges.	Innovations,	1(2),	3-23.		Holling,	C.	S.	(2001).	Understanding	the	complexity	of	economic,	ecological,	and	social	systems.	Ecosystems,	4(5),	390-405.		Horton,	J.	B.	(2015).	The	emergency	framing	of	solar	geoengineering:	time	for	a	different	approach.	The	Anthropocene	Review	2(2),	147–151.		Huber,	O.	(2012).	Risky	decisions.	Active	risk	management.	Current	Directions	in	
Psychological	Science,	21(1),	26-30.		Huber,	O.,	Huber,	O.	W.,	&	Bär,	A.	S.	(2014).	Framing	of	decisions:	effect	on	active	and	passive	risk	avoidance.	Journal	of	Behavioral	Decision	Making,	27(5),	444-453.		Hulme,	M.	(2014).	Can	Science	Fix	Climate	Change:	A	Case	Against	Climate	Engineering.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press.		Hulme,	M	(2009).	Why	we	disagree	about	climate	change.	Understanding	Controversy,	Inaction	and	Opportunity.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Hulme,	M.	(2014a).	Why	we	disagree	about	climate	change	(pp.	239-243).	In	S.	Rayner,	M.	Caine,	M.	(Eds.).	The	Hartwell	Approach	to	Climate	Policy.	London:	Routledge.		Hurlstone,	M.	J.,	Lewandowsky,	S.,	Newell,	B.	R.,	&	Sewell,	B.	(2014).	The	effect	of	framing	and	normative	messages	in	building	support	for	climate	policies.	PloS	one,	9(12).	IPCC,	(2014a).	Summary	for	policymakers.	In	C.	B.	Field,	V.	R.	Barros,	D.	J.	Dokken,	K.	J.	Mach,	M.	D.	Mastrandrea,	T.	E.	Bilir,	M.	Chatterjee,	K.	L.	Ebi,	Y.	O.	Estrada,	R.	C.	Genova,	B.	Girma,	E.	S.	Kissel,	A.	N.	Levy,	S.	MacCracken,	P.	R.	Mastrandrea,	and	L.	L.	White	(Eds.),	Climate	Change	2014:	Impacts,	Adaptation,	and	Vulnerability.	Part	
A:	Global	and	Sectoral	Aspects.	Contribution	of	Working	Group	II	to	the	Fifth	
Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(pp.	1-32).	Cambridge,	UK	and	New	York,	USA:	Cambridge	University	Press.		IPCC,	(2014b):	Summary	for	Policymakers.	In	O.	Edenhofer,	R.	Pichs-Madruga,	Y.	Sokona,	E.	Farahani,	S.	Kadner,	K.	Seyboth,	A.	Adler,	I.	Baum,	S.	Brunner,	P.	Eickemeier,	B.	Kriemann,	J.	Savolainen,	S.	Schlömer,	C.	von	Stechow,	T.	Zwickel	and	J.	C.	Minx	(Eds.),	Climate	Change	2014:	Mitigation	of	Climate	Change.	Contribution	of	
39 
 
Working	Group	III	to	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	
on	Climate	Change	(pp.	1-30).	Cambridge,	UK	and	New	York,	USA:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Jamieson,	D.	(1996).	Ethics	and	intentional	climate	change.	Climatic	Change,	33,	323–336.	Johnson,	B.	B.	(2012).	Climate	change	communication:	A	provocative	inquiry	into	motives,	meanings,	and	means.	Risk	Analysis,	32(6),	973-991.	Joireman,	J.,	Shaffer,	M.	J.,	Balliet,	D.,	&	Strathman,	A.	(2012).	Promotion	orientation	explains	why	future-oriented	people	exercise	and	eat	healthy	evidence	from	the	two-factor	consideration	of	future	consequences-14	scale.	Personality	and	Social	
Psychology	Bulletin,	38(10),	1272-1287.		Kahneman,	D.,	Tversky,	A.	(2000).	Choices,	values	and	frames.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Karlsson,	C.,	Parker,	C.,	Hjerpe,	M.,	&	Linnér,	B.	O.	(2011).	Looking	for	leaders:	Perceptions	of	climate	change	leadership	among	climate	change	negotiation	participants.	Global	Environmental	Politics,	11(1),	89-107.	Keller,	J.,	&	Bless,	H.	(2006).	Regulatory	fit	and	cognitive	performance:	the	interactive	effect	of	chronic	and	situationally	induced	self-regulatory	mechanisms	on	test	performance.	European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	36(3),	393-405.	Kunreuther,	H.,	Heal,	G.,	Allen,	M.,	Edenhofer,	O.,	Field,	C.	B.,	Yohe,	G.	(2013).	Risk	management	and	climate	change.	Nature	Climate	Change,	3,	447–450.		Leiserowitz,	A.	A.	(2005).	American	risk	perceptions:	Is	climate	change	dangerous?	Risk	
analysis,	25(6),	1433-1442.	Lempert,	R.,	Nakicenovic,	N.,	Sarewitz,	D.,	Schlesinger,	M.	(2004).	Characterizing	Climate-Change	Uncertainties	for	Decision-Makers.	An	Editorial	Essay.	Climatic	Change,	
65(1),1-9.		Lenton,	T.	M.	(2011).	Early	warning	of	climate	tipping	points.	Nature	Climate	Change,	1,	201–209.		Liberman,	N.,	Molden,	D.	C.,	Idson,	L.	C.,	&	Higgins,	E.	T.	(2001).	Promotion	and	prevention	focus	on	alternative	hypotheses:	implications	for	attributional	functions.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	80(1),	5-18.		Lockwood,	P.,	Jordan,	C.	H.,	&	Kunda,	Z.	(2002).	Motivation	by	positive	or	negative	role	models:	regulatory	focus	determines	who	will	best	inspire	us.	Journal	of	
Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	83(4),	854.		Lorenzoni,	I.,	Nicholson-Cole,	S.,	&	Whitmarsh,	L.	(2007).	Barriers	perceived	to	engaging	with	climate	change	among	the	UK	public	and	their	policy	implications.	Global	
environmental	change,	17(3),	445-459.		
40 
 
Markusson,	N.,	Ginn,	F.,	Ghaleigh,	N.	S.,	Scott,	V.	(2014).	‘In	case	of	emergency	press	here’:	framing	geoengineering	as	a	response	to	dangerous	climate	change.	Wiley	
Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	5(2),	281–290.		Morton,	T.	A.,	Rabinovich,	A.,	Marshall,	D.,	&	Bretschneider,	P.	(2011).	The	future	that	may	(or	may	not)	come:	How	framing	changes	responses	to	uncertainty	in	climate	change	communications.	Global	Environmental	Change,	21(1),	103-109.		Moser,	S.	C.	(2016).	Reflections	on	climate	change	communication	research	and	practice	in	the	second	decade	of	the	21st	century:	what	more	is	there	to	say?.	Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	7(3),	345-369.		Moser,	S.	C.	(2009).	Communicating	climate	change:	history,	challenges,	process	and	future	directions.	Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	1,	31-53.			Moser,	S.	C.	(2007).	More	bad	news:	The	risk	of	neglecting	emotional	responses	to	climate	change	information.	In	S.	C.	Moser,	L.	Dilling	(Eds.),	Creating	a	climate	for	
change:	communicating	climate	change	and	facilitating	social	change	(pp.	64-81).	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Moser,	S.	C.,	&	Ekstrom,	J.	A.	(2010).	A	framework	to	diagnose	barriers	to	climate	change	adaptation.	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	107(51),	22026-22031.	Murphy,	J.	M.,	Sexton,	D.	M.	H.,	Barnett,	D.	N.,	Jones,	G.	S.,	Webb,	M.	J.,	Collins,	M.,	Stainforth,	D.	A.	(2004).	Quantification	of	modelling	uncertainties	in	a	large	ensemble	of	climate	change	simulations.	Nature,	430,	768-772.			Ostrom,	E.	(1990).	Governing	the	commons.	The	evolution	of	institutions	for	collective	
action.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Pearce,	W.,	Brown,	B.,	Nerlich,	B.,	Koteyko,	N.	(2015).	Communicating	climate	change:	conduits,	content,	and	consensus.	Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews:	Climate	Change,	
6,	613-626.			Pennington,	G.	L.,	&	Roese,	N.	J.	(2003).	Regulatory	focus	and	temporal	distance.	Journal	
of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	39(6),	563-576.		Pidgeon,	N.,	&	Fischhoff,	B.	(2011).	The	role	of	social	and	decision	sciences	in	communicating	uncertain	climate	risks.	Nature	Climate	Change,	1(1),	35-41.		Power,	M.	(2004).	The	risk	management	of	everything:	Rethinking	the	politics	of	
uncertainty.	London:	Demos.		Reiter-Palmon,	R.,	Mumford,	M.	D.,	O'Connor	Boes,	J.,	&	Runco,	M.	A.	(1997).	Problem	construction	and	creativity:	The	role	of	ability,	cue	consistency,	and	active	processing.	Creativity	Research	Journal,	10(1),	9-23.		Robinson,	J.,	Bradley,	M.,	Busby,	P.,	Connor,	D.,	Murray,	A.,	Sampson,	B.,	&	Soper,	W.	
41 
 
(2006).	Climate	change	and	sustainable	development:	Realizing	the	opportunity.	
AMBIO:	A	Journal	of	the	Human	Environment,	35(1),	2-8.		Robock,	A.,	Jerch,	K.,	&	Bunzl,	M.	(2008).	20	reasons	why	geoengineering	may	be	a	bad	idea.	Bulletin	of	the	Atomic	Scientists,	64(2),	14-59.		Sassenberg,	K.,	Sassenrath,	C.,	Fetterman,	A.	K.	(2015).	Threat	≠	prevention,	challenge	≠	promotion:	The	impact	of	threat,	challenge	and	regulatory	focus	on	attention	to	negative	stimuli.	Cognition	and	Emotion,	29(1),	188-195.		Schneider,	R.	O.	(2011).	Climate	change:	an	emergency	management	perspective.	
Disaster	Prevention	and	Management:	An	International	Journal,	20(1),	53	–	62.		Scholer,	A.	A.,	&	Higgins,	E.	T.	(2011).	Promotion	and	prevention	systems:	regulatory	focus	dynamics	within	self-regulatory	hierarchies.	In	K.	D.	Vohs,	E.	F.	Baumeister	(Eds.),	Handbook	of	self-regulation.	Research,	theory,	and	applications	(pp.	143-161).	New	York:	Guilford	Press.		Shi,	J.,	Visschers,	V.	H.,	Siegrist,	M.,	&	Arvai,	J.	(2016).	Knowledge	as	a	driver	of	public	perceptions	about	climate	change	reassessed.	Nature	Climate	Change.	
	Shin,	Y.	(2014).	Positive	group	affect	and	team	creativity:	Mediation	of	team	reflexivity	and	promotion	focus.	Small	Group	Research,	45(3),	337-364.		Shin,	Y.,	Kim,	M.,	Choi,	J.	N.,	Lee,	S.-H.	(2016).	Does	team	culture	matter?	Roles	of	team	culture	and	collective	regulatory	focus	in	team	task	and	creative	performance.	
Group	&	Organization	Management,	41(2),	232-265.		Smith,	J.	(2005).	Dangerous	news:	media	decision	making	about	climate	change.	Risk	Analysis,	25(6),	1471–1482.			Sunstein,	C.	R.	(2005a).	Laws	of	fear:	Beyond	the	precautionary	principle.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Sunstein,	C.	R.	(2005b).	The	precautionary	principle	as	a	basis	for	decision	making.	The	
Economists'	Voice,	2(2).		Swim,	J.,	Clayton,	S.,	Doherty,	T.,	Gifford,	R.,	Howard,	G.,	Reser,	J.,	Stern,	P.,	Weber,	E.	(2009).	Psychology	and	global	climate	change:	Addressing	a	multi-faceted	phenomenon	and	set	of	challenges.	A	report	by	the	American	Psychological	Association’s	task	force	on	the	interface	between	psychology	and	global	climate	change.	Washington:	American	Psychological	Association.	Available	at:	http://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change.pdf		Tumasjan,	A.,	&	Braun,	R.	(2012).	In	the	eye	of	the	beholder:	How	regulatory	focus	and	self-efficacy	interact	in	influencing	opportunity	recognition.		Journal	of	Business	
Venturing,	27(6),	622-636.		Tversky,	A.,	&	Kahneman,	D.	(1981).	The	framing	of	decisions	and	the	psychology	of	
42 
 
choice.	Science,	211(4481),	453-458.		van	Vianen,	A.	E.,	Klehe,	U.	C.,	Koen,	J.,	&	Dries,	N.	(2012).	Career	adapt-abilities	scale—Netherlands	form:	Psychometric	properties	and	relationships	to	ability,	personality,	and	regulatory	focus.	Journal	of	Vocational	Behavior,	80(3),	716-724.		Wagner,	G.,	Weitzman,	M.	L.	(2015).	Climate	shock:	the	economic	consequences	of	a	hotter	
planet.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.		Wallace,	J.	C.,	Butts,	M.	M.,	Johnson,	P.	D.,	Stevens,	F.	G.,	&	Smith,	M.	B.	(2016).	A	multilevel	model	of	employee	innovation:	Understanding	the	effects	of	regulatory	focus,	thriving,	and	employee	involvement	climate.	Journal	of	Management,	42(4),	982-1004.	Wallace,	J.	C.,	Little,	L.	M.,	Hill,	A.	D.,	&	Ridge,	J.	W.	(2010).	CEO	regulatory	foci,	environmental	dynamism,	and	small	firm	performance.	Journal	of	Small	Business	
Management,	48(4),	580-604.	Wilsdon,	J.,	Willis,	R.	(2004).	See-through	science:	why	public	engagement	needs	to	move	
upstream.	London:	demos.		Zaal,	M.	P.,	Van	Laar,	C.,	Ståhl,	T.,	Ellemers,	N.,	Derks,	B.	(2015).	'Self-promotion':	How	regulatory	focus	affects	the	pursuit	of	self-interest	at	the	expense	of	the	group.	
European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	45(5),	587-598.		Zhou,	Q.,	Hirst,	G.,	&	Shipton,	H.	(2012).	Context	matters:	Combined	influence	of	participation	and	intellectual	stimulation	on	the	promotion	focus–employee	creativity	relationship.	Journal	of	Organizational	Behavior,	33(7),	894-909.	Zhu,	R.,	&	Meyers-Levy,	J.	(2007).	Exploring	the	cognitive	mechanism	that	underlies	regulatory	focus	effects.	Journal	of	Consumer	Research,	34(1),	89-96.	
43 
 
De c l a r a t i o n 	 i n 	 a c c o r d an c e 	 t o 	 § 	 8 	 ( 1 ) 	 b ) 	 a nd 	 § 	 8 	 ( 1 ) 	 c ) 	 o f 	 t h e 	
d o c t o r a l 	 d e g r e e 	 r e g u l a t i o n 	 o f 	 H e i d e l b e r g 	 Un i v e r s i t y , 	 F a c u l t y 	
o f 	 B e h a v i o u r a l 	 a nd 	 C u l t u r a l 	 S t u d i e s 	
	
 
 
Promotionsausschuss der Fakultät für Verhaltens- und Empirische Kulturwissenschaften 
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg 
Doctoral Committee of the Faculty of Behavioural and Cultural Studies, of Heidelberg University 
 
 
Erklärung gemäß § 8 Abs. 1 Buchst. b) der Promotionsordnung der Universität Heidelberg 
für die Fakultät für Verhaltens- und Empirische Kulturwissenschaften 
Declaration in accordance to § 8 (1) b) of the doctoral degree regulation of Heidelberg University, Faculty of 
Behavioural and Cultural Studies 
 
 
Ich erkläre, dass ich die vorgelegte Dissertation selbstständig angefertigt, nur die angegebenen 
Hilfsmittel benutzt und die Zitate gekennzeichnet habe. 
I declare that I have made the submitted dissertation independently, using only the specified tools and have 
correctly marked all quotations. 
 
 
Erklärung gemäß § 8 Abs. 1 Buchst. c) der Promotionsordnung der Universität Heidelberg für die 
Fakultät für Verhaltens- und Empirische Kulturwissenschaften 
Declaration in accordance to § 8 (1) c) of the doctoral degree regulation of Heidelberg University, Faculty of 
Behavioural and Cultural Studies 
 
Ich erkläre, dass ich die vorgelegte Dissertation in dieser oder einer anderen Form nicht anderweitig als 
Prüfungsarbeit verwendet oder einer anderen Fakultät als Dissertation vorgelegt habe. 
I declare that I did not use the submitted dissertation in this or any other form as an examination paper until now and 
that I did not submit it in another faculty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorname Nachname 
First name Family name ___________________Dorothee Amelung_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datum, Unterschrift 
Date, Signature _______________________________________	
44 
 
Append i x 	
 
Manuscript	1:	Amelung,	D.,	&	Funke,	J.	(2013).	Dealing	with	the	uncertainties	of	climate	engineering:	Warnings	from	a	psychological	complex	problem	solving	perspective.	
Technology	in	Society,	35(1),	32-40.	
Manuscript	2:	Amelung,	D.,	&	Funke,	J.	(2015).	Laypeople's	risky	decisions	in	the	climate	change	context:	Climate	engineering	as	a	risk-defusing	strategy?	Human	and	
Ecological	Risk	Assessment,	21(2),	533-559.	
Manuscript	3:	Fischer,	H.,	Amelung,	D.,	&	Said,	N.	(2016).	Climate	change	and	the	problem	with	overconfidence:	The	difference	between	perceived	and	actual	understanding.	Manuscript	submitted	for	publication. 
Dealing with the uncertainties of climate engineering:
Warnings from a psychological complex problem solving
perspective
Dorothee Amelung*, Joachim Funke
Department of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstraße 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 16 November 2012
Received in revised form 1 March 2013
Accepted 2 March 2013
Keywords:
Complex problem solving
Geoengineering technology
Decision-making
Uncertainty
Climate politics
a b s t r a c t
Decision-makers in the context of climate politics are confronted with considerable un-
certainties due to the complexities inherent in the relevant natural and social systems.
Nonetheless, pressure on decision-makers to ﬁnd solutions to dangerous climate change is
rising due to the inertia in the climate system. Considering these pressures, technological
options (climate engineering) have been proposed to counteract the effects of climatic
change. However, introducing options that bear their own scientiﬁc uncertainties means
further adding to the complexity of the situation. By adopting the psychological
perspective of complex problem solving research, we analyze one frequently neglected
source of uncertainty with regard to climate engineering: errors of the political problem-
solver in his interaction with the situational demands of complex problems. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we examine the psychological sources for human error that are common in
dealing with the uncertainties implied in this type of problem. We will conclude from the
complex problem solving perspective that a consideration of climate engineering in the
context of climate change can provide a dangerous illusion of controllability.
! 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Decisions in the context of climate politics are commonly
regarded as decisions under uncertainty [1], even more so
with the introduction of an additional possible strategy: the
intentional technological intervention in the global climate
system on a planetary scale (geoengineering or, more
adequately, climate engineering, hereafter shortened to CE).
From a psychological perspective, we can conceive of this
decision situation as a complex problem because very
generally speaking, complex problems require dealing with
(psychological) uncertainty [2]. Therefore, in the present
paper, we wish to stress the psychological problem solving
perspective: in order to do so we will ﬁrst give an intro-
duction to the concept of complex problems and how it
applies to the CE situation. We will proceed with the im-
plications for the problem solver. We will put emphasis on
explaining human errors and failures in the area of decisions
under uncertainty given that this decision type is closely
linked to human interaction with complex problems. These
errors and failures can be considered in themselves as a new
source of uncertainty that adds to the complexity of the
situation. We will conclude from the complex problem
solving perspective that a consideration of CE in the context
of climate change at best offers an unjustiﬁed illusion of
controllability.
2. Why ﬁnding a solution to climate change means
solving a complex problem
Having a problem means having a goal (e.g., reducing
the impacts of climatic change) while being uncertain
about how to reach it. Solving a problem implies a search
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process for means with which to overcome the barrier
imposed by the problem. In the case of climate politics,
possible means to achieve the goal could be: (a) mitigating
CO2 emissions, (b) adapting to the consequences of climatic
change, (c) deploying technological options (i.e. CE) or a
combination of these. What is the central aspect that im-
poses barriers on the problem-solver within this context?
In order to control the complex environment around them,
problem-solvers need to reduce the uncertainties involved
in the problem [2,3]. These uncertainties stem from certain
characteristics of the problem that will be outlined in the
following.
From a problem solving perspective, a situation inwhich
a strategy todealwith climate changehas to be chosen (e.g., a
decision for or against a deployment of CE), can be described
as a complex problem. A complex problem is said to occur
when the following characteristics of it complicate the
ﬁnding of a solution due to an enhanced level of uncertainty
[4,5]: (a) the number of elements relevant to the solution
process is large (complexity) aswell ashighly interconnected
(connectivity), and (b) the system is dynamically changing
over time (dynamics). In addition, (c) neither the decision
structure nor its dynamics are fully disclosed to the actor
(intransparency). Finally, (d) goals are not easily set: in
dealing with a complex problem, a decision maker is con-
frontedwith a number of different goal facets that have to be
weighted and coordinated (polytelic situation).
Let us say that, for instance, a nation state is faced with
extreme weather phenomena such as storms or droughts
that are attributable to climate change. The severity of
these weather events threaten crop yields and thus the
food supply, which results in an enhanced pressure on the
government to decide on the deployment of a CE technique
such as stratospheric aerosols [6]. The government of this
state is now faced with a complex problem as we can show
by reference to such a problem’s ﬁve characteristics:
(a) Complexity. The number of items of information that
need to be taken into account to come to an adequate
solution is extremely large if one does not only include
the physical variables (Is this speciﬁc technique effec-
tive enough to reduce the occurrence of extreme
weather events? What are the risks that can be ex-
pected?), but also the psychological and social aspects
(How will the voters of the government react to such a
decision?), the economical aspects (Are the costs of
deployment justiﬁed when compared to the beneﬁts
and risks?), and political or legal aspects (As the effects
of this option will be global in extent, how can a
consensus be reached with other states? Will other
states eventually feel threatened by a deployment?).
(b) Connectivity. CE interacts with an already intensely
connected network of variables: not onlywould such an
option inﬂuence the already highly interconnected
variables of the climate system, such as temperature,
precipitation patterns and the ozone layer, it would also
interact with, for example, social systems. For instance,
the fear of anticipated negative side-effects of a
deployment could lead to public mobilization processes
in neighboring states which means that even in the
(unlikely) absence of such negative side-effects the
potential for conﬂict is expectably high.
(c) Dynamics. CE aims at inﬂuencing the intricate future
trends of the climate system. In case of a deployment of
stratospheric aerosols as described in our exemplifying
scenario, the future trend with the targeted interven-
tion would be hard to predict since the aerosols would
curb temperature rise but would not alter the amount
of CO2 in the atmosphere. However, this is a previously
unexperienced scenario.
(d) Intransparency. Not all manifestations of relevant vari-
ables and their interconnections can be directly assessed
or observed (e.g.,many of the climate system’s intricacies
still are not perfectly understood or only reproduced
approximately in climate models) which is why the
problem structure is not completely transparent to the
problem solver. This also means that, for example,
possible unintended consequences of a deployment of
stratospheric aerosols could not adequately be deter-
mined in advance (e.g., with the help of experimental
simulations).
(e) Polytely.As a deployment of stratospheric aerosols would
have global effects, yet would involve regional variabil-
ities, there would be winners and losers. Therefore, the
goals and interests of other stakeholder groups and na-
tions have to be considered in addition to the individual’s
goal prioritization process in the face of multiple and
partly conﬂicting goals. In fact, different regional in-
terests with regard to the effects of a CE deployment are
one of the major sources of missing consensus.
In summary, these ﬁve characteristics of a complex
problem imply uncertainties for the problem solver, a
barrier that has to be overcome. We conclude, then, that CE
within the broader climate politics context can be regarded
as a prototype of a complex problem.
3. Psychological complex problem solving research in
the context of climate politics
If this is the case, canwe also conclude that it is useful to
drawonpsychological complex problem solving research in
the context of climate politics? In psychological problem
solving research, insights into the question of how in-
dividuals deal with complex problems mostly stem from
the use of computer-based simulation scenarios [7]. In
these scenarios, subjects are in charge of a complex situa-
tion for certain periods of time. Such situations can involve
managing a company, dealing with a bush ﬁre catastrophe,
or ﬁnding a solution to the ﬁnancial crisis in Europe [8]. In
order to learn about the effects of different conditions (e.g.,
degree of complexity; type of semantic embedding; avail-
ability of previous knowledge), they are experimentally
manipulated and the decision-making process is analyzed
afterwards. Insights from this type of research can be rele-
vant for climate politics because important characteristics
of the simulation tasks resemble the situationwe face in the
context of climate politics.
D. Amelung, J. Funke / Technology in Society 35 (2013) 32–40 33
The complex and dynamic environments in these
studies need to be controlled by the participants. This re-
quires them to make decisions in consecutive rounds. In
other words, rather than taking one single decision in order
to complete the task, the participants need to make a series
of interdependent decisions over time. This not only means
that they are confronted with uncertainties inherent in the
situation and experienced on a psychological level. It also
means that they need to remain capable of acting despite of
these uncertainties. They are required to act under uncer-
tainty or more speciﬁcally, they need to take decisions
under uncertainty. All of these aspects are equally relevant
in climate politics.
However, one could argue that it is objectionable to
generalize from laboratory ﬁndings with non-experts to
experts in the context of climate politics. One could also
argue that, since political decision-makers can (a) rely on
expert advice as well as (b) on computer-aided models and
(c) are used to taking decisions under uncertainty, they
would not be susceptible to the same errors as lay people
(e.g., participants in psychological experiments) are.
With regard to (a) expert advice, Philip Tetlock [9] has
demonstrated in his long-term study that expert political
predictions often are unimpressive and prone to failure,
which does not support the assumption of expert advantages
under conditions of uncertainty and in complex environ-
ments. It becomes clear why one would not assume signiﬁ-
cant differences between experts and novices as both groups
try to control complex dynamic environments that also ex-
perts only have very little experience with (e.g., the climate
system). This is because one has to (c) take decisions under
uncertainty within this type of environment while expertise
is characterized by a shift from a high level of experienced
uncertainty to a reduced level of experienced uncertainty:
“Both experts and novices are susceptible to biases, particu-
larly under highly pressurized conditions [.], or because
there simply is not enough information to decide on, or to
predict, the outcome in the environment” [2]. Clearly, there is
a high level of experienced uncertainty among experts
associated with a decision in the context of CE as one alter-
native in the ﬁght against climate change, since relevant in-
formation is, and will likely always be, lacking [10].
So far, we have established that decisions under un-
certainty are susceptible to errors regardless of expertise.
With regard to (b) it is certainly true that computer-aided
models advance our understanding of speciﬁc issues.
However, the climate models we base our decisions on are
not perfect representations of reality and are prone to er-
rors themselves. We will come back to this point in the
subsequent sections. We conclude that, as political de-
cisions are commonly made on the basis of certain pre-
dictions and strategic forecasts and thus are commonly
decisions under uncertainty, errors made by novices in
complex and uncertain environments, are comparable to
errors made by political experts in similar environments.
4. Implications of the complex problem solving
perspective for the problem solver
We have argued that a decision in the context of climate
politics is a decision under uncertainty. The uncertainties a
decision-maker is confronted with in this context result
from the characteristics of the problem structure:
complexity, connectivity, intransparency, dynamics, and
polytely.
What are the consequences for the problem solver, be
they a scientist, a politician, or the general public? The
different aspects of complex situations have speciﬁc de-
mands to the problem solver: (1) complexity requires the
reduction of information by means of model building; (2)
intransparency requires creating transparency by means of
information retrieval; (3) dynamics require the control of
systems on the basis of predictions of future trends; (4)
polytely requires solving goal conﬂicts by means of a goal
setting process including value decisions and compromises.
We argue that all of these demands amount to the fact
that the problem solver has to make decisions under un-
certainty because these task characteristics are sources of
uncertainty that are then experienced on a psychological
level [2] as a “.sense of doubt that blocks or delays action.”
[11]. This action-blocking sense of doubt is experienced
because (1) in the model building process, information has
to be reduced, (2) information that is required to create
transparency can vary in its relevancy and quality, (3)
predictions of future trends are made based on the models
as mentioned in (1), and (4) value decisions and compro-
mises between different stakeholder groups that might
have been accepted in the face of a goal conﬂict are not
necessarily stable and adequate. Human problem solvers
are prone to errors in all four ﬁelds: errors in model
building, errors in information retrieval, errors in predic-
tion and control, and errors in goal setting.
With the help of an example commonly referred to by
scientists in the ﬁeld of CE, wewill establish that a problem
in this context features the characteristics complexity,
intransparency, dynamics, and polytely. For each of these
characteristics, we will exemplify the experienced un-
certainties and common errors that result from a human
problem solvers’ interaction with them. We will discuss
each of the four dimensions separately for the reason of
clarity. In practice, they can hardly be separated, however,
as the demands for the problem solver resulting from the
dimensions are intertwined [12].
4.1. Example of a CE related complex decision
To illustrate our points, we will consider an example
that is commonly referred to by CE scientists: Political de-
cision makers need to decide about the budget that will be
spent on CE related research programs. This can be seen as
an intervention to gain control over the climate situation.
According to Bellamy and colleagues [13], a common line of
thought or framing that is found in the peer-reviewed and
gray scientiﬁc literature on CE is the following: Mitigation
policies are likely to fail to meet the goal of a 2 !C cap,
which will lead to a rise in global average temperature
above the designated level. Global warming to such high
levels is unprecedented in such a short time frame and
therefore potentially dangerous because it could lead to a
climate emergency. The implementation of a CE technique,
and more speciﬁcally one of the so-called Solar Radiation
Management (SRM) techniques, is the only presently
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known way to quickly curb the effects of such a climate
emergency. This is because SRM techniques aim at blocking
incident solar radiation hereby offsetting global warming.
Thus, these techniques represent a temporary back-up plan
in a future climate emergency scenario that would enable
politicians and scientists to work on a more sustainable
solution to climate change. Among the more intensively
discussed SRM techniques is the stratospheric aerosol op-
tion which aims at blocking the radiation by means of tiny
sulfur particles that are injected into the higher atmo-
sphere [6]. Given the large time frames still needed to
research and develop SRM techniques, a decision for
spending money on the development of SRM to have it
available in the future needs to be made now. An optimal
decision framework from an economic perspective for this
situation has been explored in a (simpliﬁed) model by
Moreno-Cruz & Keith [14].
4.2. Connectivity as a characteristic of a CE related complex
decision
A CE deployment would interact with an intensely
connected network of variables in the climate system as
well as relevant political and social systems. In our
example, we focus on the seemingly much simpler decision
whether to fund a research and development program of
one speciﬁc SRM technique (stratospheric aerosols) to have
it available as a back-up plan in the future. However, the
decision that is made today with regard to research and
development is not independent of a future decision for or
against deployment as strategic economic deliberations
demonstrate [14]. Facing a complex situation means that a
range of highly interconnected variables needs to be
considered. In taking a decision for allocating parts of the
available budget on an SRM research program, our decision
maker is faced with the interconnectedness of the available
climate strategies mitigation, adaptation and CE (SRM).
This is best exempliﬁed by the so-called moral hazard
problem, a systemic response comparable to a rebound
effect, that refers to the idea that the prospect of having a
fast and seemingly simple technological solution like CE
available in the future could undermine present mitigation
efforts [15] as well as its counterpart (the possibility that
this very notion could scare the public into heightened
mitigation efforts [6]).
However, the decision maker also needs to take the
anticipated interactions of the method he wants to support
(e.g., the stratospheric aerosols) with the climate system’s
variables into account, even if he does not intend to
implement this technique at this point in time. This is
because it would be awaste to spend limited resources on a
technique that could already be ruled out as a potentially
effective means to counteract detrimental climate change
effects.
4.2.1. Human error as a result from connectivity
The task of dealing with the interconnected variables as
illustrated in the preceding section transcends the capacity
of human memory. Therefore, our decision maker needs to
draw on computer models and simulations that are run by
climate experts. Apart from the fact that this reliance on
outside expertise poses its own challenges regarding effec-
tive communication [cf.[16]], there are restrictions set by
limited computational power, human ignorance of impor-
tant factors, or simply a lack of available data, which render
the models imperfect. As a result, the human problem solver
is likely to be confronted with the uncertainty whether a
future targeted intervention with stratospheric aerosols in
case of an emergency would be effective enough [cf.[2]], as
climate changes are not likely to be entirely reversible with
the aerosol technique [17,18], anticipated outcomes are
highly dependent on a multitude of input variables such as
aerosol size, altitude of injection, or aerosol material [19,20],
and anticipated outcomes are likely to be regionally diverse
so that, for example, a climate crisis in the tropics could be
avoided but not a polar crisis [17,18].
Even without reliance on scientiﬁc climate models, the
mind of our decision maker obviously is no “blank slate”
which means that he has a mental model of his environ-
ment, of the complex problem he wants to solve that
necessarily reduces information [21]. Among the typical
errors human problem solvers face when reducing infor-
mation to build mental models to deal with many largely
interconnected variables, are the ignorance against side
effects [22,23], and tipping points [24]. As a result, the de-
cisionmaker is likely to experience uncertainty with regard
to his ability to adequately predict the state of his
environment.
Accumulated side effects can signiﬁcantly disrupt the
intended main effects. In this context the term policy
resistance refers to the “.tendency for interventions to be
defeated by the system’s response to the intervention it-
self.” [25] Sterman argues that policy resistance is a com-
mon phenomenon due to the boundaries of our mental
models. Let us assume that, in our example, the problem
solver decides to invest a certain amount of the climate
budget into the research and development of the strategy
of stratospheric aerosols. The research program includes a
ﬁeld experiment. His intended main effect is having the
option available in a future emergency scenario. However,
due to coupled processes, one action has rarely only one
effect: he has not anticipated the strong reactions of the
people who reside near the site of the ﬁeld experiment. The
locals demonstrate and stop the ﬁeld test. But this is only
one outcome in a chain of effects that accumulate in ulti-
mately leading to the decision maker’s resignation from his
position because he has lost the conﬁdence of his voters.
His successor does not consider CE again. This example
shows how unanticipated side effects can deeply disrupt
the intended main effect.
Complex dynamic systems, ranging from ﬁnancial
markets to ecosystems and the climate, can have tipping
points at which a sudden shift to a contrasting dynamical
regime may occur [26]. The prediction of such tipping
points is very difﬁcult, even with complex computer-aided
models. Therefore, the search for early warning signals is
essential which is why the endeavor to ﬁnd indicators for a
system that approaches a critical threshold becomes
increasingly recognized [27]. Potential tipping points
complicate our political decision maker’s ability to assess
the likelihood as well as the severity of a future emergency
scenario for which he wants to prepare.
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4.3. Intransparency as a characteristic of a CE related complex
decision
Our decisionmaker is confrontedwith the fact that not all
variables, which are relevant to his decision are known to
him. Furthermore, themanifestations of the knownvariables
are not necessarily established, or only by approximation.
Latent variables often are estimated on the basis of in-
ferences from observations. This is certainly true for the
climate system. Climate scientists have to historically
reconstruct temperature from tree rings or glacier geometry
[28] or infer the permafrost’s sensitivity to future global
warming from past historical reactions to temperature
changes by analyzing relict ground ice [29]. But intrans-
parencycan also arise from the fact that a decisionmaker has
to rely on outside expertise: not everything a problem solver
canpossibly knowof is communicated to himby scientists or
other experts, not due to intentional concealment but
because time is limited and complex information needs to be
condensed in some way (on the issue of adequately
communicating climate related issues to political decision-
makers, see Ref. [16]). Furthermore, there might be intrans-
parency with regard to the preferences of different stake-
holder groups, among them our decision maker’s voters.
4.3.1. Human error as a result of intransparency
The human reaction to intransparency is experienced
(psychological) uncertainty, which in turn provokes fear
(and other negative emotions) and which usually leads to a
more intensive information search [30]. Thus, our
emotional state serves as a signal to guide our attention to
problems and to regulate our behavior answering these
problems. As we retrieve more information about the sit-
uation, thus reducing the experienced uncertainty, we
should gain conﬁdence and feel better. However, we have
established that the connectivity and complexity of the
situation necessarily requires the reduction of information
to form an adequate model (see Section 4.2.1). This means
that the identiﬁcation of relevant information as opposed
to irrelevant information is a crucial aspect of a successful
interaction with complex systems [31,32]. For example, it
will be less relevant for our decision maker to know if the
mayor of a small town in a neighboring country supports
his plans on funding SRM research, than to know the po-
sition of his country’s tax payers. As a consequence, our
decision maker is confronted with a considerable amount
of uncertainty with regard to the relevancy and
completeness of the information he bases his decision on.
However, a piece of information that is relevant for the
decision is not necessarily reliable either because it con-
tains errors or it is based on erroneous assumptions. For
example, the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SERS)
of the IPCC speciﬁcally deals with four different scenario
groups developed by Nakicenovic and Swart [33]. These
emission scenarios are based on different assumptions
concerning the demographic, societal, economic, and
technological changes that the world might face in the
future. Climate Change Scenarios based on these four
different sets of assumptions necessarily yield different
prognoses [34]. Some of these assumptions and their cor-
responding scenarios will necessarily prove to be
erroneous. However, this is the best available data our de-
cision maker can get at this point in time.
In climate change, the issue of the time frame or quantity
of information is of great importance when assessing the
reliability of information: Is the time period long enough
that we consider to differentiate the signal (anthropogenic
climate change or the effects of an SRM implementation)
from the noise (natural variations in the global climate)? For
example, if our decision maker decides to test the strato-
spheric aerosols in the ﬁeld to assess the potential positive
effects on temperature as well as the risks before full-scale
implementation, hewould need to separate the effects from
natural ﬂuctuations as well. Therefore, with such a test, a
trade-off decision would be needed between the duration
of it, the magnitude of it and the uncertainty of any esti-
mated climate response: “Accurate estimates at a local scale
would require greater time or larger forcing”. If our decision
maker wants to restrict the magnitude of the test (for
example, because with larger forcings, the line between
ﬁeld test and full implementation becomes blurry, possibly
also threatening his relations with neighboring states) he
would want to plan many years ahead: “.accurate esti-
mates could require several decades or longer” [35].
In summary, our decisionmaker needs to assess whether
the information he bases his decisions on is sufﬁcient,
relevant and of good enough quality or if additional or
different information has to be gathered, all of which adds to
his experienced uncertainty and the possibility for failure.
4.4. Dynamics as a characteristic of a CE related complex
decision
Our decision maker needs to deal with an environment
that constantly changes with and without his interference.
The inertia in the climate system is responsible for long
time delays, contributing to the fact that these changes do
not occur in a rapid manner. This means that neither the
decision makers nor those who will be affected by the
decisions are constants in our equation: Our political de-
cision maker who decides the direction we take today in
climate politics (e.g., over the funding of research programs
on stratospheric aerosols) is not necessarily the one who
will be affected by this direction, nor the one who is going
to decide over the strategies in the future (e.g., over a
possible deployment of the stratospheric aerosol method in
case of a climate emergency). Thus, the dynamics of the
situation give rise to questions concerning, for example,
intergenerational justice and the question what the pref-
erences of future generations might look like [36–38].
4.4.1. Human error as a result of dynamics
Complex dynamic systems require making predictions
about future events to exercise adequate control over them.
Based on projections of the climate characteristics we can
expect in the future, our problem solver takes decisions to
inﬂuence the situation. Thus, these predictions affect his
ability to control. Furthermore, to adequately predict
changes of the environment with andwithout interventions,
he needs to draw on his mental model to support his
decisions, which necessarily has to reduce information
(see Section 4.2.1).
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Because, as we have already outlined, both mental and
computer-aided models are not reality and have their
shortcomings, the problem solver needs to assess the val-
idity of the predictions based on these models. This is
especially true given the long time perspectives in the
climate change problem as with larger time frames, the
vagueness of predictions increases [39]. Coming back to the
example of an SRM ﬁeld test, if our decision maker decides
to carry it out only for a short duration, effects would need
to be extrapolated from the effects found during the time
frame of the test, yielding signiﬁcant uncertainties [35].
Thus, the uncertainties that are associated with the climate
models he bases his predictions onmake it more difﬁcult to
control the complex system. More speciﬁcally, difﬁculties
as well as errors in prediction represent a source of un-
certainty that impedes adequate control.
Where do these difﬁculties stem from? Regarding his
mental model, our human problem solver will have the
general tendency to base predictions on simpliﬁed linear
models that face difﬁculties when dealing with non-
linearities, cyclic processes, long time delays, and stock and
ﬂow principles [4,40–42]. The dynamics of a complex sys-
tem require learning to improve predictions [43]. It is
possible for the human mind to learn to effectively control
complex environments [44,45]. However, certain pre-
conditions have to be met to enable adequate learning:
Learning requires feedback [21,46] while frequent feedback
in fast consecutive cycles (with short decision delays) is
better suited than less rapid and less frequent feedback
response, which is why more frequent policy strategy in-
terventions to improve learning in the context of climate
politics have been suggested [47]. However, with climate
change, there are no fast feedback responses. Therefore,
one needs to rely on simulations.
Of course, feedback can also vary in its quality [22]. This
is similar to the issue of the quality of information that we
base our decisions on and to the intransparency dimension
of a complex problem: as the feedback we observe in the
environment often is ambiguous and intransparent, we
have to infer from these observations the underlying vari-
ables: For example, if our decision maker, after giving funds
to his SRM research program, observes that the companies
in his region are not meeting their CO2 emissions targets
anymore, he might attribute this failure to their managers’
reduced motivation to do so because of them relying on the
prospect of a climate emergency insurance option, even if
the reason might lie elsewhere. For example, the com-
panies’ managements might have been waiting for the
upcoming annual United Nations Framework on Climate
Change meeting’s negotiation results with regard to long-
term emission targets.
4.5. Polytely as a characteristic of a CE related complex
decision
Our decision maker is confronted with several goals: he
wants to ﬁnd a solution to climate change in the short and
in the long run, hewants to reduce costs, hewants to stayon
peaceful termswith neighboring states, and be re-elected at
the end of his term of ofﬁce. All of these goals can be further
subdivided into subgoals, for example “ﬁnding a solution to
climate change” can mean a multitude of things: working
with other countries on global treaties to reduce emissions,
taking part in carbon trading, promoting climate programs
to change the behavior of citizens, reducing the costs of
climate damages in the long run, preparing for a possible
climate emergency in the future etc. The decision for allo-
cating funds to an SRM research program could be expe-
dient to prepare for a possible climate emergency in the
future but it might be conﬂicting with regard to his re-
election or with his behavior change programs (as the
notion of an “insurance” against dangerous climate change
effects could undermine people’s motivation to change
their behavior to reduce emissions). The polytelic nature of
this situation necessitates setting up priorities and
balancing conﬂicting values and goals. Therefore, in a ﬁrst
step, goals need to be identiﬁed (this can be confusing
enough for the individual as values have to be prioritized in
the face of a hierarchy of numerous goals on different levels
of abstraction [48]). However, as soon as our decisionmaker
has identiﬁed his own goals, the latter still have to be
negotiated with other affected individuals or groups in a
second step. Concerning this large-scale emergent tech-
nology, what level of risk does a society as a whole wish to
accept when balanced against the risks of climate change
[49]? Are the stratospheric aerosols an acceptable method,
even in case of an emergency, as they are likely to introduce
new risks to the environment, for example ozone depletion
[50]? Can CE be brought into accordance with a nation’s
values as well as its cultural and natural belief systems, is it
morally justiﬁable [51]?
4.5.1. Human error as a result of polytely
Goals can be shifting in the light of new information or
because the conditions in the environment have changed,
for example, the preferences of stakeholders. However, this
adds to the experienced uncertainty of a political decision
maker with regard to his ability to predict and control his
environment [cf.[2]] since the stability of any compromise
within his nation and between nations largely depends on
the stability of the stakeholder groups’ interests and goals.
Psychological research with complex dynamic systems has
shown that people are more successful in the long-term
control of these systems with an open-minded learning
attitude: the pursuit of a non-speciﬁc goal such as to learn
as much as possible about the system helps provide the
decision maker with the ﬂexibility needed to cope with
changing demands of the system and thus changing goals
[52–54]. Thus, a more speciﬁc goal such as the preparation
for a climate emergency does not necessarily allow for this
ﬂexibility when the decision maker focuses on it.
The goals of a decision maker largely depend on the
mental model he has of the problem: if he views the
climate change problem as a risk management issue as
opposed to an economic efﬁciency issue [49], his goals are
likely to shift accordingly. This highlights how the different
characteristics of a complex problem relate to each other:
The connectivity, intransparency, and dynamics of the sit-
uation impede the building of an adequate mental model
which in turn inﬂuences the goal setting process. This also
underlines the importance for a decision maker to
constantly update his mental model on the basis of new
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information and feedback hereby being open for the pos-
sibility to reframe the entire problem rather than to simply
integrate new knowledge into the existing model. This type
of learning which implies the open-mindedness to chal-
lenge existing problem framings, is emphasized by Sterman
[21] as an important way of dealing with complex systems.
He argues that this type of learning requires the use of
simulations for decision makers as well as training of de-
cision makers in scientiﬁc reasoning skills.
In addition to this, an open learning attitude can be
promoted by the integration of different perspectives. This
can apply to the integration of the perspectives of multiple
scientiﬁc disciplines or the integration of different stake-
holders’ perspectives. It certainly is essential that the
complexity of CE research is dealt with in terms of multiple
scientiﬁc disciplines to allow for an evaluation of the po-
tential beneﬁts, the risks and uncertainties of CE according
to the principle of multiperspectivity [55,56]. This is neces-
sary because adopting a complex system’s perspective we
argue that single perspectives often are too fragmented to
adequately understand the intricacies of a system. More-
over, simply aggregating the different perspectives does not
necessarily lead to a correct understanding of the system
[57]. With regard to the goal negotiation process between
stakeholders, a participatory approach involving important
stakeholders seems to be appropriate because next to the
fact that multiple perspectives likely converge to more
appropriate solution proposals, those solutions arising from
a transparent participatory process might also be more
acceptable to a broader community than single-perspective
solutions [58–63].
5. Discussion
By adopting the complex problem solving perspective,
we were able to identify and systematize the theoretically
relevant uncertainties together with common areas of fail-
ure that arise from the interactionwith the characteristics of
a CE related political problem. More speciﬁcally, we have
argued that human problem solvers face difﬁculties in
model building, retrieving the right amount of relevant
items of reliable information, predicting future trends, as
well as selecting goals, all of which are basic prerequisites to
controlling a complex environment. Climate scientists and
experts in CE related ﬁelds have argued before that human
error in dealingwith complex systems should be regarded as
one important non-technical risk factor in the emergence of
CE [64]. Psychological research in complex problem solving
further substantiates this notion because by human errors in
model building, information search, prediction, and goal
setting, uncertainties are introduced into an adequate
decision-making process regarding CE technology.
However, does this mean that, from a psychological
complex problem-solving point of view, the risk of human
error outweighs potential beneﬁts of CE? Might there be
any hope to overcome the different sources of error and
failure in complex problem solving and in decision-making
under uncertainty, respectively? The uncertainties we are
faced with in our climate models and thus also in the future
scenarios upon which political decisions are based, are
continuously reduced, for example, with the help of better
resolutions, enhanced computational power, or new in-
sights into important factors of inﬂuence. However, they
are unlikely to be ever completely resolved and new un-
certainties might emerge as our understanding of the
relevant systems is advanced.
Is it hybris, then, to think humans could safely intervene
in the climate system, turning it to their advantage?Wehave
established that learning is the only way of coming to terms
with the uncertainty in the management of complex dy-
namic systems. Therefore, as an important precondition for
any problemsolver tomake effective decisions in the context
of CE is an awareness, an active scrutinizing and constant
updating of his mental model of the problem structure.
Closely linked to this is the need for effective communication
strategies between scientists, political decision makers as
well as other stakeholders that involve simulation tech-
niques andmapping tools [16], and anopen-minded attitude
with the true willingness to learn on all sides.
Moreover, to enable learning, goals as well as their un-
derlying models should not be too narrowly deﬁned:
framing the issue of climate change around catastrophic
scenarios, therefore focusing on the goal of climate emer-
gency preparation should not prevent a decision maker
from exploring and learning about other options such as
carbon capture and storage or adaptation strategies. A focus
on too narrowly deﬁned goals could lead to premature
(intellectual) lock-in to any speciﬁc technology [cf.[65]].
However, in the CE context, we are faced with multiple
situational characteristics that hinder effective learning:
decade-long time delays do not allow us to obtain imme-
diate feedback from our actions in fast learning cycles,
intransparent processes, and process couplings hinder the
unambiguous attribution of cause to effect, ethical con-
siderations as well as the globality of effects make real life
experimentation impossible and reliance on imperfect
models a necessity. Under these difﬁcult learning condi-
tions, aspirations to adequately predict and control a sys-
tem, must be exaggerated. However, CE technology
speciﬁcally aims at controlling a system.
Members of the scientiﬁc community have, of course,
acknowledged the risks and uncertainties associated with
CE and have fundamentally challenged the idea of trying to
interfere with the global climate system by technological
means [64]. However, common justiﬁcations of pursuing
the idea despite all objections involve the argument that
the overall goal of CE is not the control of the climate sys-
tem (as it is acknowledged that this is not possible) but
rather that CE might be the lesser evil compared to a future
of catastrophic climate change effects and that therefore
future generations need to be provided with the option of it
[66]. The superﬁcial attractiveness of this argument has
already been challenged from an ethical point of view [67].
The complex problem solving perspective adds to these
reservations by the following rationale: Even if the case for
CE as a long-term strategy of controlling the climate system
is not made, by adopting a mental model following these
arguments, the impression is made that the climate system
can be controlled at least in the short term until more
sustainable solutions have been achieved, for example, by
mitigation strategies. This in turn enhances the perceived
controllability of the system, at the same time reducing
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psychological uncertainty. We argue that this perceived
controllability due to a simpliﬁed mental model of the
situation (along the lines of “if the worst case happens, we
will have a plan b available”) might have a reassuring effect
on political problem solvers, but is illusionary.
The present article has outlined the reasons for our
claim: Let us assume that political problem solvers adopt an
open learning attitude and perfectly communicate with the
experts they rely on, thus having an updated mental model
of the problem structure at their disposal, allowing them to
(a) base their decisions on the best available predictions
and (b) to set adequate goals and achieve stable compro-
mises with stakeholders. Even under these idealized con-
ditions, we are still faced with the so-called “unknown
unknowns” [68,69]: one unforeseen process can signiﬁ-
cantly disrupt all well-intentioned actions. However, our
analysis of the characteristics of a CE related policy problem
has shown that erroneous decisions due to inaccurate in-
formation, mental models and/or goals are not the excep-
tion but can be expected and idealized conditions can
therefore not be assumed. Moreover, as our ability to learn
to control the complex climate system is dramatically
reduced by its inherent characteristics, the complex prob-
lem solving perspective severely challenges the illusory
assumption of CE being a justiﬁable control strategy even in
the short run and in the case of a climate emergency.
6. Conclusion
The present article presents human errors in the inter-
action with a complex problem of taking uncertain policy
decisions with regard to CE technology. By such an adop-
tion of the complex problem solving perspective, these
errors can be systematized and practical implications for
decision-making can be derived. However, as we have
established, dealing with complex dynamic systems re-
quires learning, which is severely complicated by the
characteristics of the climate system. Under these condi-
tions, control is likely to be corrupted by the limitations of
the humanmind. Thus, the psychological complex problem
solving perspective calls for a cautious approach to argu-
ments that frame CE as an option of temporary emergency
control because such a control is illusionary.
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ABSTRACT
This study explores the development of laypeople’s preferences for newly emerg-
ing climate engineering technology (CE). It examines whether laypeople perceive
CE to be an acceptable back-up strategy (plan B) if current efforts to mitigate CO2
emissions were to fail. This idea is a common justification for CE research in the
scientific debate and may significantly influence future public debates. Ninety-eight
German participants chose their preferred climate policy strategy in a quasi-realistic
scenario. Participants could chose between mitigation and three CE techniques as
alternative options. We employed a think-aloud interview technique, which allowed
us to trace participants’ informational needs and thought processes. Drawing on
Huber’s risk management decision theory, the study addressed whether specific CE
options are more likely to be accepted if they are mentally represented as a back-up
strategy. Results support this assumption, especially for cloud whitening. This result
is especially relevant considering the high prevalence of the plan B framing in CE
appraisal studies and its implications for public opinion-formation processes.
Key Words: climate engineering, climate politics, risk perception, moral judg-
ment, public acceptance, values, metacognition.
INTRODUCTION
“If sizeable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will not happen and temper-
atures rise rapidly, then climatic engineering, such as presented here, is the only
option available to rapidly reduce temperature rises and counteract other climatic
effects” (Crutzen 2006, p. 216). Climate engineering (CE; also widely known as
geoengineering) denotes a set of several newly emerging technological options to
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combat climate change. The options are commonly differentiated into two distinct
categories: Carbon dioxide removal techniques that seek to intervene in the global
carbon cycle by removing excess CO2 from the atmosphere and solar radiation man-
agement techniques that aim at shielding incident solar radiation. The former thus
addresses the main trigger for the climate’s warming but would not affect global
average temperature until after a time delay of several decades, while the latter
only addresses the symptoms, but would show its effects at a much faster pace. An
overview of suggested techniques and the current state of research can be found in
the Royal Society’s special report on the topic (Royal Society 2009).
Crutzen’s remark quoted above has initiated a vigorous scientific debate about
the possible role of CE as an emergency option or plan B if international policy
efforts to meet the designated 2◦Celsius limit fail. This scenario is not unlikely since
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement
to significantly reduce carbon emissions (hereafter referred to as mitigation), has
expired in 2012, while the member states of the second commitment period until
2020 are only responsible for 15% of global emissions. Furthermore, a universal
climate agreement that will only become effective in 2020 cannot be expected before
2015. Moreover, the general public seems to be reluctant to adopt climate-friendly
behaviors (Dutt and Gonzalez 2012; Gifford 2011; Tobler et al . 2012).
Since 2006, the argument that CE represents a plan B for mitigation efforts
has widely been adopted by researchers as a justification for pursuing the idea
and has been a prevalent contextual framing of the issue within the scientific debate
(Bellamy et al . 2012; Ott 2011) and in theGermanmedia (Schulz 2011a,b). However,
not all scientists share the notion that research and development of CE options
should be encouraged to have an emergency option available (Robock 2008). Also,
within an interested lay public, skepticism towards CE has already become apparent.
For example, disapproving reactions to the first CE-related field trials led to their
significant delay (e.g., LOHAFEX, a German-Indian ocean fertilization experiment
of 2009) or even to their abandonment (SPICE, a UK-based field experiment on
testing the stratospheric aerosol technique that was called off in 2012) (Galaz 2012).
Consistent with this reaction, the role of the public in deciding over the future of
CE has been widely acknowledged: “Geoengineering research that may impact the
environment, or any moves toward potential deployment, should not proceed in the
absence of a wider dialogue between scientists, policymakers, the public and civil
society groups” (Royal Society 2009, p. 42).
However, CE technologies are still largely unknown to the broader public in the
United States and Europe (Mercer et al . 2011; Poumadere et al . 2011), and the
search for factors contributing to the development of public preferences for CE
technologies is still at an early stage. Because lay individuals have only marginally
been exposed to information about CE, there is little understanding about the
process of how they form their opinions on this topic.
The present study seeks to explore the development of laypeople’s preferences
with regard to CE. We applied the risky decision-making theory by Huber (2007,
2012) to explain preferences based on CE technology risk perceptions. Perceived
risks are expected to play a dominant role in the future public debate on CE (Royal
Society 2009). The theory promotes the idea that when people are confronted with
an attractive but risky option in a decision scenario, they actively search for an
2 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
additional strategy to defuse the risks involved in this option (e.g., when having
oneself vaccinated against a dangerous disease before deciding to go on a trip to
another country with high infection risk). This additional strategy can take the form
of a back-up plan for the attractive alternative, which—within the climate change
context—closely resembles the plan B narrative in the scientific debate. Research on
CE might provide future generations with a back-up strategy to mitigation efforts.
This idea is the central object of our study because it can be seen as one important
way of framing a future public debate. Concern has already been expressed that this
frame, if predominant in a political or public discourse, may prematurely enhance
the acceptability of CE (Bellamy et al . 2012) because it leads to a positive, CE-
supportive conclusion. However, this assumption has yet to be empirically tested.
We begin with a brief outline of the methodological challenge in studying pub-
lic perceptions of CE because of their susceptibility to contextual framing effects.
Subsequently, we introduce the plan B idea as our object of study and explain how
Huber’s theory in risky decision-making relates to this idea, from which we derive
and test our hypotheses.
The Challenge of Studying Public Perceptions of CE
A growing body of research on public perceptions of CE has recently emerged,
most of it conducted in the English-speaking world (Bellamy and Hulme 2011;
Kahan et al . 2012; Mercer et al . 2011; Poumadere et al . 2011). In Germany, we know
of one report on CE that includes an examination of likely public perceptions on CE
(Rickels et al . 2011), yet the findings are based on expert discussions and analogous
conclusions of comparable technologies rather than on empirical data. This bias of
empirical data in favor of the English-speaking world implies that previous findings
might not be generalizable to other countries. In line with this concern, cultural
values as well as national contexts have been acknowledged as important factors of
influence on the public’s reactions to technological risks (Kahan 2010; Renn and
Rohrmann 2010). However, we also know of one cross-cultural study on the public’s
support for different climate change policies, which included technological options,
and which did not show large variations between economics and business students’
opinions across national samples (Bostrom et al . 2012).
All of these studies had to deal with the methodological challenge of assessing lay
opinions towards an issue that is still mostly unknown or generally not understood.
This lack of knowledge implies that opinions are not well developed and therefore
can easily be influenced by the question format or can depend on the way in
which necessary background information is presented, that is, the way the issue or
the questions themselves are framed. For example, Bellamy and colleagues (2012)
argued that the context frames employed in several studies on public perceptions of
CE (Mercer et al . 2011; Natural Environmental Research Council 2010) are likely to
have influenced the acceptability of CE. Because these studies described the future
in terms of a climate emergency, an implicit necessity of researching CE might have
been suggested. Accordingly, Mercer and colleagues acknowledged that the “ . . .
public opinion on SRM [Solar Radiation Management] is strongly contingent on
how, where and in what context SRM is discussed” (2011, p. 9). However, none of
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the studies have assessed the potential role of a specific contextual framing such as
the plan B idea for laypeople’s preferences from a process perspective.
CE as a Plan B
After a review of CE appraisals in the peer-reviewed and grey scientific literature,
Bellamy and colleagues (2012) identified the two most prevalent ways in which CE
was framed: Most frequently, the authors introduced CE against the background
of (a) insufficient mitigation efforts and (b) a possible climate emergency. Taken
together, these two contextual framings engender the perception that CE is an
emergency back-up strategy or plan B. The line of thought is as follows: Mitigation
policies might fail to meet the goal of a 2◦C cap, which will lead to a rise in global
average temperature above the designated level. Global warming to such high levels
is unprecedented in such a short time frame and therefore potentially dangerous
because it could lead to a climate emergency. CE could represent a temporary plan
B while working on a more sustainable solution to climate change.
The idea of having CE available as a back-up strategy in the event that mitigation
efforts fail plays an important role in the scientific debate, because it represents
one major justification for more research on CE. Concurrently, the line of thought
given above has already appeared in the media, for example, in German newspaper
articles (Schulz 2011a,b). In these articles, the plan B narrative has already been
used as a means of communicating the issue of CE to the public, which suggests that
it is a possible influential framing in a future public debate on CE.
Huber’s Theory of Risky Decision-Making and the Plan B Narrative
In his theory on risky choice, Huber emphasizes the processes underlying risky
behavior in quasi-realistic scenario settings (Huber 2007; Huber et al . 2001; Huber
et al . 1997). One important step in this process includes the active construction
of a mental representation of the decision situation, which can dynamically change
throughout the decision process when forming a solution (Svenson 1996). Themen-
tal representation is based on situational information the decision-maker has about
the different options.When the risky decision situation is not pre-structured as it is in
gambling experiments, the classical paradigm to analyze behavior under uncertainty
(Kahnemann and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahnemann 1981), decision-makers
are required to search for the information that they believe is important when form-
ing a decision. Huber argues that in such quasi-realistic settings people usually are
not interested in probabilities but instead try to actively reduce the risks involved in
the situation. This means that they search for an additional action or risk-defusing
operator to reduce the risks they identify with an otherwise attractive choice option.
By incorporating such an operator into the problem space, the perceived risk of the
different options is changed, which in turn influences the final decision.
To allow for a tracing of the decision process, different variations of the Active
Information Search Method have been employed (Huber 2007). By use of these
methods, it has been shown that most decision-makers identify a preferential option
based on a screening of the option’s advantages early in the process, at least if they
do not act under time pressure (Huber et al . 2011; Huber and Kunz 2007; Svenson
1996). Then, further information search is focused on this attractive option and
4 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
the search for a risk-defusing action is initiated, if necessary. If the search for a risk-
defusing operator is not initiated or if it is unsuccessful, participants have been shown
to frequently adopt the MAXIMIN heuristic, according to which the alternative with
the least negative outcome is chosen (Ba¨r and Huber 2008).
So far, Huber’s theory has mainly been tested in artificial scenarios, which are
not based on scientific knowledge about complex relations as we can find them in
the climate system. Also, the theory has been mainly applied to small-scale risks that
are controllable on a personal level such as the control of infection risk by means of
vaccination (Lion et al . 2002). However, the framework’s usefulness has been proven
for some real-life applications in the health and insurance sectors. For example, it
has been applied to the decision-making process of genetic counselees (Shiloh
et al . 2006), where it could successfully predict their informational needs. It was also
successful in predicting customers’ decisions whether to buy insurance (Ranyard and
McHugh 2012; Williamson et al . 2000a) and has theoretically contributed to issues
of applied risk management in the environmental sector such as rural development
(Kostov and Lingard 2003).
In the context of the climate change problem, the theory could explain how
a mental representation is developed in an opinion-formation process on CE that
resembles the plan B narrative. More specifically, the theory would predict the
following steps based on its process assumptions:
1. First, an attractive option is identified. In the climate change context, mitigation
might represent such an initially attractive option based on an evaluation of its
risks, because it is perceived to have a low potential of negative side effects on the
environment, and it is more familiar compared to CE (Slovic 1987).
2. A possible negative outcome (i.e., risk) of the attractive option is detected. Mit-
igation strategies may yield a low potential for negative side effects on the envi-
ronment, however, they still bear the risk of possible failure. Note, that for the
development of this mental representation, a person needs to focus on the po-
tential risk of failure of mitigation, rather than the risks of economic and societal
change, which also pertain to the mitigation strategy.
3. The decision-maker searches for an action to be taken in addition to the attractive
alternative to reduce its risk.We refer to this kind of search behavior as risk-defusing
behavior . To defuse the risk of mitigation, one could (additionally) support the
development of CE technology.
4. If the search for a risk-defusing operator is successful, the attractive alternative
is chosen together with this operator. In a climate change decision scenario, the
decision-maker might choose mitigation together with a CE option as the risk-
defusing strategy. Thus, a decision-maker who develops the idea that CE might
represent a plan B to mitigation efforts is likely to include CE as part of a strategy
to counteract climate change.
Huber’s theory is applicable to decision situations that are obviously risky. Thus,
the riskiness of the alternatives should represent a salient dimension for decision-
makers. The theory’s applicability to CE in the climate change context is question-
able, because whether or not laypeople would focus on the dimension of risk is
unclear. Numerous other criteria have been suggested as possible factors to evaluate
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015 5
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such a complex issue like CE. The Royal Society Report (2009) mentions several
criteria, including issues of law or equity (given the global extent and regional vari-
ability of CE and climate change effects), issues of timeliness (given the large time
framewhich also implies questions of intergenerational justice), or cost-effectiveness
considerations. However, we focus on an assessment of the risk dimension, because
we assume that laypeople consider the risks to be especially important relative to
other possible dimensions when they are confronted with the idea of CE technology.
In line with this, the Royal Society suggests that the public’s view of CE is likely to be
dominated by potential negative side effects or risks of CE: “Experience with other
similar issues indicates that public perceptions of geoengineering are likely to be
dominated by the risk of something going wrong . . . ” (Royal Society 2009, p. 42).
This notion is further supported by Mercer and colleagues (2011), who found that
the perceived riskiness of CE is a central aspect in the opinion-formation process.
Therefore, we assume that risk is the attribute most people will attend to when con-
fronted with the notion of CE. This also suggests that preferences with regard to CE
are likely to be influenced by the perceived riskiness of CE.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Our primary goal in the present study was to investigate the processes underlying
the formation of laypeople’s preferences with regard to CE in the context of climate
change. More specifically, we assessed the potential role of the plan B argument in
the preference formation process with the following research question in mind: Do
laypeople perceive CE to be an acceptable option as part of a risk-defusing strategy
in case mitigation efforts fail? Our assumptions and hypotheses were as follows:
H1a. We assumed that perceived risk is an important factor in laypeople’s pref-
erence formation process of CE. This should become evident in their informa-
tional needs.
• We hypothesized that participants would ask for the risk aspect more often
than for any other aspect (e.g., cost or effectiveness) in a quasi-realistic decision
scenario.
H1b. We assumed that if perceived risk is an important factor in laypeople’s
preference formation process of CE, this aspect should also influence the final
preferences with regard to CE.
• We hypothesized that subjective risk assessments would have an effect on the
final decisions in a quasi-realistic decision scenario.
H2a. We assumed that laypeople developing the idea that CE represents a
possible risk-defusing back-up plan for mitigation are more inclined to accept
CE.
• We hypothesized that participants showing risk-defusing behavior for miti-
gation would be more inclined to accept CE as part of their decision in a
quasi-realistic scenario than those who do not show this kind of behavior.
H2b. Risk-defusing behavior can only be successful if an acceptable risk-defusing
strategy is found. The risks associated with the risk-defusing strategy should
6 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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therefore not exceed the perceived risks already involved in the attractive al-
ternative because this would mean replacing one unacceptable risk with an-
other. More specifically, the risks associated with the attractive alternative (e.g.,
mitigation) must be traded off against the risks associated with the possible
risk-defusing strategies (e.g., the CE options). Therefore, we assumed that a CE
option can only be chosen as a risk-defusing strategy if the associated risks are
comparably low.
• We hypothesized that, apart from risk-defusing behavior, lower subjective risk
assessments of at least one CE option would be associated with CE acceptance
as part of a decision in a quasi-realistic scenario.
METHOD
Participants
The majority of participants were recruited from psychology lectures and various
other departments of Heidelberg University. A smaller proportion of the sample was
approached at meetings of the Heidelberg formations of the “Gru¨ne Hochschul-
gruppe,” a students’ organization of Germany’s green party “Die Gru¨nen,” and
“Greenpeace.” We did not reject participants from nationalities other than German.
However, as a prerequisite, they needed to be living in Germany so that we could
expect them to have similar access to media coverage on CE and similar amounts
of background knowledge on climate change and CE. Furthermore, they needed
to be fluent in German, so that they would not have problems understanding the
material in the study. The study was advertised as a psychological experiment on
environmental issues. CE was not mentioned as a topic at this point, because we
expected a low familiarity with the term and associated concepts among students
and the general population. The study was conducted from May to August 2011,
when media coverage was at a very low level and any form of public debate was
practically non-existent (Rickels et al . 2011).
Three participants were excluded from all analyses due to technical problems
or mistakes made by the experimenters. Of the remaining 98 participants, the
majority was female (n = 75). 86% of the participants were of German nationality;
all participants lived and worked in Heidelberg, Germany.
Participants were typically young and well educated: The vast majority of the
sample participants (92.9%) were between 15 and 35 years of age. 91 participants
indicated that they were currently undertaking an academic degree or had already
obtained one. Their education stemmed from a broad range of disciplines (mostly
in the arts or the social sciences, while about one-half (n = 53) were in the field of
psychology). The highest level of education obtained or sought after by the remain-
ing 7 participants was the German Abitur (the general qualification for university
entrance). A minority of 20 participants were active members of an environmental
group or organization (i.e., the Heidelberg formations of the “Gru¨ne Hochschul-
gruppe,” a students’ organization of Germany’s green party, “Die Gru¨nen,” as well
as “Greenpeace”). Please refer to the online supplemental information (SI) for a
detailed overview of the nationalities, age structure, educational background and
academic disciplines of the participants in our sample.
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Measures
The decision scenario
A decision scenario was presented in the form of a one-to-one interview using the
conversation-based Active Information Search method and participants were asked
to think aloud while performing the task (Huber et al . 1997;Williamson et al . 2000b).
We decided to deploy this method, because our hypotheses focused on the process
of preference formation with regard to CE. The method encourages participants
to ask for the information they need to make an informed decision. Therefore, it
enabled us to trace important steps in the decision process such as the construction
of a mental representation based on information that participants judged to be
important. The method was conducted in a conversation-based manner to establish
a sufficiently natural atmosphere that would keep participants engaged with the task.
The interview was recorded. To standardize the approach, answers were presented
on printed cards. In several pilot studies, different versions of the scenario were
tested. Based on free comments as well as standardized ratings of the participants
in our pretests, we reduced the amount of background information to a minimum,
concentrated on simple facts, and eliminated emotionally charged adjectives such
as “crisis” to make the scenario as neutral and unpersuasive as possible. We provided
the participants with a role that was sufficiently realistic, a role with which they could
easily identify. We also created a hypothetical situation in which they believed that
their decision would have a political impact.
In the final version of the scenario, which can be found in the online supple-
mental information, participants were told that as citizens and taxpayers of their
country, they were selected for a civil survey, asking them the method for which the
“federal climate change budget” should allocate funds. Four alternative methods
were presented: mitigation and three of the most controversial CE techniques in-
cluding stratospheric aerosols, cloud whitening , and ocean fertilization. The idea behind
the stratospheric aerosols technique is to inject tiny reflective particles, such as sul-
fate aerosols, into the stratosphere that reflect sunlight back into space, which would
cause a cooling effect. The cloud whitening method has a similar rationale: it aims
to enhance the reflectivity of marine clouds by injecting sea salt particles to brighten
them. The ocean fertilization method is fundamentally different from the first two
because it seeks to remove excess CO2 from the atmosphere. More specifically, the
method aims at enhancing natural respiratory processes in the ocean by promoting
algae growth. Greater amounts of algae are then expected to take up more CO2
from the atmosphere, hopefully storing it in the deep sea by use of the biological
pump (for more detailed information on the CE options we presented as well as our
rationale for choosing them, see the SI and Royal Society 2009).
The participants in the present study were provided with only a general de-
scription of the CE options in our scenario. The names of the techniques were
presented together with the information that the stratospheric aerosols and the
cloud whitening methods are “technological options with the aim to block incident
solar radiation.” Ocean fertilization was characterized as “a technological option
with the aim to remove excess CO2 from the atmosphere.” We did not inform partic-
ipants about the possibility to combine several options, because we wanted to avoid
suggesting certain framings of the decision problem. In case participants asked for
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this possibility, we had prepared a standardized answer to tell them they were al-
lowed to combine options but that they had to prioritize them, because the federal
budget would not suffice to equally support every option. Thus, while we largely
followed the standard procedure to test the assumptions of Huber’s theory, we also
made three necessary changes as specified in the following.
a. In contrast to the common approach, we included possible risk-defusing oper-
ators (i.e., the CE options) as part of the presented alternatives. This approach
enabled us to test the possibility that laypeople would spontaneously perceive CE as
a back-up strategy for mitigation efforts. At the same time, we were able to avoid
suggesting the formation of any specific mental representation of the problem.
We decided to include several CE options as alternatives, because previous stud-
ies found that it is unlikely for people who do not expect to find a risk-defusing
strategy to actively search for one (Huber 2007; Huber and Huber 2008). If we
had employed the typical approach to the theory’s paradigm, we would not have
expected participants to explore the situation in search for possible risk-defusing
operators in the context of climate policy strategies based on their estimated
background knowledge.
Moreover, we had to develop an interview technique that introduced the
choice options by use of a minimum of context information or framing that
could possibly suggest an order of priority or any connections between them.
Therefore, we introduced the strategies as independent decision alternatives
revealing only a minimum amount of information, not suggestive of an inherent
hierarchy between them. For the same reasons, we did not intervene into the
decision-making process by requesting additional information in the course of
the interview, by which we would have provoked specific trains of thought or
would have distracted participants from their original ideas, prohibiting us from
assessing the spontaneous development of certain mental representations.
b. Contrary to the standard procedure, we refrained from stating risks involved in
our scenario for two reasons. First, we had observed a devastating motivational
effect from emphasizing the risks and possible negative consequences of the
current climate change situation and its anticipated future in several pretests
with an earlier version of the scenario (common reactions were: “Well, then it’s
too late anyway” or “I can’t listen to these worst case scenarios anymore. What
difference can I make?”). Second, we were concerned that by focusing on the
risk aspect, we would bias participants’ mental representations of the task or even
their final decisions.
c. As opposed to the scenarios that are commonly employed in Huber’s experimen-
tal settings, our scenario was based on a real-life problem and on real scientific
background information. Therefore, participants were expected to have (varying
degrees of) background knowledge on climate change and related policies.
Background knowledge scales
To allow for the inclusion of background knowledge as a control variable we
incorporated the respective measures: we asked participants to indicate the amount
of previous knowledge they had of climate change, climate politics, and CE on
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015 9
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6-point rating scales ranging from no background knowledge to very much background
knowledge.
Questions for the active information search method
The Royal Society Report on CE (2009) served as an orientation in the process
of collecting and roughly classifying the questions our participants would find nec-
essary while completing the task, and in formulating the corresponding answers.
We adapted the categories probability information (e.g., “How likely is it that the 2-
degrees-Celsius target will be met?”), background information, either general (e.g.,
“What does climate change cost?”) or specific to the alternatives (addressing the
basic idea behind the technical implementation, for example, “How does option
x work?”), positive consequences (e.g., “What are the advantages or positive effects of
option x?”), and negative consequences (e.g., “What are the disadvantages or negative
effects of option x?”) from existing classifications (Huber et al . 2001; Huber et al .
1997; Wilke et al . 2008). We extended this classification scheme by the following CE
evaluation criteria proposed by the Royal Society: effectiveness (e.g., “How effective is
option x on a global level?”), timeliness (e.g., “How quickly could option x show its
effects?”), cost (“How much would option x cost?”), reversibility (e.g., “For how long
would we need to invest in or implement option x?”). We added fairness as a further
category possibly relevant for our participants given the context of climate change
(“Are there any nations/areas that would benefit more from option x than other
countries/areas?”). All of these criteria were equally applicable to the mitigation
option in our decision scenario. We tested and extended our questions in several
pretests. The questions we prepared can be seen as a template. Participants did not
need to adhere to the exact wording of these questions to obtain the answers. As
long as it was clear to the experimenter that the question concerned the informa-
tion given in the answer, the respective card was presented to the participant. The
formulation of the answers was also based on the Royal Society report. We adopted
a factual style to avoid biased answers. The wording was held constant in between
all four options to control for possible resulting effects (a full list of questions and
answers is available upon request from the corresponding author).
Post-interview questionnaire
We asked participants to write down a short description of their final decision, as
well as their main reasons for it, upon completion of the decision task. To measure
the participants’ risk perceptions to test our second hypothesis, the questionnaire
included a 6-point rating scale of the perceived riskiness for each presented option.
The scales ranged from not at all risky to very risky.
PROCEDURE
Prior to the experimental phase, three different experimenters were trained
to adequately realize the think-aloud method. This training was done to avoid
influencing participants with verbal or non-verbal cues, and to enhance com-
parability between the three experimenters’ reactions. The participants were
10 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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randomly assigned to the three experimenters. The general procedure was as
follows:
After providing demographic information they were given a more detailed intro-
duction to the think-aloud technique. They were told not to filter their thoughts and
questions but to freely voice anything that came to their minds. To encourage such
a behavior and to reduce social desirability effects, we emphasized that there was no
such thing as a right or wrong remark or decision. Participants were introduced to
the procedure by the means of a warm-up decision scenario, unrelated to climate
change. Then, the experimenter presented the climate change decision scenario to
the participant and conducted and recorded the think-aloud interview. The inter-
view was completed and recordings were stopped as soon as the participant came
to a decision. There were no time restrictions. Finally, the participant was asked to
complete the post-interview questionnaire, as well as the background knowledge
scales. As compensation, participants could choose to receive either course credit
or 5 Euro, or the equivalent value in coupons for popular shops within the city of
Heidelberg.
Transcription and Coding
Each interview was transcribed by the experimenter who had originally
carried it out. Because there were no time restrictions, interviews varied in
length, lasting anywhere from 50 s to 37 min, 58 s. On average, partici-
pants spent nearly 10 min on the decision process. With three different ex-
perimenters, transcripts were randomly crosschecked by one of the other two
transcribers.
Because three participants in our sample only spent 50 or 82 s on the task, we
checked their protocols to find out if they were not motivated enough to thoroughly
elaborate the problem. The protocols revealed that all three of them had a clear
preference for the mitigation option and instantaneously rejected the idea behind
climate engineering technology without the need for further exploration, and that
they had an explicit rationale behind their decision. Therefore, we did not eliminate
their cases from our analyses.
Then, the final decisions were coded by the scheme indicated in Figure 1 (codes
plus subcodes and their frequencies). The decision process was coded based on the
assumptions of Huber’s theory and on our rationale as outlined in the introduction.
This procedure resulted in three process codes corresponding to each step predicted
by the theory. The frequencies of the three codes can be found in Figure 2. Based on
our process codes, we identified three different ways in which the participants of our
sample mentally structured the decision problem: One type of participants showed
risk-defusing behavior for mitigation as predicted by theory (22.4% of the sample).
A second type of participants instantaneously rejected the CE options (72.5%). The
third type of participants spontaneously perceived one of the CE options as attractive
(5.1%). Examples of coded statements of four participants, which illustrate these
three prototypical mental representations, can be found in Table 1. We proceeded
as follows:
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D. Amelung and J. Funke
Figure 1. Overview of decision types. The most common decisions are printed in
bold type. Note that the subcodes for mitigation plus CE do not add up
to n = 32 but to n = 33. This is due to the fact that one participant
decided for mitigation plus one CDR option plus one SRM option. Mitigation
plus CE was coded when the participant clearly stated that mitigation
was the preferred strategy while one of the CE options should be seen
as additional strategy. SRM = Solar radiation management techniques
like cloud whitening and stratospheric aerosols. CDR= Carbon dioxide
removal techniques like ocean fertilization.
The process code attractive alternative
Huber’s theory predicts that people identify one attractive choice early in the
decision-making process and then examine it inmore detail later (Huber et al . 2011).
Based on this prediction, we coded the option that was identified by each participant
as attractive in a first step. The coding was based on the following criterion: The
participant had to identify one of the options as attractive after an initial screening
phase, regardless of the depth or length of this screening phase.
As expected, most participants initially identified the mitigation option as an at-
tractive alternative (79.6%). Only a small proportion of participants spontaneously
perceived one of the CE options as attractive (5.1%). In the remaining 15.3% of
cases, we could not identify an alternative that was perceived to be attractive after an
14 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
Figure 2. Frequencies of process variables “mitigation attractive,” “mitigation
risky,” and “risk-defusing behavior.” The frequencies of the crossed-out
variables indicate the amount of participants who were not coded with
the respective process code. Of the 20 participants who were not coded
with “mitigation attractive,” n = 5 initially identified one of the CE
options as attractive and n = 15 did not initially identify any of the
alternatives as attractive.
initial screening phase. Instead, these participants identified their preferred alter-
native after an exploration phase and decided for it without further examination.
Often, they chose the residual alternative once they had eliminated all other op-
tions based on one or two criteria such as risk or cost. This approach resembles the
MAXIMIN heuristic, according to which the option with the “least bad” outcome is
chosen.
The process code mitigation risky
In the next step, we checked if participants who perceived mitigation to be
attractive, also perceived it to be risky. We identified the (bivariate) code mitigation
risky (0 = no; 1 = yes), if the participant mentioned possible negative outcomes or
difficulties associated with the mitigation option (either retrieved from his or her
own background information or asked for in the information-gathering process).
Possible negative outcomes could include that political negotiations might fail or
that the efforts might come too late.
Regarding the risks of mitigation, the primary focus in this study was on the risk of
failure due to implementation problems or delayed reactions of the climate system.
Certainly, one could conceive of other risks that might play a role in the participants’
decisions like the risks associated with societal change and economic impacts as a
result of cutting emissions. While the former type of risk could possibly be addressed
by CE options, the latter could not. However, in analyzing the transcripts, we did
not find any participants who identified the risks of societal change as a clear dis-
advantage to the mitigation strategy. Rather, those who acknowledged this type of
risk clearly expressed their disappointment about it being a major impediment to
an effective realization of the mitigation strategy.
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D. Amelung and J. Funke
The process code risk-defusing behavior
In a final step, we developed the code for risk-defusing behavior , again following a
bivariate coding scheme (0 = no; 1 = yes). This code was assigned if mitigation had
already been identified as initially attractive alternative and if the code mitigation risky
had been assigned in the respective protocol. Additionally, the participant had to
state clearly that he or she perceived at least one of the CE options to be potentially
useful as an additional strategy for the attractive alternative (mitigation). Because
the concept of risk defusing is closely related to the concept of control (Huber
and Kunz 2007), it was not a sufficient criterion for this code if one of the CE
options was simply perceived to be beneficial. Rather, the potential usefulness of CE
options, in general, or one specific CE option, as an additional strategy for gaining
control over any perceived shortcoming of mitigation, needed to be expressed by
a participant. This means that participants who perceived CE options as beneficial,
but did not consider them as a potential complementary strategy, were not coded with
the risk-defusing behavior code. In this way, we wanted to make sure that this code
represented a specific mental representation of the problem structure, rather than
the mere positive evaluation of CE. Some participants explicitly considered one
of the CE options as an emergency strategy in case of mitigation failure. In these
cases the statement was clearly identified as risk-defusing behavior without the other
two process codes having necessarily been assigned.
Two coders independently coded all variables, and inter-coder reliability was
computed. For all of the final decision variables, reliability was high (Cohen’s κ >
.9, n = 98). Regarding the decision-process variables, reliability was only computed
for risk-defusing behavior because the code partly depends on the other two codes,
and it was the central code for our analysis. Two coders jointly developed the coding
criteria for risk-defusing behavior , as mentioned above, and reliability with a third
coder was computed. With Cohen’s κ = .87, n = 98, reliability was good.
RESULTS
Relative Importance of Risk
Were questions concerning negative consequences relatively highly important to
our participants compared to the other question types? Shown in Table 2 are the
percentages of participants who asked at least one question regarding each of the
available information types. Probability questions were excluded from the analysis,
because participants had not asked for them. The question type background informa-
tion comprised only questions that were directed at specific alternatives rather than
questions that asked for general information about the climate change situation.
Cochrane’s Q test was significant, χ 2(6) = 182.793, p < .001, which suggests that
the seven information types differed significantly in their distributions of partici-
pants’ asking at least one corresponding question. Therefore, pairwise comparisons
between questions about negative consequences and the other information types were
computed, using the McNemar test with Bonferroni adjusted p values. Results are
also shown in Table 2. Questions concerning negative consequences were requested by
significantly more participants than all other question types except for cost (which
16 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
Table 2. Percentage of participants who asked for the seven available
information types, respectively, and McNemar test statistics for the
difference in relative importance between the information type negative
consequences and each of the other information types.
Question type % χ2 p W
Background
information
76.5 18.27 .000∗ .43
Negative consequences 49.0 NA NA NA
Cost 31.6 5.95 .015 .25
Effectivity 27.6 10.26 .001∗ .32
Positive consequences 12.2 34.03 .000∗ .59
Reversibility 12.2 32.24 .000∗ .57
Timeliness 10.2 32.60 .000∗ .58
% = Percentage of participants who asked at least one question of the respective
information type (with reference to the overall sample with N = 98). χ2 = value of the
McNemar test statistic for the difference between each information type and negative
consequences. w = effect size Cohen’s w for the χ2 test statistic. NA = not applicable.
∗p < .05/6 (Bonferroni-corrected).
was not significant but still in the expected direction) and background information
(which was the significantly most frequent question type).
We then assessed the frequency of questions about negative consequences among the
first two questions that the participants requested in the decision-making process as
a further indicator of relative importance of this information type. Altogether, n =
36 participants asked for negative consequences as their first or second question (75%
of those who asked for it in general), compared to n = 69 asking for background
information (92% of all participants interested in this kind of information), n = 17
for cost (54.84%), n = 16 for effectivity (59%), n = 5 for timeliness (50%), and
n = 2 for positive consequences (16.67%) and reversibility (16.67%) as one of their first
two questions. In sum, apart from the question type background information, negative
consequences was the most commonly required information type and, if required, was
also comparably most commonly requested at the beginning of the information-
gathering process.
Effects of Subjective Risk Assessments on the Final Decisions
We conducted a profile analysis on the four risk assessments of mitigation and the
three CE techniques. Thus, we tested whether participants who included CE in their
decisions systematically differed in their risk assessments of the options from those
who did not include CE. Therefore, the grouping variable was the final decision of
the participants with the two levels CE included and CE not included. One unusual case
was detected as an outlier and was excluded from our analysis because the respective
participant indicated all of the options to be not at all risky. This resulted in a sample
reduction of n = 97.
The two groups CE included and CE not included differed significantly in their
patterns of risk assessments on the four options, F (3, 93) = 5.46, p = .002, partial
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015 17
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Figure 3. Mean perceived risk of the four options mitigation, cloud whitening
(CW), stratospheric aerosols (SA), and ocean fertilization (OF), sepa-
rately for those participants who included CE into their decision (CE
included) and those who did not (CE not included). Error bars repre-
sent standard deviations.
η2 = .15 using the Wilk’s λ criterion. Thus, the subjective risk assessments had an
effect on the final decision. The differences in the profiles between the two groups
are shown in Figure 3.
No overall difference among the groups was found with F (1, 95) = 1.91, p = .17,
partial η2= .02, which suggests that no group on average scored higher on all of the
risk scales.
To determine the specific option’s risk assessments that were responsible for the
differences in the profiles between the two groups, we then performed a simple-
effects analysis for the differences in the means of the four option’s risk assessments
between the two groups. A significant difference was found between the two groups
in their risk assessments of cloud whitening, F (1, 95) = 16.88, p < .001, partial η2 =
.16. No differences were found between the two groups in the other risk assessments
(mitigation: F (1, 95) = 0.99, p = .32, partial η2 = .01; stratospheric aerosols: F (1,
95)= 0, p = .96, partial η2= .00; ocean fertilization: F (1, 95)= 0.42, p = .52, partial
η2 = .01).
Prediction of CE Acceptance
Adirect bivariate logistic regression analysis was performed with the final decision
as dependent variable (Is a CE option part of the decision or not?) and risk-defusing
18 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
Table 3. Statistics of the predictors in a logistic regression analysis with CE as part
of the final decision (yes/no) as DV.
95%-CI
Predictor b SE Wald p b∗ OR LL UL
RDB 4.34 1.12 15.07 .000∗∗ 0.57 77.04 8.59 690.75
RiskCW −1.16 0.44 6.98 .008∗∗ −0.35 0.31 0.13 0.74
b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = standard error of b; Wald =Wald statistic; b∗
= standardized regression coefficient; OR = odds ratio; 95%-CI = 95% confidence interval;
LL = lower level, UL = upper level; RDB = risk-defusing behavior; RiskCW = perceived risk
of cloud whitening. ∗∗p < .01
behavior together with the subjective risk assessment of cloud whitening as predic-
tors. We included only the risk assessment of cloud whitening because we found
a difference only for this option in the subjective risk values between those who
included CE in their decision and those who did not.
Control variables (membership of an environmental group, sex, background
knowledge) were also included in the model for a first analysis. To minimize a
problem with reduced power associated with an unfavorable cases-to-variables ratio
and a problem with multicollinearity, the scores of the three knowledge scales were
summed to form a general knowledge scale. Cronbach’s Alpha for this scale was
reasonably sufficient to justify this approach, α = .82 (n = 78).
To avoid a power problem with small cell sizes because of rare incidences, we
included only the majority of participants in the analysis who had been coded with
mitigation attractive (n= 78). There were no missing values. None of the control vari-
ables were significant. Therefore, they were excluded from the following analyses.
The full model with the two predictors against the constant-only model was
statistically significant (χ 2 = 52.9, p < .001, df = 2). Thus, risk-defusing behavior and
the subjective risk of cloud whitening were able to distinguish between participants
who included a CE option into their decision and those who did not. Following
Nagelkerke’s R2, a moderate 66.2% of the variance in the final decision could be
accounted for by the model. Themodel was able to correctly classify the participants
with 93.3% of participants who did not include CE into their decision correctly
predicted and a percentage of 81.8% of those who did include CE. This result
computed to an overall success rate of 88.5%.
To test hypothesis 2b that the inclusion of the subjective risk of cloud whitening
should enhance the model’s classification ability above risk-defusing behavior , we
compared our model with one that included only risk-defusing behavior as predictor.
In this single predictor model, the explained variance (Nagelkerke’s R2) was slightly
reduced to 57% and classification was reduced to 84.6%. Thus, a model with the
subjective risk assessment of cloud whitening as second predictor is better than one
with risk-defusing behavior as the only predictor.
Shown in Table 3 are the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients
for the two predictors, including the Wald statistics, standard errors, and odds
ratios with 95% confidence intervals. The standardized coefficients indicate that
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D. Amelung and J. Funke
risk-defusing behavior was positively associated with the odds (the relative probability)
of deciding for CE, whereas the subjective risk of cloud whitening was negatively
associated with the odds of deciding for CE, revealing that the impact of risk-defusing
behavior is comparably stronger.
DISCUSSION
Our primary goal was to assess if and under which circumstances laypeople em-
brace the idea that CE technology could represent a back-up strategy for a possible
failure of mitigation efforts. As a prerequisite for laypeople to adopt the idea of such
a back-up strategy, they need to put sufficient emphasis on the risk criterion. Our
findings support the hypothesis that perceived risk is highly important to laypeople
when confronted with the issue of CE. In line with Huber’s risk theory, we also found
that participants conceived the idea of a back-up strategy when they (a) realized that
current political efforts to mitigate CO2 emissions bear the risk of possible failure,
and when they (b) indicated that, to them, a certain threshold of perceived risk of
a CE option is undercut.
Do People Accept CE as Part of a Back-Up Strategy?
We expected those participants to show a greater tendency to accept CE, who ac-
tively explore the technology’s potential service as a back-up strategy for mitigation.
In our model, risk-defusing behavior was found to be the strongest positive predic-
tor of involving CE in the final decision, which is consistent with our expectation.
We also expected that participants would only accept a CE option as part of their
decision, if they found at least one option with an acceptable level of risk. Because
a lower perceived riskiness of cloud whitening enhanced CE acceptance above risk
defusing, our hypothesis was confirmed.
In sum, participants perceived CE to be an acceptable option as part of a risk-
defusing strategy for mitigation, if they found at least one CE option with an ac-
ceptable level of (subjective) risk. Therefore, acceptable risk levels seem to be an
important prerequisite for actively defusing the risks of mitigation with CE. The op-
tion with the lowest perceived risk was cloud whitening. Participant protocols suggest
that the low ratings were due to the perceived naturalness of this option, given that
“only” sea salt particles are used (as opposed to the use of sulfur particles in the
stratospheric aerosol method; see the SI for more information). If such an accept-
able option was not found, active risk-defusing as predicted by Huber’s framework
appears to be an unsuitable strategy. In fact, if no acceptable risk-defusing operator
is found or the expectation of finding one is low, the framework predicts that no
risk-defusing behavior is shown (Ba¨r and Huber 2008; Huber and Huber 2008). In
these cases, the MAXIMIN heuristic has previously been identified as an alternative
strategy, according to which the worst outcomes of the alternatives are compared
and the option with the least bad outcome is chosen. We could also identify this
kind of behavior in participants who did not spontaneously identify mitigation as an
attractive option. However, at the end of their decision-making process, they were
also very likely to decide for mitigation as a result of an elimination process of the
other (CE) alternatives. This suggests that people are likely to accept a specific CE
20 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 0, No. 0, 2015
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Risk Acceptance of Climate Engineering
option as a back-up strategy for mitigation only if the perceived risk of the option
does not exceed the risk of mitigation. Thus, public perceptions of CE in the cli-
mate change context are likely to be influenced by a tradeoff between the perceived
risks of specific CE options and alternative strategies for combating climate change.
Therefore, it is important to assess public evaluations of CE within the broader
context of alternative strategies.
Limitations
Sample bias
One of the most important aspects for participants in the present study when
dealing with the climate change decision scenario was the perceived risk of the
options. This focus on risks might be explained by a bias in the sample (e.g., students
and members of environmental organizations). Bellamy et al . (2012) argued that
recruitment strategies can yield important framing effects, suggesting that in a more
balanced sample, a larger proportion of participants might set their focus on, for
example, costs or effectiveness rather than risks.
Although the bias in our sample reduces the generalizability of our results, we be-
lieve that it augments the results. Public acceptance of a global technology such as CE
more probably means that affected people will tolerate it than have a positive attitude
towards it (Renn 2005). A future decision for or against an eventual deployment
of CE will likely be made by a political top-down approach driven by international
negotiations rather than a bottom-up movement or a participatory approach, such
as a national referendum. Therefore, the crucial question is whether an eventual
future decision in favor of the deployment of a CE option will be tolerated by society.
An eventual mobilization process, answering an unacceptable decision, is likely to
be led by a minority that offers resistance to such a decision; that is, members of
environmental organizations (Botetzagias and Schuur 2012) and a dedicated lay
public. This tendency has already become clear with the LOHAFEX and SPICE
projects. In this sense, our sample is likely to more accurately reflect the groups
that might take a leading role in the question of whether or not political decisions
regarding CE will be tolerated, than a more balanced sample. Still, we can state
that someone who perceives risk to be an important factor in an evaluation of CE,
is more likely to accept the technology if he or she perceives it as a risk-defusing
strategy. Furthermore, studies involving representative samples in the United States,
United Kingdom, and Canada support the idea that risk is also an influential factor
for more diverse sections of the population.
Wording of answer material
Similar to other public perception studies on CE, it was important for our study
that the information material we presented our participants with, did not implicitly
suggest any valuation or judgment. Although we tried to keep the wording as neutral
as possible and to adopt a factual style, the specific selection of information units
in the prepared answers might have influenced the risk perception of the different
CE options in our decision scenario. The nature of the particles used in the cloud
whitening technique (“sea salt”) as opposed to the particles in the stratospheric
aerosol technique (“sulfur”) might have been the main driver of the difference in
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perceived risk between the two; many participants mentioned that the description
of the cloud whitening method sounded more natural to them, sometimes with
explicit reference to the sea salt particles. This is important to consider, because
the nature of the particles is subject to an ongoing scientific debate. Especially
for the stratospheric aerosol technique, other materials than sulfur have already
been proposed that might sound less deterrent, such as specifically engineered
nanoparticles (Keith 2010). This also suggests that public opinions will dynamically
change in parallel to the scientific progress that is made with the development of
CE technology. Therefore, these opinions cannot be regarded as static.
OUTLOOK
Considering the Issue of Framing in CE Appraisal Studies
Bellamy and colleagues encourage greater consideration of implicit framings in
CE appraisal studies to avoid premature closure around specific ways of thinking
about the problem or around specific CE options. As we took an effort to avoid
suggesting any specific ways of representing the climate change issue or related
strategies, we believe we could minimize this effect. This is especially important
given that studies such as ours contribute to a spreading of information on CE; most
of our participants heard about the issue for their first time. Presumably, our par-
ticipants will also discuss the issue within their peer-groups and hereby conduce to
the diffusion of the topic to wider parts of society and to the shaping of public opin-
ions. Upstream engagement is increasingly acknowledged as an important means to
include the public in risk management processes (Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Renn
2008). Therefore, the issue around climate change and CE needs to be presented in
a responsible and balanced way in public perception studies. Although, for our study,
we believe that we were successful in doing so, we see possibilities of improvement
for future decision scenario studies in terms of the following two aspects:
We decided to restrict the set of possible options in our scenario to four, so that
our participants were not overburdened or demotivated. However, this could have
imposed the impression on them that these four options represent a preselection
based on their viability, their political importance, or any other criteria. As a result,
our participants could have been less creative and open to other possibilities. In
effect, only one of our participants mentioned adaptation as a possible strategy
alongside with mitigation and thus introduced a new option.
To address this issue in future studies using the scenario technique, one could
mention that the presented CE options are only prototypical examples for a wider
range of options and that they do not have precedence over others. It could also be
useful to prepare a sheet of information on other proposed CE options and other
climate policy strategies together with a balanced selection of sources for further
information to correct any bias that could have been provoked by the study. Indeed,
many of our participants expressed their interest in obtaining further information
upon completion of the study, not only about CE but also about emission scenarios
andmitigationpolicies. This is further evidence for the claim that studies such as ours
are important with regard to upstream engagement processes: some participants
evidently felt an enhanced motivation to keep informed about climate change,
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related policies, and, most interestingly, their own possibilities of contributing to the
reduction of emissions as a result of our study. Also, our observations are in line with
the study of Kahan and colleagues (2012), which showed that participants who were
exposed to information about CE were more concerned with climate change than
a control group. If our participants’ enhanced motivation to contribute to emission
targets as a result of our study will convert into action, is questionable. However,
because these considerations indicate that studies such as ours potentially affect
upstream engagement processes, they highlight the responsibility of the authors of
these studies to adequately present the issue to their subjects.
On a similar note and as Bellamy and colleagues (2012) have elaborated on,
the framings in CE appraisal studies have the power to structure and influence
scientific, political, and public debates around the issue. As our findings support the
assumption that the plan B framing has the potential to enhance at least conditional
support for CE also in laypeople, it gives cause for concern that this framing is highly
prevalent in the research community. Our findings thus highlight the importance
for researchers to carefully present the issue of CE in appraisal studies, also to their
fellow researchers.
Other Factors Influencing Public Perceptions of CE
Risk not only is part of traditional expert evaluations of newly emerging tech-
nology such as CE, it has also been highlighted in previous studies as an influen-
tial factor in the development of public opinions on CE. Our study supports the
assumption that risk framings will play an important role in public evaluations be-
cause most of our participants concentrated on the negative consequences of CE
for the environment, which they evaluated as especially reprehensible. Such a focus
on environmental risk, however, is expectable of members of environmental orga-
nizations or people, who are interested in environmental issues, both of which were
characteristics of many of our participants. In addition to the environmental risks of
CE, some of our participants mentioned other aspects to consider in evaluating the
options, such as an equitable distribution of risks between the developed and the
developing world or trust in scientific and political institutions. Other aspects such
as these may also play a role in a public opinion-formation process and may even be
more influential in different groups of society than they were in our sample. It there-
fore is important to keep in mind that environmental risk is only one dimension
on which CE in its broader context can and needs to be evaluated (Amelung and
Funke 2013). In line with this, Bellamy and colleagues (2012) caution against the
temptation to focus too much on traditional technical evaluation criteria of perfor-
mance and risk in the context of CE. In Germany, among other countries, there have
already been attempts by governmental agencies to broaden the scope of traditional
technical risk evaluation criteria such as the amount of damage and probability of
occurrence to criteria such as inequity and injustice to achieve a more effective risk
management of increasingly complex and global risks (German Advisory Council
on Global Change [WBGU] 2000). Also, strategies for an increased participation
of public stakeholder groups have been advocated as a means to broaden the per-
spectives on complex issues such as CE (Corner and Pidgeon 2010). Therefore, an
exclusive focus on the risk dimension does not account for the complexity of the
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issue of CE and all possible perspectives on it. For example, a CE technique that
might be perceived to have an acceptable amount of negative consequences on the
environment such as cloud whitening is not likely to be accepted by wider parts of
society if the administering institution appears to have vested financial interests and
therefore is not trusted. Also, our participants’ focus on the negative consequences
of CE for the environment, which influenced their decisions, can possibly be at-
tributed to the homogeneity of the sample, as most of the participants are likely to
have pro-environmental attitudes by tendency.
Hence, to avoid premature closure around too narrow framings of the issue and
to account for the complexity of the issue, it would be interesting for future studies
to directly test the relative importance of different evaluation criteria or ways of
framing the issue for different groups of the public. It could also be informative
to compare the relative importance of different ways of framing the issue between
stakeholder groups in the developed and developing countries. Given that negative
impacts of CE are likely to be regionally diverse, and risks might be enhanced for
developing countries (Royal Society 2009), framings around fairness considerations
could have a higher impact on public perceptions in developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Our study suggests that laypeople who perceive CE as a back-up strategy for
mitigation with an acceptable level of risk have a comparably more favorable attitude
toward the notion of CE, even though our participants’ choice for CE as a back-
up plan, as demonstrated in our study, can merely be interpreted as a conditional
tolerance for CE and should not be mistaken for a generally positive evaluation
of it. The plan B idea is a common contextual framing to justify research on CE
in the scientific debate and has also been adopted by the media. Thus, it may
significantly influence opinion-formation processes in scientific, public and political
debates. Therefore, concern is warranted that the high prevalence of the plan B
framing might prematurely enhance the acceptability of CE technology (Bellamy
et al . 2012). Our results also substantiate the concern that the introduction of an
easy technological resort could undermine current mitigation efforts (the so-called
“moral hazard,” cf. Davies 2010). Because a failure of mitigation is perceived to be
less severe with the introduction of a back-up strategy, the motivation to support
inconvenient mitigation strategies may be reduced as well.
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Abstract 
Empirical results linking understanding of climate change to relevant outcome variables such 
as concern or willingness to take action are inconclusive, with some studies finding positive, 
and others mixed or even negative effects. We propose that contradictory results can be 
explained by subjective versus objective measures of understanding, and more importantly, 
the systematic difference between the two: overconfidence. In a two-alternative forced 
choice paradigm (N=264), participants read original excerpts from the 2014 IPCC report’s 
Summary for Policymakers, and objective and subjective understanding was assessed. 
Results show that (i) people on average overestimate their true understanding of climate 
change information; (ii) subjective understanding is systematically miscalibrated as a 
function of actual understanding in that overestimation increases as actual understanding 
decreases; and (iii) higher overconfidence is related to a lower willingness to sacrifice 
personal gains to contribute to mitigation, even when controlling for actual understanding. 
We conclude that subjective understanding is not tantamount to objective understanding. 
Implications for climate communication are discussed.  
  
Keywords: overconfidence, Dunning-Kruger effect, climate change, objective 
understanding, subjective understanding, public engagement 
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Accurate world knowledge is vital as it allows us to understand, predict, and control 
the environment, be it to effectively manage the planet’s resources or to mitigate the risks of 
climate change (CC). Inaccurate world knowledge, in contrast, can lead to erroneous 
conclusions, faulty predictions, and unfounded decisions. Particularly devastating effects 
may result from inaccurate knowledge when paired with high subjective confidence in its 
accuracy: People are ready to act on the grounds of knowledge they should have little 
confidence in (Shiller, 2015). Unfortunately, overconfidence--the subjective overestimation of 
one’s true understanding, control over events, or invulnerability to risk--is one of the most 
prevalent human biases (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Armor & Taylor, 1998; Benoit, Dubra & 
Moore, 2015; Keren, 1991; Mamassian, 2008; Moore & Healy, 2000; Simons, 2013; 
Weinstein & Klein, 2002). Albeit these positive illusions confer important advantages by 
enabling individuals to “distort reality in a direction that enhances self-esteem, maintains 
beliefs in personal efficacy, and promotes an optimistic view of the future” (Taylor & Brown, 
1988, p. 204), and overconfident individuals were probably favored evolutionarily in the past 
(Johnson & Fowler, 2011), overconfidence can also lead to unrealistically positive 
expectations, risk blindness, collective hubris, and costly disasters. In fact, research 
suggests that overconfidence contributed to the Vietnam war, the war in Iraq 2003, the 
financial crisis of 2008, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 2010 (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; 
Johnson, 2004; Johnson & Tierney, 2011; Johnson et al., 2006; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 
Sylves & Comfort, 2012; Tuchman, 1984). In the present article, we show that (1) people 
tend to be overconfident about their understanding of one of the arguably biggest threats of 
our time as well: global climate change; and that (2) higher overconfidence in one’s 
understanding is associated with lowering willingness to sacrifice egoistic rewards to mitigate 
climate change independent of actual understanding. 
 
 
4 
Studying overconfidence 
The most common approach to measuring the calibration of subjective knowledge is 
the 2-alternative forced choice paradigm (Moore, Tenney & Haran, 2015). Participants 
answer whether a statement is correct or incorrect (e.g., ”Alcohol kills brain cells”; Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005), and indicate their confidence that they answered correctly (e.g., on a 50%-
100% scale). Overconfidence is quantified as the signed difference between accuracy and 
confidence. When data from these experiments are visualized in calibration curves plotting 
confidence against accuracy (e.g., Yates, 1990), the typical result is that average calibration 
deviates considerably from perfect calibration (the diagonal), specifically, that the calibration 
curve is too flat: Participants tend to be too confident in their degree of accuracy.  
In addition to investigating the degree of miscalibration of subjective estimates of 
knowledge (overconfidence as an outcome), there is a multitude of research demonstrating 
the importance of overconfidence as a predictor of real-world correlates, particularly in areas 
characterized by high amounts of uncertainty such as managerial (Russo & Schoemaker, 
1992), medical (Berner & Graber, 2008), or political decision-making (Johnson, 2004). 
Overconfidence was found to be associated with reduced perceptions of risk and higher risk-
taking propensity (Broihanne, Merli & Roger, 2014), increased feelings of being in control 
(Stotz & von Nitzsch, 2005), and increased tendency to overlook potential problems (“blind 
spots”; Ng, Westgren & Sonka, 2009). As a consequence, overconfidence can also be 
associated to suboptimal decisions. Venture capitalists’ overconfidence was found to be 
negatively associated with decision accuracy, the success of the funded company 
(Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001), investors with higher overconfidence trade more frequently 
but achieve lower returns (Park, Konana, Gu, Kumar & Raghunathan, 2010), and physicians 
tend to underestimate the possibility of their diagnoses being wrong, leading to premature 
narrowing of the choice of diagnostic hypotheses, and diagnostic error (Berner & Graber, 
2008). Drawing on these findings, the conjecture that we would like to put forth in this article 
is that overconfidence in one’s understanding of climate science may be linked to perceiving 
5 
CC as less risky, as less of a problem, and consequently, to a reduced willingness to 
contribute to mitigation.  
Overconfidence and Climate Change 
Subjective estimates of understanding (e.g., “How much do you feel you know 
about…?”) are not only less reliable compared to objective measures (e.g., multiple-choice 
tests). Subjective estimates are also biased. Subjective measures tend to be systematically 
mis-calibrated in that the discrepancy between subjective and objective measures is a 
function of the level of actual understanding (Raju, Lonial & Mangold, 1995). Ironically, 
people tend to be overconfident when their actual understanding is low, and people are likely 
to be better calibrated, or even underconfident when their actual understanding is higher; a 
phenomenon termed Dunning-Kruger-effect (Dunning, 2011; Schlösser, Dunning, Johnson & 
Kruger, 2013; Simons, 2013). Several explanations exist for why this effect occurs, both 
psychological and statistical. The classic explanation is that due to domain-specific 
misbeliefs or knowledge gaps (“unknown unknowns”), people are unaware of the scope of 
their ignorance, and hence a double-curse of ignorance arises: The lacking knowledge itself, 
and the lacking ability to recognize it (Dunning, 2011). Overconfidence was also shown to 
arise from imperfect information processing, such as selective dismissal of (unpleasant) 
information (for a review, Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes & Mantel, 1998), confusion of 
heuristical inferences with remembered facts (Block & Harper, 1991), or the tendency to 
underweigh conflicting information to confirm prior beliefs (confirmation bias; Ortoleva & 
Snowberg, 2015; Park, Konana, Gu, Kumar & Raghunathan, 2010). The statistical 
explanation holds that because people cannot directly access their true level of 
understanding--and hence any estimation thereof contains error--subjective estimates 
regress towards the mean, and the estimates of more extreme levels of (mis)understanding 
do so mores strongly. (discrepancy is positively correlated to overconfidence) (Erev, 
Wallsten & Budescu, 1994; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). 
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There is reason to fear that overconfidence in one’s knowledge may be particularly 
prevalent in the climate change domain. Distant events, complex interdependencies, and 
long time lags are inherent characteristics of the climate system, rendering direct and 
immediate feedback about the veracity of one’s beliefs rare (if not impossible). Hence, there 
is ample room for domain-specific “unknown unknowns”. Reports in classical media (Antilla, 
2005) as well as skeptical blogs (Sharman, 2014) can be found to substantiate basically all 
sorts of subjective beliefs, no matter how distorted or how far from scientific consensus. 
Even the sheer magnitude of scientific knowledge itself--ironically--,allows one to assemble 
sets of evidence supporting prior beliefs (Sarewitz, 2004). People can live in the constant 
bliss of unchallenged CC beliefs. Hence, there is ample room for domain-specific misbeliefs. 
In fact, the idea that overconfidence might prevail in the context of CC is not new: Johnson 
and Fowler (2011) conclude from their evolutionary model that overconfidence should prevail 
about uncertain, rare, and unpredictable phenomena such as natural disasters and CC.  
How does understanding of CC relate to concern and action? 
It makes intuitive sense to assume that understanding CC--acquiring and employing 
factually correct knowledge of CC (cf. Wolf & Moser, 2011)--is a necessary precondition to 
adequately assess the risks associated with CC, and for deciding upon policy alternatives 
(Stoutenborough, Vedlitz & Liu, 2015), particularly in a topic as complex as CC where far-
reaching and potentially irreversible impacts reside not only in itself (e.g., extreme weather 
events or risks to food security; IPCC, 2014), but also in means to address it (e.g., carbon 
capture and storage, geoengineering; Amelung & Funke, 2013, 2015). A lack of knowledge 
on climate change risks has been identified as a major barrier to climate action (Lata & 
Nunn, 2012). Moreover, understanding should serve as a link between attitudes and 
individual action (Meinhold & Malkus, 2005), as environmental knowledge enables people 
with pro-environmental attitudes to act in accordance with their attitudes, whereas lacking 
knowledge is a major cause for inaction or unsuited “token actions” (Attari, DeKay, Davidson 
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& De Bruin, 2010; Gifford, 2011; Semenza, Hall, Wilson, Bontempo, Sailor & George, 2008; 
Whitmarsh, 2009).  
Given these rather fundamental reasons of why understanding should be a 
precondition for climate-related action, it seems puzzling that existing results are far from 
conclusive, with some studies finding positive, and others mixed, or even negative 
relationships. We offer an explanation for these contradictory findings: The systematic mis-
calibration of subjective understanding of CC. 
Let us suppose that higher levels of objective understanding of CC are associated 
with higher concern, or higher willingness to take action. Let us also suppose that perceived 
CC knowledge is systematically miscalibrated as predicted by the Dunning-Kruger effect, so 
that those who understand most tend to underestimate their understanding, and those who 
understand the least tend to overestimate it. It follows from these simple assumptions that a 
relationship between true understanding and the dependent variable, albeit in fact positive, 
can appear zero or even negative when a subjective measure of understanding is used. 
Furthermore, these assumptions can explain why the relationship between subjective 
understanding and CC outcomes such as concern appears to vary depending on 
partisanship (Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009; McCright, 2011, 2008): If political 
conservatives possess less scientifically correct understanding of CC than liberals 
(McCright, 2010), they should overestimate their understanding more, and hence, for them, 
the relationship between (perceived) understanding and concern, beliefs or action would 
appear non-existing or negative. 
Existing empirical results are largely in line with these theoretical arguments. Using 
subjective measures, Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) find that those who claim to be 
more informed about global warming (“How informed do you consider yourself to be about 
global warming?”) feel less personally responsible, and show less concern. Malka, Krosnick 
and Langer (2009) find that the feeling to know more about global warming is positively 
associated with concern for Democrats, but unrelated for Republicans. Also, greater self-
reported understanding of CC was positively associated with objective understanding and 
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concern for liberals and democrats, but negatively so for Republicans. Similarly, McCright 
and Dunlap (2011a) find within 10 nationally representative US polls between 2001 and 
2010 that self-reported understanding is positively associated with concern over climate 
change for liberals and democrats, and more weakly so or even negatively for conservatives 
and Republicans. Drawing on the same data, McCright and Dunlap report that denial of 
climate change is highest among white male conservatives who claim to understand climate 
change very well (2011b).  
Using objective measures of understanding, in contrast, Tobler, Visschers & Siegrist 
(2012) find that those who understand more about CC tend to be more concerned and feel 
less powerless. Likewise, understanding of the causes of global warming was the single best 
predictor of behavioral intentions to act on global warming among 1218 Americans (Bord, 
O’Connor & Fisher, 2000), understanding CC and global warming was positively associated 
with responsibility to act on CC among 269 New Zealandians, (Milfont, 2012), knowledge 
about the causes of CC was a significant predictor for concern about CC in six politically and 
culturally diverse countries (Shi, Visschers, Siegrist & Arvai, 2016), in 119 countries, 
understanding the anthropogenicity of CC proved the strongest predictor of climate change 
risk perceptions (Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko & Leiserowitz, 2015), and within one and the 
same study sample, subjective knowledge was a negative, and objective knowledge a 
positive predictor of concern (Stoutenborough & Vedlitz, 2014). 
The present study 
The present study assesses whether the degree of participants’ confidence in their 
understanding of CC is justified by their actual understanding (overconfidence as an 
outcome). Moreover, we investigate whether unjustified confidence in one’s understanding 
can predict willingness to contribute to CC mitigation, even when controlling for actual 
understanding (overconfidence as a predictor). In a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, 
participants read a total of ten excerpts from the IPCC’s 2014 Summary for Policymakers 
(IPCC, 2014), and both objective and perceived understanding was assessed. For each of 
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20 statements on the IPCC excerpts, each starting with “Does the text say that…”, 
participants indicated whether the statement was correct or incorrect, and then indicated 
their subjective confidence that they answered accurately. Measuring both objective and 
subjective understanding in one study allowed us to investigate the degree of calibration of 
perceived understanding of CC, and how participants’ degree of calibration and 
overconfidence is associated to their willingness to contribute to CC mitigation. In order to 
assess willingness to contribute to CC mitigation, participants took part in a lottery as part of 
their compensation. Participants could win an amazon or cinema voucher worth a maximum 
of 20$, and indicated how much of this prize--if anything--they wanted to donate to a non-
profit organization (Atmosfair) to offset CO2. 
Importantly, since subjective and objective understanding are correlated, we 
differentiate between two operationalizations of overconfidence in our analyses: The typically 
used signed difference between understanding and confidence (overconfidence) that treats 
subjective and objective understanding as equally important; and the residual confidence 
that controls for actual understanding by regressing participants’ subjective understanding 
on their actual understanding, and retaining the standardized residuals (residual confidence). 
In line with the recommendations by Parker and Stone (2014), we use overconfidence as an 
intuitive and signed measure to address the difference between subjective and actual 
understanding, and when overconfidence is the outcome. We use residual confidence when 
overconfidence is a predictor to address the impact of confidence that cannot be accounted 
for by actual understanding. This approach allows us to investigate both whether 
overconfidence varies with understanding, and whether overconfidence exerts behavioral 
effects independent of understanding. 
To assess the unique and incremental effects of (perceived) understanding and 
overconfidence about CC, we controlled for a comprehensive list of established predictors: 
prior knowledge about the state, causes, and consequences of CC; perceived 
persuasiveness of the information; perceived competency of the authors; gender, age, level 
of education, and political orientation (Achtnicht, 2011; Daziano & Bolduc, 2013; Hansla, 
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Gamble, Juliusson & Gärling, 2008; Hersch & Viscusi, 2006; Hunter, Hatch & Johnson, 
2004; Israel & Levinson, 2004; Zelezny, Chua & Aldrich, 2000). 
We expected: 
1. In general, participants overestimate their understanding of CC information 
(overconfidence). 
2. Subjective understanding of CC information is systematically miscalibrated as 
a function of actual understanding (Dunning-Kruger effect). 
3. Higher overconfidence in one’s understanding of CC is associated with 
reduced willingness to contribute to CC mitigation. 
Method and Materials 
Participants 
The sample consisted of a total of N=264 participants (n=119 female) from  the US 
(n=110), India (n=107), and Germany (n=47). Participants from different countries were 
selected to achieve a heterogeneous sample with varying political and educational 
backgrounds. Participants from USA and India were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), participants from Germany were recruited via university mailing lists. The vast 
majority of participants (84%) held at least a Bachelor’s degree, 23% held a Master’s 
degree, and 2% a PhD. Only 1 participant indicated their level of education to be “less than 
high school”. The average level of English proficiency was high (M=5.17, SD=1.07, on a 6-
point scale). 10% of participants indicated membership of an environmental group. 
Participants who were recruited via MTurk received a monetary compensation of a typical 
amount of 0.80 $. Participants recruited via university mailing lists also received course 
credit if they were Heidelberg university students. As part of their compensation, all 
participants could additionally take part in a lottery to win a voucher worth a maximum of 
20$.  
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IPCC text excerpts 
10 text excerpts were taken from the main outlet for integrated climate science 
information, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Synthesis Report Summary for 
Policymakers (cite 2014). This report arguably constitutes the most relevant source of 
climate science information. The excerpts were taken from the report’s text boxes as those 
constitute important and stand-alone information that is--due to its salient character within 
the report--most likely to be read. We included the two very first boxes of the report (page 2), 
and then the text boxes from all uneven page numbers (pp. 7-31) to ensure their 
representativity for a wide range of topics covered in the report, yielding a total sample of 10 
excerpts (supplementary file A).    
Objective and subjective understanding 
Objective understanding. For each of the ten excerpts, two statements were 
presented that participants evaluated as either correct or incorrect according to the 
information presented in the excerpt: “Does the text say that …?” (Yes/No). Only 
unambiguous statements clearly reflecting the information presented in the excerpts, and 
jointly covering a range of difficulties were selected based on pre-testing. Participants’ 
objective understanding score was the proportion of accurately evaluated statements (i.e., 0-
20). For an example item, see Figure 1; all statements together with their respective text 
boxes can be found in supplementary file A. 
Subjective understanding. After evaluating a statement as correct or incorrect, 
participants indicated their subjective confidence that they answered accurately: “How 
certain are you that the answer you just gave is correct?” (1=not at all certain; 6= extremely 
certain; Radecki & Jaccard, 1995).  
Political climate action preferences 
We used the items adapted by Guy et al. (2013) from a Lowy Institute national survey 
(Hanson, 2011) to assess whether participants perceive CC as a problem that should be 
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addressed even if this involves costs: (1) “Climate change is a serious and pressing 
problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs.” (act now) 
(2) “The problems of climate change should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so 
we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost.” (wait-and-see) 
(3) “Until we are sure that climate change is really a problem, we should not take any steps 
that would have significant costs.” (go slow). 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of an exemplary item assessing objective and subjective 
understanding of information on climate change. Participants are given an excerpt from the 
IPCC Summary for policymakers, 2014 (above). Participants then indicate whether a 
statement on the excerpt is correct or incorrect, and indicate their subjective confidence that 
they answered correctly (below). 
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Willingness to contribute to mitigation 
To measure participants willingness to contribute to CC mitigation, participants took 
part in a lottery to win a prize. Participants were told that the prize was worth 20$. 
Participants then indicated how they wanted to split up their prize: Participants indicated the 
share (if anything) of the fixed amount of 20$ they wanted to allocate to (a) a donation to 
Atmosfair to offset CO2; and the share (if anything) they wanted to allocate to (b) an amazon 
voucher (participants recruited via MTurk) or cinema voucher (participants recruited via 
mailing lists) for themselves. Participants were told that any combination of integer numbers 
was allowed. The share allocated to Atmosfair was counted as participants’ willingness to 
contribute to CC mitigation, the share allocated to the voucher as their degree of egoistic 
behavior.  
Albeit it may appear redundant at first, we opted for a separate assessment of 
allocations to Atmosfair and the voucher, respectively. In this way, a separate assessment of 
egoistic and pro-environmental tendencies was made possible in case they were treated 
differently by our participants, so as to disentangle differential mechanisms leading up to the 
two. A comprehensive list of additional control variables used in the study can be found in 
Table 1. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted online. After participants were informed about the 
anonymity of data collection and their right to withdraw at any time during the study, 
participants were told about the possibility to take part in a lottery as part of their 
compensation. Participants were informed that they were eligible to take part in the lottery 
only if they answered at least 10% of the text comprehension statements correctly. This was 
done to ensure that participants were motivated to complete the objective understanding 
questions for 10 difficult-to-read excerpts. We then assessed participants’ level of English 
proficiency, environmental group membership, political orientation, prior beliefs in the 
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existence and anthropogenicity of CC, behavioral intentions to change behavior in an 
environmental-friendly manner and to engage with climate science, and prior knowledge on 
climate change (Table 1). 
Table 1. List of control variables in the study 
Variable label Wording 
Answer format 
difficult How difficult is the text? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
qualified How qualified are the authors? Please guess. 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
convincing How convincing is the text? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
CCexists_pre 
& CC 
exists_post 
How convinced are you that climate change exists? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
CCman_pre & 
CCman_post 
How convinced are you that climate change is caused by human 
activity? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
Info_pre 
& 
info_post 
How motivated are you to look for further information about climate 
change? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
Change_pre 
& 
change_post 
How determined are you to change your own behavior in order to 
act environmental friendly? 
6-point rating scale (1=not at all/6=extremely) 
know* Are the following statements true or false? 
6-point rating scale (1=certainly false/6=certainly true) 
 
Political view How would you characterise your political views? 
6-point rating scale (1=left/6=right) 
English How fluent is your English? 
6-point rating scale (1=a1(beginner)/6=c2(proficient) 
envgroup Are you a member of an environmental group? 
Binary (Yes/No) 
Note. *adapted from Sundblad, Biel & Gärling (2009): Three items were chosen from each of 
the three knowledge domains state, causes, and consequences such that at least one 
statement within each domain was incorrect.  
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Next, participants went through the total of 10 excerpts from the IPCC report. Each 
excerpt was presented on a separate page. Objective and subjective understanding and 
participants’ perceptions of each excerpt were assessed on the page following the 
respective excerpt, without the possibility to get back and re-read it. This was done to assess 
whether participants had understood the information enough to actually make use of it. 
Upon completion of all 10 excerpts, participants completed the regulatory focus 
questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002; results are not reported here), indicated 
their political climate action preferences, and were assessed for their post beliefs in the 
existence and anthropogenicity of CC, and their behavioral intentions to change behavior in 
an environmental-friendly manner, and to engage with climate science. Prior and post beliefs 
and behavioral intentions were assessed for two reasons. First, to ensure that reading the 
IPCC excerpts exerted any influence on participants at all, and second, to investigate 
whether subjective and objective understanding and overconfidence exert an influence 
above and beyond prior and post beliefs and behavioral intentions. Participants then 
indicated their demographics (age, sex, nationality, occupation, education).  
In a final step, we assessed participants’ willingness to contribute to mitigation with 
the lottery. Participants were then thanked and told to re-visit the webpage in two weeks time 
as then the winner (anonymised personal code) of the lottery would be announced.  
Results 
For the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study, see Table 2.  
Measures of overconfidence 
To measure overconfidence, we converted subjective understanding into a score 
ranging from 0 to 1 akin to objective understanding by dividing each participant’s mean by 6. 
Overconfidence was the signed difference between the subjective understanding score and 
the objective understanding score for each participant such that positive values denote 
overconfidence, and negative values denote underconfidence. To measure residual 
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confidence, we regressed subjective understanding on objective understanding, and 
retained the standardized residual for each participant. Subjective understanding was able to 
explain only 7% of the total variance of objective understanding, R2=.07.  
Table 2. Descriptives 
Variable N Scale 
range 
Min Max M SD 
Atmosfair 264 0-20 0 20 7.2 6.9 
Voucher 264 0-20 0 20 12.0 7.2 
Objective understanding 264 0-1 0.20 1 0.65 0.17 
Subjective understanding 263 0-1 0.17 1 0.77 0.14 
Overconfidence (residuals) 263 -∞/+∞ -4.4 2.0 0 1 
difficulty 264 1-6 1 6 3.3 1.1 
qualified 264 1-6 1 6 4.3 0.9 
convincing 264 1-6 1 6 4.2 1.0 
prior belief in CC (existence) 261 1-6 1 6 5.0 1.2 
post belief in CC (existence) 262 1-6 1 6 5.1 1.2 
prior belief in CC (anthropogenicity) 260 1-6 1 6 4.8 1.3 
post belief in CC (anthropogenicity) 262 1-6 1 6 5.0 1.3 
prior intention to engage in climate 
science information 
263 1-6 1 6 4.4 1.2 
post intention to engage in climate 
science information 
263 1-6 1 6 4.6 1.2 
prior intention to change behavior 
in a pro-environmental way 
264 1-6 1 6 4.5 1.3 
post intention to change behavior 
in a pro-environmental way 
263 1-6 1 6 4.7 1.3 
prior knowledge 264 0-54 20 50 35.6 4.6 
Note. Atmosfair=pro-environmental choice; Voucher=egoistic choice; difficulty=perceived 
difficulty of text; qualified=perceived qualification of authors; convincing=perceived 
persuasiveness of the text. 
 
We first controlled whether working through the IPCC excerpts exerted any influence 
on participants’ beliefs and intentions. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that, while 
belief in the existence of CC did not change after reading the IPCC text excerpts, F(1, 
17 
258)=0.91, p=.340, part. η2 =.00, belief in the anthropogenicity of CC, F(1, 258)=6.41, 
p=.012, part. η2 =.02, and behavioral intentions to engage with climate science information, 
F(1, 258)=9.10, p=.003, part. η2 =.03, and to change behavior in an environmental-friendly 
manner, F(1, 258)=9.52, p=.002, part. η2 =.04, increased slightly (see Table 2 for descriptive 
values). These results are in line with general findings that attribution skepticism (Is CC man-
made?) is more common than trend skepticism (Does CC exist?) (Leiserowitz, Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, Feinberg & Howe, 2013; cf. Rahmstorf, 2004). 
Objective understanding, subjective understanding, and overconfidence 
 
Figure 2. Left panel: Relation of objective and subjective understanding. The diagonal 
displays perfect calibration, values above the diagonal denote overconfidence, values below 
denote underconfidence. Right panel: Relation of subjective understanding and 
overconfidence.  
Figure 2 displays participants’ calibration compared to the ideal calibration of 
subjective understanding. Participants were generally overconfident about their 
understanding. The mean difference between subjective understanding scores (M=.78, 
SD=.14) and objective understanding scores (M=.65, SD=.17) was positive (M=.13, 
SD=.19), and significantly different from zero, t(262)=11.2, p >.001. In line with the Dunning-
Kruger effect, overconfidence increased as objective understanding decreased, r(263)=-.72, 
p <.001. The absolute degree of discrepancy between subjective and objective 
understanding (discrepancy = |subjective understanding score-objective understanding 
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score|) was higher for the n=200 overconfident participants (overconfidence >0, discrepancy 
M=.21,SD=.15) compared to the n=63 underconfident (overconfidence <0; discrepancy 
M=.09,SD=.09) participants, t(168.99)=6.5, p <.001. As opposed to objective understanding, 
subjective understanding was a strong positive predictor for overconfidence, r(261)=.61, p 
<.001 (Figure 2, right panel). 
Subjective and objective understanding were moderately correlated in the overall 
sample, r(262)=.22, p < .001. This relationship was strongly dependent on political 
orientation. Only for self-rated left-wing participants (<=3 on 6-point rating scale), objective 
and subjective understanding were significantly correlated, r(140)=.38, p < .001, whereas for 
self-rated right-wing participants (>=4 on 6-point rating scale), both measures were unrelated 
r(119)=.08, p=.36. In line with our theoretical arguments, however, increasing right-wing 
orientation was associated to lower objective understanding, r(262)=-.38, p < .001, while 
subjective understanding was unrelated to political attitude, resulting in a positive association 
between increasingly right-wing political orientation and overconfidence, r(263)=.33, p < 
.001. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency with which any given number of the 20 items was indicated as more 
certainly correct. 
To assess how participants’ subjective understanding was distributed on the level of 
individual items, we dichotomized the subjective understanding scale. Values above the 
scale’s midpoint (3) indicate being more certain, values below the midpoint indicate being 
19 
more uncertain. The frequencies of participants who indicated being more certain for any of 
the 20 statements are displayed in Figure 3. The figure demonstrates that the distribution 
has a strong negative skew such that that there are much more participants in the sample 
who indicate to be certain with most or all items than participants who indicate to be certain 
with only a small subset of items. 
Overconfidence and perceptions of the IPCC excerpts 
Higher residual confidence was related to perceiving the texts as more convincing, 
r(263)=.52, p < .001, and the authors as more qualified, r(263)=.53, p < .001. Objective 
understanding, in contrast, was unrelated to either perceived persuasiveness, r(262)=-.09, 
p=.13, or perceived qualification of the authors, r(262)=-.05, p=.46.  
Overconfidence as a predictor I: Is higher overconfidence associated to lower 
perception of CC as a serious problem?  
In our sample, 67% perceived CC as a serious and pressing problem (act-now), 24% 
perceived CC as a problem that can be addressed gradually (wait-and-see), and 7% state 
that no costly climate action should be taken until we are sure that CC really is a problem 
(go-slow). These frequencies roughly correspond to the numbers found in representative 
polls (Leiserowitz, Maibach & Roser-Renouf, 2009). Higher residual confidence in 
understanding the IPCC excerpts was associated to higher post-reading preferences for 
wait-and-see or go-slow policies controlling for prior beliefs in the anthropogenicity of CC, 
prior motivation to change behavior to act environmental-friendly, prior knowledge, 
perceptions of the excerpts, and political attitude; partial rank correlation rs(247)=.16, p=.01.  
Overconfidence as a predictor II: Is overconfidence linked to willingness to 
contribute to mitigation? 
Willingness to contribute to mitigation was operationalized as the share participants 
allocated to the pro-environmental option (Atmosfair) as opposed to the egoistic option 
(voucher). The modal allocation of shares was a fully egoistic one, with a 0$ donation to 
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Atmosfair and 20$ attributed to the voucher (25% of participants), followed by an even 
assignment of 10$ to each option (21%), a 5$-donation to Atmosfair (16%), a fully pro-
environmental allocation of shares (13%). 
Table 4a. Correlations between full list of predictors, part I 
 sex age Engl CC 
exists 
CC 
man 
info change know 
age .11 
.085 
       
Engl .06 
.314 
-.10 
.125 
      
CCexists .01 
.875 
-.23*** 
<.001 
.01 
.844 
     
CCman -.05 
.473 
-.23*** 
<.001 
-.00 
.985 
.72*** 
<.001 
    
info -.08 
.179 
-.18** 
.003 
-.03 
.663 
.51*** 
<.001 
.50*** 
<.001 
   
change -.10 
.096 
-.14* 
.024 
.01 
.869 
.48*** 
<.001 
.50*** 
<.001 
.71*** 
<.001 
  
know .02 
.712 
-.15* 
.018 
.11 
.085 
.58*** 
<.001 
.54*** 
<.001 
.35*** 
<.001 
.38*** 
<.001 
 
polit -.01 
.816 
-.07 
.293 
-.14* 
.021 
-.30*** 
<.001 
-.25** 
<.001 
-.00 
.966 
-.05 
.404 
-.33*** 
<.001 
qual -.08 
.217 
-.14* 
.028 
.06 
.340 
.38*** 
<.001 
.40*** 
<.001 
.32*** 
<.00 
.39*** 
<.001 
.29*** 
<.001 
conv -.08 
.226 
-.14* 
.027 
.06 
.302 
.36*** 
<.001 
.41*** 
<.001 
.39*** 
<.001 
.45*** 
<.001 
.32*** 
<.001 
diff -.01 
.934 
-.14* 
.027 
-.03 
.653 
-.01 
.827 
.08 
.159 
.04 
.481 
.04 
.534 
-.01 
.879 
OU -.01 
.847 
-.05 
.425 
.22*** 
<.001 
.31*** 
<.001 
.18** 
.003 
-.08 
.210 
.04 
.562 
.30*** 
<.001 
SU .01 
.941 
-.16** 
.008 
.15* 
.013 
.38*** 
<.001 
.30*** 
<.001 
.27*** 
<.001 
.35*** 
<.001 
.29*** 
<.001 
OCres .01 
<.001 
-.16* 
<.001 
-.11 
<.001 
.32*** 
<.001 
.27*** 
<.001 
.30*** 
<.001 
.35*** 
<.001 
.23*** 
<.001 
Note. N=259-264. Engl=English proficiency; CCexists=prior belief in the existence of climate 
change; CCman=prior belief in anthropogenicity of climate change; info=prior motivation to 
look for further information; change=prior motivation to change behavior; know=prior 
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knowledge on climate change; polit=political view (higher values indicate more right-wing 
orientations); qual=perceived qualification of authors; conv=perception of how convincing the 
text was; diff=perceived difficulty of text; OU=objective understanding; SU=subjective 
understanding; OCres=overconfidence (residuals). 
*p ≤ 05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001 
Table 4b.Correlations between full list of predictors, part II 
 polit qual conv diff OU SU 
qual .06 
.314 
     
conv .06 
.376 
.85*** 
<.001 
    
diff .17** 
.006 
.08 
.189 
.16** 
.010 
   
OU -.38*** 
<.001 
-.05 
.461 
-.09 
.129 
-.26*** 
<.001 
  
SU .02 
.747 
.53*** 
<.001 
.51*** 
<.001 
-.10 
.098 
.22*** 
<.001 
 
OCres .32*** 
<.001 
.55*** 
<.001 
.54*** 
<.001 
-.05 
.438 
.00 
1.00 
.98*** 
<.001 
Note. N=259-264. polit=political view (higher values indicate more right-wing orientations); 
qual=perceived qualification of authors; conv=perceived persuasiveness of the text; 
diff=perceived difficulty of text; OU=objective understanding; SU=subjective understanding; 
OCres=overconfidence (residuals). 
*p ≤ 05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .000 
 
Both the allocation to Atmosfair, and to the voucher served each as the dependent 
variable in separate multiple stepwise regression analyses on the list of predictors. The full 
list of predictors can be found in Tables 4a and 4b including all correlations between them. 
Subjective understanding was not included as a predictor since residual confidence was 
computed to reflect participants’ subjective confidence independent of actual understanding. 
The highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was found for the prior motivation for behavior 
change in a regression with the egoistic choice as dependent variable, but was well below 
10 (VIFchange=2.21), therefore, no problem with multicollinearity was assumed (cf. Chatterjee, 
Hadi & Price, 2000). 
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Higher allocation to Atmosfair was predicted by higher objective understanding 
beyond english proficiency, sex, age, and prior willingness to engage with climate science. 
Higher allocation to the voucher, in contrast, was predicted by lower objective understanding 
and higher levels of residual confidence beyond English proficiency, sex, age, and prior 
knowledge on CC (Table 5). 
Table 5. Stepwise regression analyses of egoistic and pro-environmental allocations on the 
list of predictors. 
  Egoistic allocation Pro-environmental allocation 
  B 
(SE) 
t p B 
(SE) 
t p 
Constant 8.37 
(1.35) 
6.20 <.001 
(***) 
11.49 
(1.25) 
9.23 <.001 
(***) 
English 1.90 
(0.43) 
4.41 <.001 
(***) 
-2.25 
(0.40) 
-5.67 <.001 
(***) 
Sex 2.29 
(0.83) 
2.74 .007 
(**) 
-2.75 
(0.77) 
-3.57 <.001 
(***) 
Age 1.01 
(0.42) 
2.39 .018 
(*) 
-0.96 
(0.39) 
-2.48 .014 
(*) 
information -1.19 
(0.44) 
-2.74 .007 
(**) 
- - - 
prior knowledge - - - 0.95 
(0.40) 
2.37 .019 
(*) 
Objective 
understanding 
-1.18 
(0.43) 
-2.73 .007 
(**) 
1.04 
(0.40) 
2.58 .011 
(*) 
Residual 
confidence 
0.8 
(0.43) 
2.02 .044 
(*) 
- - - 
Adj. R2 .15 .20 
Note. B=unstandardized regression coefficient; SE=standard error; English=English 
proficiency; information=prior motivation to look for further information; prior knowledge=prior 
knowledge on climate change; Adj. R2=adjusted R2. All continuous predictors were z-
standardized prior to analysis, therefore, standardized regression coefficients are not 
reported. 
*p ≤ 05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001 
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Discussion 
The present study shows that on average, people overestimate their levels of 
understanding of climate change information. The discrepancy between objective and 
subjective understanding increases as actual understanding decreases, whereas people 
who objectively understand more are better-calibrated, or even underconfident. The average 
difference between subjective confidence and objective understanding scores was positive 
and different from zero, and participants who were confident about their understanding 
tended to indicate their certainty for most or all items, not only for a subset. In other words, 
participants’ subjective estimates of their understanding tended to be both positively biased 
towards an overconfidence in understanding, and systematically biased as a function of 
understanding.  
Differential effects of subjective and objective measures of understanding have only 
rarely been systematically analyzed in one study (for an exception, see Stoutenborough and 
Vedlitz, 2014), and in particular, the unique effect of overconfidence has not been addressed 
at all. The present results can help explain the previously contradictory results of some 
studies finding positive, negative, or mixed effects of understanding on CC concern and 
action. As suggested in our theoretical arguments, and in line with the Dunning-Kruger 
effect, a negative correlation between subjective understanding and willingness to act cannot 
per se be interpreted as a detrimental backfiring of higher understanding on action. 
Subjective understanding can be negatively associated even though actual understanding is 
positively associated because of the systematic miscalibration of subjective understanding 
as a function of actual understanding. Subjective understanding is not tantamount to 
understanding. 
Furthermore, the systematic miscalibration of subjective measures of understanding 
CC may at least partially explain why self-reported understanding is positively associated 
with actual understanding and concern for some groups of participants, but unrelated or 
negatively so for others (for example, those with a left- as opposed to right-wing political 
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orientation; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). When objective 
understanding of CC varies between groups, relative overconfidence should be higher for 
the group with lower understanding, and hence the relationship between subjective 
understanding and the outcome of interest would appear non-existent or even negative.  
Besides its systematic bias, our results also reveal that subjective understanding is 
not a particularly strong predictor of objective understanding. In fact, only 7% of the total 
variance of objective understanding was explained by subjective understanding. Taken 
together, the present results suggest that people have only very limited access to a realistic 
estimation of their level of understanding of CC, and may be particularly convinced of the 
accuracy of their understanding when it is low.   
The systematic difference between subjective and objective understanding, and 
particularly overconfidence, may be an important predictor of cognitive and behavioral 
outcome variables relevant for the climate change debate. It has been shown that people 
who are too sure of their understanding of a risky situation tend to understate its risks 
(Broihanne, Merli & Roger, 2014), and do not take precautions against them (Silver, 2012).  
In the present study, higher residual confidence in one’s understanding--the degree 
of variation that cannot be accounted for by actual understanding--was associated to a 
reduced perception of climate change as a risky problem, and lower support for costly 
political action. This held while controlling for political orientation, prior climate-related beliefs 
and behavioral intentions, and prior knowledge. Higher residual confidence was also 
positively associated to a lower willingness to contribute to mitigation as assessed with the 
lottery: Participants allocated higher shares to the egoistic option (cinema or amazon 
voucher) when they had objectively understood less and showed more unjustified 
confidence in their understanding. That is, participants who were too certain of their 
understanding of CC tended to choose egoistic rewards over investments into precautionary 
measures (mitigation). The result that both lower understanding and higher residual 
confidence served as independent predictors in one and the same regression equation 
suggests that it is not as much a lack of understanding of CC that predicts whether someone 
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is unwilling to contribute to mitigation. Much rather, it is a lack of understanding coupled with 
being too sure of one’s understanding. To adequately respond to climate change, we do not 
only need to understand more, we also seem to need an awareness of the limits of our 
understanding. 
Implications for climate communication 
It seems crucial to note that--as a cognitive variable--overconfidence constitutes a 
potential point of leverage. While other established predictors of CC concern and action such 
as sex, age, education, and political attitude are hardly subject to change, overconfidence 
may be malleable. The present results therefore bear important implications for the 
communication of climate science. With higher degrees of overconfidence, people may tend 
to selectively process climate information in favor of their prior beliefs (cf. Innocenti, Rufa & 
Semmoloni, 2010), may generally seek less--especially conflicting--information (Zacharakis 
& Shepherd, 2001), and may tend to focus on information in support of their prior beliefs 
(Berner & Graber, 2008). 
Overconfidence can thus further exacerbate ongoing polarization of public opinion on 
climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Albeit it is difficult to reduce unjustified 
confidence, it has been successfully accomplished in the past. Successful methods include, 
for example, counter-argumentation (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992), and, as our results and a 
substantial amount of other research on the negative relationship between knowledge and 
overconfidence suggests (Dunning, 2011; Schlösser, Dunning, Johnson & Kruger, 2013; 
Simons, 2013), increasing actual understanding. Higher actual understanding appears to 
protect us from excessive overconfidence in our understanding. An adequate estimation of 
what one does not understand already requires substantial understanding. 
It was found that, counterintuitively, more information can backfire in that, for 
example, uncertainty about possible outcomes increases (Moore, Tenney, Haran, 2015; 
Peterson & Pitz, 1988). Taking the phenomenon of overconfidence into account, an 
alternative explanation may include that more information can help people construct 
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coherent explanations, so that confidence may increase more quickly than accuracy. What 
backfires, then, is not the information: it is the possibility to construct stories in line with prior 
beliefs that ultimately strengthen overconfidence in those beliefs (“I knew it all along”). 
Hence, rather than simply providing the public with more information, information needs to 
be presented in a way that facilitates true (not subjective) understanding. 
Is overconfidence always bad? 
As already discussed in the introduction, it is typically found that overconfidence 
endows both advantages and disadvantages (e.g. Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Johnson & 
Tierney, 2011). In our case, overconfidence turns out to be a double-edged sword as it is 
also associated to finding excerpts more convincing.  
Subjective feelings of understanding have been shown to exert positive effects on the 
judged persuasiveness of texts and qualification of authors, not only in previous research 
(Kahneman, 2011) but also in our own findings (in which participants seem to use their 
subjective understanding as a proxy for its quality). One possible explanation for these 
findings is that subjective understanding of a text may be used as a proxy for how valid the 
argumentation is (cf. Amelung, Fischer, Kruse & Sauerborn, forthcoming).  
This is especially noteworthy if one assumes that a higher subjective understanding 
is the result of higher processing ease (lower difficulty with which the presented information 
is processed), because it has been shown that lower processing ease corrupts attempts to 
debias overconfidence: if, for example, people are asked to find arguments counter to their 
current position (counter-argumentation), but these arguments do not come to mind easily 
(lower processing fluency), overconfidence is not likely to be reduced (Schwarz, Sanna, 
Skurnik & Yoon, 2007). 
This may imply that texts which are very difficult to read such as the IPCC texts 
(Barkemeyer, Dessai, Monge-Sanz, Renzi & Napolitano, 2016), and thus reduce processing 
fluency, are exceptionally unsuited to debias overconfidence in prior beliefs about CC. 
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This also further underlines the importance of improving the readability of climate 
information to address issues of low processing ease as well as low actual understanding, 
given that in our study, only real understanding (as opposed to subjective feelings of 
understanding) was predictive of actual behavior.  
Further research could also reveal potential benefits of overconfidence in the domain 
of climate change. For example, overconfidence in the likelihood of future success or future 
rewards could diminish temporal discounting (Shapira-Ettinger & Shapira, 2008), and thus 
improve the acceptance of immediate small losses in order to achieve a long-term gain, a 
dilemma often posed by efforts to achieve more sustainability (Ascher, 2006).  
Implications for studying the effects of climate change understanding 
Results underline the importance of using subjective and objective measures of 
understanding in the same study. This is because not only both measures, but also their 
difference can independently predict different outcomes, such as persuasiveness of IPCC 
texts, or pro-environmental as opposed to egoistic allocations of a limited resource. The 
difference between subjective and objective understanding may prove an independent 
predictor in areas where systematic miscalibration can prevail due to high degrees of 
uncertainty, the possibility of unknown unknowns, or where subjectively unpleasant 
information predisposes for selective information processing.  
Conclusion 
The present results offer a new answer to an age-old problem, the relationship 
between understanding and action (Arbuthnot, 1977; Bord, O’Connor & Fisher, 2000). 
Willingness to contribute to CC mitigation is not only a question of subjective and objective 
understanding. It is also question of the difference between the two. 
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Supplement A. IPCC text excerpts with their respective objective understanding test 
statements 
 
Page 
no. 
IPCC text excerpt True/False statements  % of right answers 
2 Human influence on 
the climate system is 
clear, and recent 
anthropogenic 
emissions of green-
house gases are the 
highest in history. 
Recent climate 
changes have had 
widespread impacts on 
human and natural 
systems. 
Recent climate changes 
have affected natural 
systems more than 
human systems. (false) 
59 % 
  
Recent natural emissions 
of greenhouse gases are 
the highest in history. 
(false) 
18 % 
2 Warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, 
and since the 1950s, 
many of the observed 
changes are 
unprecedented over 
decades to millennia. 
The atmosphere and 
ocean have warmed, 
the amounts of snow 
and ice have 
diminished, and sea 
level has risen. 
We have less snow and 
lower sea-levels than 
ever before. (false) 
·      58 % 
  
Warming of the climate 
since the 1950s is 
disputed. (false) 
  
·      67 % 
  
7 Changes in many 
extreme weather and 
climate events have 
been observed since 
about 1950. Some of 
these changes have 
been linked to human 
influences, including a 
decrease in cold 
temperature extremes, 
an increase in warm 
temperature extremes, 
an increase in extreme 
high sea levels and an 
increase in the number 
of heavy precipitation 
events in a number of 
regions. 
 Since about 1950, we 
experience less cold 
weather. (true) 
·      68 % 
  
Since about 1950, we 
experience less rainfall. 
(false) 
  
·      69 % 
  
13 Climate change will 
amplify existing risks 
The risks will be 
comparable for all 
·      57 % 
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and create new risks 
for natural and human 
systems. Risks are 
unevenly distributed 
and are generally 
greater for 
disadvantaged people 
and communities in 
countries at all levels of 
development. 
countries at all levels of 
development. (false) 
Climate change will 
increase existing risks. 
(true) 
·      94 % 
17 Without additional 
mitigation efforts 
beyond those in place 
today, and even with 
adaptation, warming by 
the end of the 21st 
century will lead to high 
to very high risk of 
severe, widespread 
and irreversible 
impacts globally (high 
confidence). Mitigation 
involves some level of 
co-benefits and of risks 
due to adverse side 
effects, but these risks 
do not involve the 
same possibility of 
severe, widespread 
and irreversible 
impacts as risks from 
climate change, 
increasing the benefits 
from near-term 
mitigation efforts. 
Mitigation also involves 
risks. (true) 
·      90 % 
  
The risks of mitigation are 
lower than the risks of 
climate change. (true) 
  
·     75 % 
  
17 Adaptation and 
mitigation are 
complementary 
strategies for reducing 
and managing the risks 
of climate change. 
Substantial emissions 
reductions over the 
next few decades can 
reduce climate risks in 
the 21st century and 
beyond, increase 
prospects for effective 
adaptation, reduce the 
costs and challenges of 
mitigation in the longer 
term and contribute to 
Mitigation and adaptation 
strategies are difficult to 
combine. (false) 
·      73 % 
  
Mitigation supports 
sustainable development. 
(true) 
  
·       80 % 
  
41 
climate-resilient 
pathways for 
sustainable 
development. 
17 Effective decision-
making to limit climate 
change and its effects 
can be informed by a 
wide range of analytical 
approaches for 
evaluating expected 
risks and benefits, 
recognizing the 
importance of 
governance, ethical 
dimensions, equity, 
value judgments, 
economic assessments 
and diverse 
perceptions and 
responses to risk and 
uncertainty. 
It is adaptation that 
should include the 
aspects of governance, 
equity, value judgments 
and economic 
assessments. (false) 
·      32 % 
  
Decisions on climate 
change should only be 
based on risks and 
benefits. (false) 
·      58 % 
19 Adaptation can reduce 
the risks of climate 
change impacts, but 
there are limits to its 
effectiveness, 
especially with greater 
magnitudes and rates 
of climate change. 
Taking a longer-term 
perspective, in the 
context of sustainable 
development, 
increases the likelihood 
that more immediate 
adaptation actions will 
also enhance future 
options and 
preparedness. 
Adaptation is a useful 
strategy in the context of 
climate change. (true) 
  
·      85 % 
  
There is no limit to the 
usefulness of adaptation. 
(false) 
  
·      66 % 
  
29 Effective adaptation 
and mitigation 
responses will depend 
on policies and 
measures across 
multiple scales: 
international, regional, 
national and sub-
national. Policies 
across all scales 
supporting technology 
International policies that 
promote adaptation and 
mitigation will be most 
effective in combating 
climate change. (false) 
·      35 % 
  
Technological responses 
to climate change are 
effective. (true) 
·      73 % 
42 
development, diffusion 
and transfer, as well as 
finance for responses 
to climate change, can 
complement and 
enhance the 
effectiveness of 
policies that directly 
promote adaptation 
and mitigation. 
31 Climate change is a 
threat to sustainable 
development. 
Nonetheless, there are 
many opportunities to 
link mitigation, 
adaptation and the 
pursuit of other societal 
objectives through 
integrated responses 
(high confidence). 
Successful 
implementation relies 
on relevant tools, 
suitable governance 
structures and 
enhanced capacity to 
respond (medium 
confidence). 
It is useful to combine 
different options to 
enhance sustainable 
development. (true) 
·      86 % 
  
Our capacity to respond 
is sufficient. (false) 
  
·      62 % 
  
 
